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Abstract
Emotional Intelligence as a Mediating Variable
in Astin's I-E-O Model of Higher Education

The statistical results of this study detected a tendency for undergraduates
who know how to understand and manage emotions to have higher GPAs. Yet the
instructional target in higher education has always and traditionally been the cognitive
domain. This is an embedded tradition, tracing a long line back to Plato, the
Aristotelian model of 'intellect/ and the Cartesian 'self' defined as a cognitive knower.
Almost forty years ago, a group of educators from the University of Chicago recognized
this as a problem. "Basically the question posed," they wrote, "...is whether a human
being ever does thinking without feeling" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 7).
One way to probe this problem is with the test construct of 'emotional intelligence'
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
An on-line instrument, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-IntelligenceTest, Version 2 (the MSCEIT, V.2), was designed to allow emotions to participate in
thinking (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49) and then measure the results. This
study used the MSCEIT, V.2 to test an undergraduate sample of academic high
achievers at a nationally top-ranked university with high admission standards. Female
participants in this study tended to score significantly higher than males on the
MSCEIT, V.2 construct of Understanding and Managing Emotions, but only male
participants in this study's focus group self-reported applying emotional intelligence to
higher learning.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Future research is needed to understand this gender difference, identify
components of 'achievement' and track achievement behaviors of emotionally
intelligent undergraduates who are high achievers. The results of this study suggest
that emotional intelligence may be a neglected learning resource.

Betsy Ross Edison, Ph.D.
Education Policy, Planning and Leadership (EPPL)
Graduate School of Education
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
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Chapter One
Statement of the Problem

"Basically the question posed...is whether a human being
ever does thinking without feeling"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 7)

The Problem
The problem is the continuing historical separation of the cognitive and
affective domains in higher education.

Introduction to the Problem
The instructional target in higher education has always and traditionally
been the cognitive domain (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946; Day and Kingsley, 1828
in Conrad and Haworth, 1990; James, 1890; Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill and
Krathwohl, 1956; Rudolph, 1962/1990; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Wolff, 1969;
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Petry, Mouton and
Reigeluth, 1987; Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering
and Reisser, 1993; Solomon, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Kerr, 1963/1995; Terenzini, 1997;
Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Caruso and Salovey,
2000a). Almost forty years ago, a group of educators formally recognized this as a
problem (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
The problem, posed by a committee of professors at the University of
Chicago and published in 1964, basically asks: Is the academic exclusion of the affective
domain an instructional mistake? (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). This question
has languised for decades because it is going upstream, against historical precedent.
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The intellectual development of the cognitive domain is being discussed in
Plato's Republic—as an educational objective (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946)—not
for masses of undergraduates but for the well-being of "the liberal state which is
founded on law and universal education and dedicated to the achievement of
knowledge and virtue by its citizens"(Buchanan in Jowett, 1946, pp. 8-9). The
educational objective was also a political objective, of great importance to the state.
'"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master' and to endure anything, rather than
think as they do..." Plato said about irrational people who live in caves and refuse to
learn how to reason (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 251).
Plato was using a devastating teaching metaphor that placed the self
defensive emotions of non-rational thinking in a dark and lower domain of ignorance
and danger (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946) where they have epistemologically
remained (Solomon, 1993; Mayer and Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Caruso and Salovey,
2000a) ever since.
One century after Plato, his follower Aristotle is describing extremes of
emotion as "vice and wickedness" whose bad influence can cause even wisdom to be
used unwisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173). In the Eudemian Ethics.
Aristotle advises his students to "...be aware as little as possible of the non-rational"
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 46).
Aristotle's definitions are part of the historical problem. The historical
problem is that ancient definitions of emotion as a threat to cognitive development
(Solomon, 1993; Salovey and Mayer, 1990) are embedded in the curriculum of early
American higher education (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Throughout the 17th, 18th and
early- to mid-19th centuries in America, a college education required reading Plato and
Aristotle in the original Greek (Rudolph, 1962/1990). It was Aristotle who wrote that
"...desire does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it overpowers rational
wish and moves to action; at other times the latter, rational wish, overpowers the
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former, desire" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Dennett, 1993, p. 70). Aristotle and Plato thus
laid the ancient trenches for the academic battlefield that was imported to colonial
America and exists today, where emotional development as an educational objective is
excluded from the academic classroom as an opposing force to the development of
intellect—as it was in Plato's day (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946).
Contemporary thinkers may inherit this historical precedent that
"...emotion as such is...more primitive, less intelligent...and more dangerous than
reason, and thus needs to be controlled by reason..." (Solomon, 1993, p. 3).
Contemporary thinkers may have "...a sense that...when affect plays a role in their
decision processes, such influences are seen to be disruptive and tend to make their
decisions 'irrational' and less appropriate" (Isen, 1993, p. 261).
It should therefore not be surprising that the contemporary university
has been defined as a city of intellect (Kerr, 1963/1995). This definition echoes a 19thcentury desire that the university be a walled fortress that "...maps out the territory of
the intellect...and sees that...there is neither encroachment nor surrender on any side"
(Newman in Kerr, 1963/1995, p. 2).

The Affective Domain Since 1964
Since 1964 the educational problem of domain separation identified by
Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, has been addressed by 'student development'
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991;
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991), and updated by recent research findings
in neuropsychology and neurophysiology (Damasio, 1994,1999) and a research concept
called 'emotional intelligence' (Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000a, 2000b). To date, however, the domains of cognition and affect remain separated
in the academic development of intellect.
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Even after visionary educators in the 1970s won an academic place in
American colleges and universities for the affective domain with 'student development/
taxonomies of educational objectives place affective development in the residence halls
and campus social interaction (Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini,
1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Cardinal Newman's
fortress of intellect has not surrendered. The Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia question of
1964 is still academically unanswered.
This unanswered question may also be an educational outcomes
problem. The academic exclusion of emotion from cognitive development in the
classroom may be making subtle, negative inroads into the desired outcomes of the
undergraduate college experience (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Wolff, 1969;
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Bandura, 1997; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Ormrod, 1995; Ifert and
Roloff, 1997; Guerrero and Miller, 1998; Levine and Cureton, 1998; Los Angeles Times,
1999; Counseling Services, 2002). Undesired and unintended outcomes of the
undergraduate experience are documented year after year and include, for example,
prolonged time-to-degree-completion and a phenomenon called stopping-out
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Other unintended outcomes of the college years are
affective or stress-related, as reported by students to counselling services (Counseling
Services, 2002; Los Angeles Times, 1999) and listed in books and journals by educational
psychologists (Levine and Cureton, 1998; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993)—all
duly reporting but not suggesting how to mediate the persistent unintended outcomes
of higher education.
Reported undesired outcomes of the undergraduate experience today
(Counseling Services, 2002; Levine and Cureton, 1998; Chickering and Reisser, 1993;
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
1977/1983,1993) include statistics on gender-specific stress (Counseling Services, 2002;
Los Angeles Times, 1999), flunking out, dropping out, stopping out, chronic
oversleeping, cutting classes, prolonged procrastination, chronic binge drinking, eating
disorders, insomnia, self-isolation in the dorms, verbal aggression in class, mood
swings, chronic headaches, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, interpersonal peer
problems, body image distorton, suicide attempts, the escapism of 'undergraduate
hedonism' recently described by Chickering (Chickering and Reisser, 1993), but
undergraduate behaviors have also been historically reported (Rudolph, 1962/1990) as
outright student rebellions and extreme disciplinary problems including assault and
battery that permeate the history of early American higher education (Rudolph,
1962/1990; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Some of the reported undesired outcomes
today and "traditional" undergraduate misbehaviors in the historical past may be
symptomatic of the research problem being probed here: the isolation of affective
development from the traditional instructional target, the cognitive domain.
For the 1,250 students who requested ongoing therapy at a top-ranked
U.S. university during 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, the top three reported affective
problems were depression, anxiety and low self-esteem (see Appendix A) (Counseling
Services, 2002). Of the 597 students requesting ongoing therapy during the academic
year 1999-2000,72.5% were female; 19% were graduate students, 80% were
undergraduates. During the academic year 1999-2000, a pattern of increasing use of
counseling services per class year is shown: 7.5% of freshmen requested therapy,
compared to 16.1% sophomores, 22.8% juniors, 28.8% seniors; this may indicate a
cumulative negative impact of the college experience on undergraduates (Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Counseling Services, 2002) during the four-year undergraduate
experience.
In fact, a large "....body of research offers few opportunities for claims of
significant benefits of college attendance in students' self-systems: their sense of
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personal identity, their ego functioning, and their self-evaluation" (Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991, p. 208). The low impact of college on these affective outcomes—
identify, ego formation and self-esteem—may be reflected in statistics from one of the
leading universities in the United States during the academic year 1999-2000: of the 597
students requesting ongoing therapy that year, 1.7 % reported self-mutilation
behaviors, 3.2% were suicidal, 7.0% reported body image distortion behaviors, 2.7%
reported anger control problems, 14.9% reported difficulty expressing affect, 12.7%
reported sleep problems, 34.5% reported interpersonal peer problems, 43.4% reported
low self-esteem, 57.1% reported anxiety, and 56.3% reported depression (Counseling
Services, 2002).
During the academic year 2000-2001 at the same university, 653 students
requested ongoing therapy, with 70.4% being female, 17.8% graduate students, and
82% undergraduates: of these 653 students, there is a pattern of increasing use of
counseling services per class year during the four-year undergraduate period, with
8.6% being freshmen, 14.2% sophomores, 21.7% juniors, 33.8% seniors (Counseling
Services, 2002). During 2000-2001,1.8% reported self-mutilation behaviors, 3.7% were
suicidal, 6.4% reported body image distortion behaviors, 3.2% reported anger control
problems, 6.0% reported difficulty expressing affect, 11.8% reported sleep problems,
23.7% reported interpersonal peer problems, 34.6% reported low self-esteem, 41.0%
reported anxiety, and 46.1% reported depression (Counseling Services, 2002).
What can account for the annual reporting (Counseling Services, 2002;
Levine and Cureton, 1998; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991;
Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Los Angeles Times,
1999) of such statistics from the affective domain? What is the role of the college
experience itself in relation to these statistics? What is the impact of low self-esteem,
depression and anxiety on achievement efforts and outcomes?
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With research indicating that college has a measurably low to moderate
impact on development of self-systems (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, pp. 168-209), the
question becomes why the college experience is not more involved in mediating these
persistent and undesired outcomes.
"First, and particularly in the areas of identity formation and ego
development, these are relatively new fields of inquiry, and theoretical foundations are
still being laid and explored....Methodological constraints in the literature as a whole
constitute a second reason (for the research findings)...that it may be unrealistic to
expect the college experience to have an effect much greater than that revealed by the
available research. Self-systems are complex, poorly understood, and generally
believed to reach deeply into an individual's being. As such, they are not likely to be
easily touched, changed, or measured....If this is so, then we ought not to be too
surprised by the apparently modest effects of college in these areas" (Pascarella and
terenzini, 1991, pp. 208-209).
Since 1991 when the available research methodology showed a low
impact of college on development of self-systems (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, pp.
168-209), the research concept of emotional intelligence has emerged as a new
methodology (Mayer and Salovey, 1997) for testing affective development. The self
systems of undergraduates may be more measureable today than in previous decades,
but the central affective problem remains unaddressed and unmeasured. The problem
is the continuing isolation of affective development from the mainstram of intellectual
activity that is the focus of the undergradute experience in the classroom. The effects
of college on self-esteem, self-concept and identity formation "...appear to be more
indirect than direct, being mediated largely by the academic and social interactions
students have with one another and with faculty members" (Pascarella and Terenzini,
1991, p. 209). But this is just the problem.
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The problem is how to design new teaching and learning strategies, or
how to upgrade existing teaching and learning strategies, to be academically inclusive
of the affective domain, based on current research showing the role of emotion in
cognitive achievement (Bandura, 1997; Schutte, et al., 1997; Francis, et al., 1997; Salovey
and Mayer, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a; Damasio, 1994,1999) and the
taxonomies of educational objectives for each domains that exist today (Bloom, et al.,
1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1970 in
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993;
Terenzini, 1997).
The problem of the affective domain, however, is not a simple problem.
It is deeply rooted in the traditions of higher education, tracing a history back to the socalled Oxbridge model (Kerr, 1963/1995; Rudolph, 1962/1990) of higher education,
which in England was first fashioned in the 13th century at Oxford.

Undergraduates Seeking Emotion
Twentieth-century undergraduates, not unlike their medieval
predecessors, were recently described in this way: "Students come to college loaded
with emotional baggage. In varying degrees, they come with...self-doubts, old
resentments, unmet needs...(and) must face the anxieties of new instructors, new
subjects, new challenges. For some, excessive anger, anxiety, or depression become
overwhelming. Many struggle with frustration, fear, boredom, or desire, without ever
exploring the sources of these feelings or learning how to shift out of them. Others
suppress their feelings and divert attention to what others want...." (Chickering and
Reisser, 1993, p. 83).

As the following paragraphs show, the affective domain has

historically been a problem area, and undergraduates across the ages have sought to
make its excluded presence known in the college experience.
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The first colleges at Oxford were small "self-governing religious
foundations" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 428) patterned after the older European
universities' ecclesiastical curriculum for the education of priests (Rudolph, 1962/1990;
Kerr, 1963/1995; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Residential life placed students "in
close quarters with authorities deeply concerned about their students' moral character"
and behavior (Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 428).
As history suggests (Rudolph, 1962/1990), the medieval educational
objectives of cognitive control and exclusion of emotion, as anciently advised by Plato
and Aristotle, became a problem.
"The prototype (in 13th-century Oxford), Merton College, had sixteen
names on its admissions rolls in 1285 and twelve books, including Aquinas, Aristotle,
Augustine, the Book of Job, and 'Half the psalter, glossed'... Scholars devoted to the
study of letters, or Arts and Philosophy, the Canons, or Theology were to obey the
Warden—a man of circumspection in spiritual and temporal affairs. They were to dress
as nearly alike as possible and dine in silence at their common table while listening to a
reader. When in their chambers, they were expected to speak in Latin and live meekly
in fellowship, without burdening each other, but sharing all things fairly" (Chickering
and Reisser, 1993, p. 428).
Later in 1636 "the jumbled mass of rules and statutes" governing student
behavior was gathered by the Oxford University chancellor, William Laud, into one
code, called Laud's Code, which included the barring of students from idling about,
from going anywhere where wine was sold....(from being) stage players (students
being actors in plays), rope dancers, or fencers (who if caught so doing) were to be
confined to their rooms, and under no condition was football to be played" (Chickering
and Reisser, 1993, p. 429). In America, Harvard College adopted similar codes of
conduct from the colleges at Cambridge which directed students to read the scriptures
two times per day, to publicly repeat sermons whenever called upon to do so, to honor

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
their parents, elders and tutors by being silent in their presence, to spend their time
studying and praying, and to never speak in oaths, lies and uncertain rumors as well as
avoiding all idle, foolish scoffing, frothy and wanton words and offensive gestures
(Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 430).
The 13th-century Merton College students, however, studied to be priests
"while acting like adolescents" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993, p. 428). They went into
town dressed in fur-trimmed gowns, argued heatedly in public places
about the number of angels on the tip of a pin, did arithmetic using Roman numerals,
and legend has it that the undergraduate mortarboard (worn ever since at college
graduations) was devised at Merton when "students stuffed their writing slates into
their knit caps, freeing their hands to defend themselves from hostile townspeople"
(Chickering and Reiser, 1993, p. 428). A fuller account of the student-priests'
misbehavior at Merton College was written by a surprised visitor to the college in 1507.
He listed various student misconduct such as "Stokysley baptized a cat and practiced
witchcraft; Gregory climbed the gate at the tower and brought a Stranger into College;
Pots and cups are seldom washed and are kept in such a dirty state that one sometimes
shudders to drink out of them; Gunne has had cooked eggs at the Taberd (Tavern) in
the middle of the night; Kyftyll played cards with the butler at Christmas time for
money...and Smith stole and killed a calf in the garden of one master..." (Chickering
and Reisser, 1993, p. 429).
From the story this history tells, the medieval moral behavior codes and
the college authorities were apparently being challenged. Were the students having an
identity crisis (Erikson and Loevinger in Santrock, 1997; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991)?
In later centuries, college authorites still lived with the students in the
same building in which they taught them, for example, at 18th-century William and
Mary College in Virginia. For some 200 years, William and Mary College held classes
and housed sudents and professors in one big brick building, horn which big building

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11
the wealthy and elite 18th-century college boys would slip away at night to meet the
town's apprentice boys for a brawling fight (Rudolph, 1962/1990).
Thus the classical European curriculum with its strict behavioral codes and
misbehaviors, brought to medieval England from Paris and Bologna, and later to
colonial America, presented, apparently from the start, an opportunity for identityseeking undergraduates to wrest emotional autonomy from in loco parentis authorities,
and be rebellious in the affective domain. Yet excluding emotion and teaching to the
cognitive domain continued to dominate 18th-century, 19th-century, and 20th-century
higher education in America—although there were some notable exceptions. In the 17th
century the English philosopher, Francis Bacon, complained that in higher education
there was "...a kind of adoration of the mind...by means whereof men have withdrawn
themselves too much...and have tumbled up and down in their own reason and
conceits" (Bacon in Kerr, 1963/1995, p.2).
Francis Bacon may have perceived the steady devolution of the ancient,
idealistic and elevated cognitive objectives of higher education, objectives paved with
the philosophical abstractions for which Cardinal Newman must have been yearning
when he wrote that the outcomes of a college education should be gentlemen with "...a
cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and
courteous bearing in the conduct of life" (Newman in Levine, 1978, p. 255). But by the
mid-19th century in America, before Newman's The Idea of a University saw print in
1873 (Levine, 1978), blatant student disobedience on elite American campuses (Rudolph,
1962/1990) was perhaps proving Bacon's point.
Disobedience occurred as student rebellions, "...a concerted strike of a
majority of the undergraduates, protesting against some real or imagined wrong,
threatening to withdraw from the college and to abandon it to the uncertainties of
enrollment and finance that were bound to follow" (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 97).
For example, at Princeton University, there were six rebellions between 1800 and 1830

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
whose "true cause" Princeton President Ashbel Green said was undergraduate
"hostility...to the whole system...of diligent study, of guarded moral conduct, and of
reasonable attention to religious duty" (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 106). Other than at
Princeton, undergraduate students staged rebellions from 1800 to 1875 at Harvard,
Yale, Dartmouth, Amherst, Brown, Williams, Georgetown, the University of South
Carolina, Bowdoin, Lafayette, the University of North Carolina, City College of New
York, Dickinson, DePauw—rebellions based in the residence dorms which "documented
the failure of the colleges to provide altogether suitable 'rites of adolescence/ (and)
satisfactory outlets for quite normal animal energy and human imagination" (Rudolph,
1962/1990, p. 98).
Other forms of undergraduate misbehaviors in the 19th century are welldocumented (Rudolph, 1962/1990), from the comical (taking a professor's turkey)
(Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 106) to the criminal (stabbings of fellow students, even death in
a duel over which student got the platter of trout at dinner), and there is even the
report of a student stoning the president and a professor at the University of Georgia
(Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 97).
In addition to the blatant disobedience of student rebellions and other
misbehaviors, outspoken student demands for an extra-curriculum (of debate d ubs for
the reading of literature and other subjects exduded from the dassical Greek and Latinbased curriculum) were also negating Newman's desired educational outcomes of
courteous gentlemen with dispassionate minds (Levine, 1978, p. 253). Newman's 19thcentury idealism when seen in the light of the extreme student disobedience and
misbehaviors of the same era, however, remains useful for a reassessment of the
"satisfactory" development of the affective as well as the cognitive domain in the
college experience of today.
Were the widespread student uprisings, and extremes of misbehaviors, on
19th-century college campuses evidence of the undergraduate need to seek and express
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emotion? "One tradition in Western thought has viewed emotions as disorganized
interruptions of mental activity" (Salovey and Meyer, 1990, p. 185). "A second tradition
views emotion as an organizing response...primary motivating forces...processes which
'arouse, sustain, and direct activity.' The full expression of emotions seems to be a
primary hum an motive" (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, p. 186).
Student misbehaviors, demands and disobedience, then, were perhaps
really, as Rudolph suggests (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 98), a way to express emotions and
negate the old medieval-based Idea of a University (Newman, 1873 in Levine, 1978;
Kerr, 1963/1995) as a walled fortress of intellect that was more or less imprisoning the
19th-century undergraduate in an unhappy, cheerless place (as some letters home
described) (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Undergraduates may need to express emotion
because undergraduates are developmentally driven to do so (Erikson and Loevinger,
in Santrock, 1997). Undergraduate disobedience may be only a natural eruption of the
late-adolescent developmental drive to establish autonomy, self-concept and a young
adult identity (Chickering and Reisser, 1993).
In fact the historical misbehaviors of undergraduates have been called
"youthful rites of passage" (Rudolph, 1962/1990, p. 98) and developmental vectors in
the affective domain—Establishing Autonomy and Identity—(Chickering and Reisser,
1993; Chickering in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) that are included in contemporary
taxonomies of educational objectives under 'psychosocial' development (Terenzini,
1997; Astin, 1977,1993).
The Taxonomies
Existing taxonomies of educational ojectives (Terenzini, 1997; Astin,
1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Astin,
1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) built on the suggestions of Bloom's Taxonomy
for the two domains (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) of affect
versus cognition. Taxonomies today do provide for the development of the affective
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domain, but as a separate 'psychosocial' domain which remains historically isolated in
the residence halls and campus social interaction, and thereby remains historically
separated from the development of intellect (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946).
When Handbook II. Affective Domain was finally published, the authors
explained with much academic breastbeating and an eloquent mea culpa (Krathwohl, et
al., 1964, pp. 12-13) that the committee of professors at the University of Chicago had
reluctantly decided to go ahead and define a taxonomy of educational objectives for the
affective domain (Krathwohl, et al., 1964, p. 7).
Krathwohl blamed the delay on his committee's prolonged period of
collective doubt and intellectual confusion as they wrestled with the questions of 1)
whether they should and 2) how they could identify (as promised in Handbook I. The
Cognitive Domain) specific educational objectives in the affective domain to be
addressed in the classroom (Krathwohl, et al., 1964). In the end, it was educators who
convinced Krathwohl and his colleagues "by the many letters we received from
teachers, specialists in measurement and evaluation, and educational research workers,
asking when the second Handbook would be published" (Krathwohl, et al., 1964, p. 13)
to go ahead and publish Handbook II. The committee's eventual decision was
grounded in their conviction that, "Basically the question posed...is whether a human
being ever does thinking without feeling" (Krathwohl, et al., 1964, p. 7).
After the introductory pages, Handbook II states that the book's
"usefulness to teachers, evaluators, and curriculum workers" is to "...help educators
redress the erosion in the meaning and substance of affective objectives which has
resulted from the greater emphasis on cognitive objectives. What is missing is a
systematic effort to collect evidence of growth in affective objectives which is in any
way parallel to the very great and systematic efforts to evaluate cognitive
achievement" (Krathwohl, et al, 1964, pp. 14-16).
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At the end of the 20th century, leading higher education theorists
(Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 1977/1993; Chickering and
Reisser, 1993; Astin, 1970 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) identified the separate
functions and outcomes of the two domains: "In determining w hat types of outcomes
to consider in our synthesis, we were guided by the thinking of various scholars
concerned with taxonomies of the outcomes of college (for example, Astin, 1973; Brown
and DeCoster, 1982; Ewell, 1984,1985,1988; Hanson, 1982; Jacobi, Astin and Ayala,
1987; Lenning, Lee, Mieck, and Service, 1977; Parker and Schmidt, 1982)....Cognitive
outcomes have to do with the utilization of higher-order intellectual processes such as
knowledge acquisition, decision making, synthesis, and reasoning. Affective outcomes
are attitudes, values, self-concepts, aspirations, and personality dispositions" (Pascarella
and Terenzini, 1991, p.5; above cites referenced in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).
A leading taxonomy that recently built on previous taxonomies by Astin
and Ewell (Terenzini, 1997) retains the historical separation of cognitive and affective
domains (Terenzini, 1997). This separation is what Professor Benjamin Bloom and his
committees at the University of Chicago in the early 1960s advised educators to address
as one inseparable learning domain in the classroom, in order to achieve specifically
defined educational objectives in both the affective and cognitive domains (Bloom, et al.,
1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). Bloom's committees concluded that cognitive
achievement begins in the affective domain as emotional "willingness" to pay attention
to the learning task (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). This is not a new concept:
affective willingness to begin learning goes back to Aristotle's ancient idea that every
movement of intellect begins with wanting or desire (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods,
1982). But how to test the theory?
The designing of "eduationally powerful" learning environments has
been suggested (Chickering and Reisser, 1993). As tin's I-E-O model of higher
education presents a potentially powerful model with which to imagine a new
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paradigm for learning and simultaneous teaching to both domains. The Astin model is
not just a cognitive environment with an affective appeal. Its dynamic is an inclusive
learning environment which gives and receives in both domains. In the Astin model,
personal incoming variables (I) are received into an educational environment (E) that
eventually produces educational outcomes (O). The incoming variables and the
educational environment must include and reflect the affective emotional self, a self
which the American psychologist, William James, one hundred years ago, and
contemporary neuropsychology (Damasio, 1994,1999), have identified as being
involved in the reasoning process (James, 1884,1890; Damasio, 1994,1999).
Developing the critical thinking skills required for abstract reasoning is a desired
outcome of higher education; research can show that reasoning requires both the
cognitive and affective domains (Damasio, 1994,1999).
Astin's model presents a structure with which to begin to imagine ways to
engage both domains during the undergraduate development of intellect and self.
Astin's model is powerful because it offers an open-ended, multi-factored environment
(E) that absorbs both the cognitive and affective inputs (I) brought by undergraduates
to the higher education table. The inputs component (I) "includes a wide variety of
personal, family, and educational background characteristics that students bring with
them to their postsecondary experience. These traits include such things as academic
and intellectual abilities, precollege achievements (academic and otherwise), goals and
motivation levels, degree and career aspirations, and a range of demographic, personal,
and family characteristics, such as gender, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age,
marital status and citizenship. In p u ts' also refers to a variety of other obligations
students may have, including those to family an d /o r work" (Terenzini, 1997, Figure 1
of his report).
In the Astin model, then, there is ample room in the college environment
(E) for the incoming (I) emotional 'self' of the undergraduate whose self-concept
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formation, and self-efficacy beliefs, are a crucial part of the process of intellectual
achievement in the classroom, and inseparable from educational outcomes (O), whether
academically recognized in the classroom or not (Bandura, 1997; Skaalvik, 1997;
Damasio, 1994,1999; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Chickering and Reisser, 1993;
Garcia and Pintrich, 1996; Guerrero and Miller, 1998; Ifert and Roloff, 1997; Fuchs, et al.,
1997; Isen, 1993; James, 1890; Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 1997; Levine and Cureton,
1998; Lewis, 1992; Matthews, 1993; Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Caruso and
Salovey, 2000; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a; Ohman, 1993; Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Richardson, 1992; Slipp, 1975; Travers, 1973;
Petry, Mouton and Reigeluth, 1987).
The question is how to academically evoke and support the affective
domain in ways that assist learning in the classroom, so that an instructional challenge
to achieve intellectually is also a challenge or 'crisis' opportunity (Erikson and Kohlberg
in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Erikson and Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997) for the
developing emotional 'self' of the undergraduate.
The experience of an identity 'crisis' (Marcia, 1965/1966 in Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Erikson and Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997) is a developmental challenge
that theoretically occurs between late adolescence and young adulthood, but not all
psychologists agree that an actual crisis is required (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, p.
209). The theoretical identity 'crisis' that can lead to young-adult autonomy does not
have to be a psychological emergency but instead can be "...engagement of and choice
among meaningful but competing altematives...(in) the making of personal
commitments" (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991, p. 164). The challenge is making a
commitment, or not, which ties in with Astin's theory that personal psychological
involvement (Astin, 1984 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) is necessary in order to
grow developmentally by "...the investment of psychological energy" (Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991, p. 50). How to academically present and encourage such challenges?
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An educationally powerful environment, and the teachers in it, would
seek to evoke both intellectual and affective "involvement" (Astin, 1977,1993; Astin,
1984 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) in order to give structured opportunities to
undergraduates as they seek to identify self-concept and achieve the outcome of
"satisfaction" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993) with the college experience.
Satisfaction intersects the two domains, as both an affective feeling (such
as a feeling of contentment) and a cognitive assessment. An existing "Taxonomy of
Student Outcomes" (Terenzini, 1997) that still separates affective from cognitive
development, suggests a desired outcomes category called "Educational Success" which
lists "retention/persistence, degree completion, time-to-degree, satisfaction" (Terenzini,
1997). These are the very outcomes that are being negatively impacted by selfreported problems in the affective domain (Counseling Services, 2002; Bandura, 1997;
Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993;
Levine and Cureton, 1998).
Even after completion of the college experience, the educational outcome
of satisfaction is a lasting affective outcome because linked to a cognitive assessment of
self-concept and self-efficacy that can influence future achievement. A taxonomy of
desired student outcomes lists "Quality of Life" (Terenzini, 1997) which includes a
"sense of well-being" (Terenzini, 1997, Table 2 in his report). The sense of well-being is
an affective feeling based on a cognitive assessment of achievement. Yet even with
such obviously linked outcomes across both domains, separate outcomes for the
cognitive domain are still being separately described (Terenzini, 1997) as, for example,
"...a set of general intellectual and cognitive competencies and skills. These skills
constitute ...complex mental functions...the effective processing and utilization of
information and include such activities as critical thinking, problem-solving, the analysis
and utilization of information, creative thinking, and both formal (i.e., Piagetian) and
postformal reasoning (the analysis of problems for which there is no verifiably-correct
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answer, sometimes called "ill-structured" or "wicked" problems requiring choices
involving questions of crime, poverty, abortion). This category also includes moral
reasoning, which refers to the processes by which judgments of right and wrong are
made..." (Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of his report). But how, exactly, to guide
undergraduates to achieve these desired educational outcomes in only one domain
when contemporary research using neuroimaging and case studies of individuals with
brain damage to the emotion centers show that "judgments of right and wrong"
(Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of his report) as well as "critical thinking, problem
solving, the analysis and utilization of information, creative thinking, and both formal
(i.e., Piagetian) and postformal reasoning"(Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of his report)
cannot be concluded without the involvement of emotions (Damasio, 1994,1999). This
research indicates a new direction for higher education in the cognitive development of
intellect. Yet it also remains an area of new research, which needs to be explored.
The research concept of 'emotional intelligence' is an exploratory concept
that intersects the two domains (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Salovey and Mayer, 1997;
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). Emotional intelligence is a set of abilities
that can be learned and thus could become a pilot concept to help future research
bridge the psychosocial gap in the undergraduate development of 'thought' and 'self/
Educational applications of the research concept of emotional intelligence, however,
have yet to emerge. "There are few ready-made real-life criteria with which to
correlate emotional intelligence at present. Questions such as, What is an effective
emotional life? or, What is an effective successful life? have only begun to be
addressed" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).
Existing taxonomies such as Chickering's Seven Vectors of affective
development, dted in his book, Education and Identity, are already geared toward
satisfaction as an undergraduate affective goal, and include managing emotions
(Chickering in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993). Managing
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emotions is also one of the four objectives of the original and current research concept
of 'emotional intelligence' (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000a, 2000b) and could be central to forming self-efficacy beliefs that direct
achievement behaviors (Bandura, 1997). Emotional intelligence is a concept that can
trace a long line back to Plato and Aristotle as the ability to perceive and mediate
extremes of emotional expressions and behaviors (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). For Aristotle, emotion management was the
golden mean (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982).
In the future, emotional intelligence may become an important new
mediating variable within the broad scope of the undergraduate experience, in an allinclusive learning environment such as Astin's model of higher education describes,
where an undergraduate could learn how to access and generate the personal emotions
that facilitate formation of positive self-efficacy beliefs, achievement behaviors, and
complex thinking and abstract reasoning, in other words how to use emotions to
engage an optimal cognitive mode for learning and achievement (Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000; Mayer and Salovery, 1990,1999; Damasio, 1994,1999; Bandura, 1997).
Emotional intelligence may be only one mediating variable in the college learning
environment, but it has the potential to mediate both undergraduate self-system
development and academic achievement effort.
Finding correlations between emotional intelligence and academic
achievement is the conceptual point of departure for this study, in order to look for an
interface of the two domains in learning, and probe the feasibility of a new inclusive
taxonomy of educational objectives for both domains in the academic classroom,
modeled after the two domain taxonomies that Bloom and his colleagues have already
written (see Appendix B) (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
Yet there is difficulty today in conceiving how to academically integrate the two
domains.
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After all, the domain of psychosocial development is the emotional
domain. The emotional or affective domain is impacted not just in residence life and
campus social interaction, but in the academic classroom where stressors in the
educational experience may be negatively impacting the outcomes of college
(Counseling Services, 2002; Levine and Cureton, 1998; Astin, 1993; Chickering and
Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).
This impact, historically apparent in the widespread 19th-century
misbehaviors of undergraduates, was referred to even in the lofty Yale Report of 1828
(when it reaffirms the in loco parentis role of colleges) (Day annd Kingsley, 1828, in
Conrad and Haworth, 1990). Were the rebellions that threatened to close down the
campus (Rudolph, 1962/1990) caused by an "unmet emotional need" (Wolff, 1969) of
undergraduates to test values and experience a crisis? Undergraduate behaviors are
just as perplexing today and as well-documented as they were at Merton College in
1507 (Chickering and Reisser, 1993). For many years, longitudinal four-year tracking
of undergraduate behaviors from freshman year through senior-year graduation has
been done (Astin, 1977/1983,1993; (Astin in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991).
One longitudinal study shows a significant-percentage decrease in churchgoing by senior year in college (-34.7) and in other religious activities such as praying (15.6) and a significant-percentage increase in beer drinking (+27.9), wine drinking
(+35.3), and oversleeping, resulting in missing class or appointment (+26.7) (Astin, 1977,
pp. 74-76). "Students undergo...marked increases in hedonism after entering
college...which appears to increase gradually ...the patterns of change in...drinking,
sleeping habits, and use of tranquillizers and sleeping pills suggest that college
attendance is often accompanied by substantially increased stress" (Astin, 1977/1983,
pp. 76-77).
Astin's early efforts at designing a taxonomy for the affective domain
aimed for the inclusion of "affective-psychological outcomes" to mediate the stress
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symptoms being reported in the college experience. The data gathered in Astin's
Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) questionnaires "over the years
have incorporated fifty-seven different affective-psychological (scale) items...(and)...
another category of affective-psychological outcomes, student satisfaction with the
college environment...." (Astin, 1977/1983, pp. 31-32).
The 58 variables investigated by CIRP were organized into four
categories. Astin has documented in all four categories affective self-concept
applications to higher education, and it is there that emotional intelligence might be
applied as a mediating variable: 1) the CIRP questionnaire area of interpersonal self
esteem which includes leadership ability and self-confidence; 2) the CIRP questionnaire
area of intellectual self-esteem which includes intellectual self-confidence; 3) the CIRP
questionnaire area of self-criticism which includes sensitivity to criticism and
defensiveness; and 4) the CIRP questionnaire area of understanding of self and others.
which includes cheerfulness and desire to achieve (Astin, 1977/1983, p. 33).
The CIRP results are more optimistic than previous research (Pascarella
and Terenzini, 1991) has resported, and suggests that "positive changes...in both
(interpersonal and intellectual) measures of self-esteem suggest that college attendance
may increase the individual's sense of competence and self-worth. Similar (positive)
changes have been reported by other investigators (Chickering, 1969,1974b;
Constantinople, 1969; Madison, 1971; McConnell, 1972; Schmidt, 1970)" (Astin,
1977/1983, p. 34; all dtes referenced in Astin, 1977/1983, pp. 273-283).
The self-report method of data gathering used by Astin in the CIRP
questionnaire, however, has certain inherent flaws and statistical gaps in the perception
of how youthful self-concept affectively develops. Astin, however, explains: "In
response to the question, 'How does college affect students?' one can legitimately ask,
'In relation to what?"'
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Astin points out that for many contemporary students 'going to college'
m ay mean little more than driving to campus for a class and then driving home, so that
the arena for affective social interaction with others is confined to the academic
classroom. There in the classroom, as history shows, the affective domain is excluded
from the cognitive development of intellect. Hence in the 1983 revision of his earlier
1977 effort at defining the affective impact of college on students, Astin enlarged the
sphere of influence of the affective domain, and recommended a more inclusive
educational environment offering psychological "involvement" as the dynamic for
achieving such educational outcomes as "satisfaction" (Chickering and Reisser, 1993;
Astin, 1977/1983; Astin, 1984 in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) with the undergraduate
experience. Satisfaction is an educational objective that involves both domains. Hence
a new inclusive taxonomy of educational objectives for the 21st century could be
housed in the Astin model, because an emotionally intelligent educational environment
is needed to academically involve and challenge the emotional self as well as the
cognitive self in college.
The historical importance of designing educational objectives that are
inclusive of both domains may have been pointed out rather harshly in American
higher education when classical Greek and Latin were being pointedly called dead
languages (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Using the Greek and Latin classics to teach
undergraduates discipline instead of poetry may have exacerbated the unrest arising
from the "unmet emotional need" (Wolff, 1969, p. 15) for poetry as well as furniture
(Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990; Rudolph, 1962/1990) of the
mind. As one educator explained that emotional need, "...between the accumulation of
knowledge and skills...there ought to occur an...emotional experience, which is neither a
mere continuation of what went before nor a mere foretaste of what is to follow (Wolff,
1969, p. 15).
Why exactly do undergraduates need an emotional challenge?
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Undergraduates in the traditional college-age range of 18 to 22 are
developmentally preorganized (Santrock, 1997; Erikson and Loevinger in Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993) to actively seek to establish an emotional
self that is an autonomous young adult, independent horn his or her parents' control
and from the control of other adult authority-figures as well.
"Somewhere in late adolescence...(is) an extended period during which
(undergraduates) make the difficult transition from childhood to the adult world...
(and)...the disinctive phase which Erikson calls the 'identity crisis'" (Wolff, 1969, p. 15).
The college undergraduate is developmentally driven to seek a new emotional identity
after losing the identity of high school (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and
Reisser, 1993). The new college identity is an indicator of personal growth, and further
stage-development (Kohlberg, Erikson and Loevinger in Santrock, 1997; Kohlberg,
Erikson and Leovinger in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) of what William James called
the ego or emotional self (James, 1884).
But even with today's understanding that expressing emotion is one of
the primary developmental motivations (Mayer and Salovey, 1990) during the
undergraduate years, and that emotions regulate self-efficacy beliefs and achievement
behaviors (Bandura, 1997) and can assist cognitive development (Damasio, 1994,1999;
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b), the undergraduate's historical emotionseeking and developmental drive for emotional crisis in order to grow into an
autonomous young adult (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993;
Erikson and Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997) is still isolated as an in loco parentis concern in
the college experience (Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Terenzini, 1997). The college
experience in the classroom does not include intellectual challenges for the affective
identity-seeking and self-concept formation (Astin, 1977,1993; Pascarella and Terenzini,
1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Terenzini, 1997) that undergraduaes are
developmentally driven to seek.
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The personal self in any case will be gradually identified, with or without a
college education, through natural maturation and life experiences as the individual
grows older, by traditional and possibly dangerous youthful misbehaviors that may
break the rules of authority to establish youthful autonomy, by social interactions with
others in the late-adolescent period of the life-span (Santrock, 1997). Yet, self-concept
formation does not have to be left to chance.
Self-concept formation could be enlightened within the college learning
environment with knowledge of emotional intelligence abilities, such as recognizing
and understanding emotions in self and others. Understanding how to recognize and
manage emotions could provide self-guidance and self-regulation during the
undergraduate years (Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Bandura, 1997) and because selfconcept formation includes self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997), it may become
educationally im portant-even an educational objective—to instructionally include
development of the self-concept/self-efficacy of the hidden emotional self during the
academic experience.
Research indicates that students with positive self-concept but moderate
ability can achieve higher than students with high ability but low self-concept (Mayer,
Salovey, and Caruso, 2000a). Self-concept is an emotional feeling based on a cognitive
assessment. Thus self-concept has one foot in the affective domain and is demonstrably
related to the traditional objective of higher education, academic high achievement
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000; Bandura, 1992; Damasio, 1994; James, 1890). The
formation of emotional self-concept is crucial for optimal learning (Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000; Damasio, 1994,1999; Bandura, 1992), but self-concept formation is not an
instructional target in higher education today. Self-concept is educationally left to
chance. Today as in Plato's day, development of the affective domain remains isolated
from academic intellectual development.
Is this historical separation justified?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
Plato who seems to have started the tradition can give an imaginative
answer, using images of: "...composite creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or
Scylla or Cerberus...in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one

now

model theform of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having a ring of heads of all manner of
beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphone at will.
"..Suppose now that you make a secondform as of a lion, and a third of a man, the
second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second....And now join them, and let
the three grow into one...Next fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that
he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single
human creature...
"(A man) should ever so speak and act as to ...watch over the many-headed
monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing
the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and...uniting the
several parts with one another and with himself...
"...men are blamedfor pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent in them
disproportionately grow and gain strength....And is not a man reproachedfor flattery and
meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and...habituates him in
the days of his youth to be trampled in the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?
....(The) whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of
...temperance and wisdom....To this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the
energies of his life" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 343-346).
Inside Plato's mythic images is the picture of the 21st-century
undergraduate 'self' who is expected to be in rational control of the inner emotional
archetypes. Plato's images suggest the hidden emotional complexity of the cognitive
thinking self, and the true instructional target of higher education.
Our 21st-century 'self' is a culturally and educationally divided 'self' who
has been socially conditioned and taught to isolate and control the affective domain
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(Damasio, 1994,1999). Existing taxonomies of educational objectives have made a place
within the undergraduate experience for the emotional complexity of undergraduate
identity-seeking and self-concept formation, but not in relation to academic
achievement.
Chickering's Seven Vectors (Chickering, 1969 in Pascarella and Terenzini,
1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993) have for the past several decades described
important affective development objectives that could be used to design a new inclusive
taxonomy to academically engage the two domains (Chickering and Reisser, 1993).
Terenzini's taxonomy re-emphasizes but separates the affective importance of
Chickering's developmental vectors (Terenzini, 1997), but Astin's I-E-O model provides
an inclusive environment with unlimited room for challenging affective development
and autonomous self-concept formation with a more complex instructional approach to
development of 'intellect' in relation to 'self' than is being offered today (Counseling
Services, 2002; Los Angeles Times, 1999; Bandura, 1997; Terenzini, 1997; Levine and
Cureton, 1997; Astin, 1977/1983,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991).
Meanwhile today as in Jeremiah Day's era when the curriculum wars
erupted (Rudolph, 1962/1990), the shunned, non-elevated non-cognitive domain
remains an affective problem area "lurking in the background" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3) of
higher education. This is precisely the problem, the continuing historical exclusion of
the affective domain from the academic development of intellect in higher education
today.
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Chapter Two
Review of the Literature
"You will not misapprehend me if you
interpret the journey upwards
to be the ascent of the (self) into the intellectual world''
(Plato, 4th century B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 252).

Introduction to the Literature
The instructional target in American higher education has always and
traditionally been the cognitive domain (Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and
Haworth, 1990; Newman, 1873 in Levine, 1978; Newman, 1873 in Kerr, 1963/1995;
James, 1890; Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill and Krathwohl, 1956; Rudolph, 1962/1990;
Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Wolff, 1969; Petry, Mouton and Reigeluth, 1987;
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Kerr,
1963/1995; Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Caruso and Salovey, 2000a). The
American psychologist and philosopher, William James, put it bluntly, "When we teach
children to repress their emotional talk and display, it is not that they may feel more—
quite the reverse. It is that they may think more..." (James, 1890, p. 466).
Jeremiah Day and James Kingsley said the same for American higher
education in The Yale Report of 1828. if with more eloquence. They defined the
cognitive objectives of the classical Greek and Latin curriculum as "...the art of fixing the
attention, directing the train of thought, analyzing a subject proposed for investigation;
following, with accurate discrimination, the course of argument; balancing nicely the
evidence presented to the judgment...and elevating and controlling the imagination"
(Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990, p. 57).
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The Yale Report of 1828 is defending the exclusive roots of the cognitive
tradition which are set very deep in the history of Western philosophy and education.
Intellectual history today still traces a long line back to Plato (428-347 B.C.)
for the traditional belief that non-rational thinking is "a threat to reason" and "a danger
to philosophy and philosophers" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3). In fact, in the Republic Plato
teaches that reasoning is "the very light of the body" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett,
1946, p. 271) while non-rational thinking occurs, metaphorically, in an absence of light.
'"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master' and to endure anything,
rather than think as they do..." Plato said, about metaphorical people who live in caves
and will not leam how to reason (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 251).
With this metaphorical statement in mind, one must wonder if history has
missed the humorous overstatement of Plato's Socratic teaching metaphors, and the
way ideas were presented for debate—not just one point of view but its counterpoint as
well. It has been said of Plato's Republic that "...his comic art runs high and delivers his
secret in dialectical statement and counter-statement and finally in luminous myths....
Let (the reader) stretch his imagination...so that he may catch some glimpse of the
principle of the liberal state which is founded on law and universal education and
dedicated to the achievment of knowledge and virtue by its citizens" (Buchanan in
Jowett, 1946, pp. 8-9). Thus when Plato asks, with some humor: "And surely...you
w ould not allow the future rulers to be like posts (the starting posts of a race course)
having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?"
(Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 273), his amusing metaphor is persuading the
need for the first known educational objective.
Educating government officials, and priests of the church, who as late as
the 18th century in colonial America were still being sent to college to leam how to
reason, is a most ancient educational objective, as discussed and debated with the
Socratic method in Plato's Republic. Learning how to reason, then as now, is a desired
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and serious educational objective. Humor and melodrama, however, were the great
teachers of a serious and virtuous subject.
Plato's attack on non-rational thinking was presented with a flair for dark
humor, perhaps to drive home the point. The melodramatic metaphor Plato used to
describe the non-rational domain was a cave. In Plato's day, caves represented a
mythical past (Daniel and Renfrew, 1988). Inside Plato's cave are people who are
chained to their own ignorance. Their source of information are shadows cast by
firelight, dancing in flickering illusions of reality, on the cave walls. Their intellectual
captivity is by choice, and the dark cave of non-rational thinking is pictured by Plato as
a place where self-defensive emotions of rage and denial threaten to murder the
rational thinker who has learned how to reason and dares to come back (Plato, 428-347
B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 249-255).
"Imagine once more...such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced
in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?....Men (back in the
cave) would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was
better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the
light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in
Jowett, 1946, p. 252).
It is a very striking thought, then, when Plato advises "...not to remain in
the upper world: but...descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of
their labours and honors, whether they are worth having or not" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in
Jowett, 1946, p. 255). Plato explains that it is the duty of the rational thinker not to
abandon the thinkers in the lower domain, but to periodically return, because each
domain "...can be beneficial one to another..." (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p.
252). The Socratic dialogues seem deliberately self-contradicting and thoughtprovoking, not at all a dictation of what is true or not true, but a thorough exploration
of "knowing that one doesn't know" (Buchanan in Jowett, 1946, pp. 7-8).
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Building on the point-counterpoint embedded in Plato's metaphors,
Plato's devoted follower, Aristotle, one hundred years later, would even theorize that
the two domains of thought—non-rational and rational—interact during ethical
reasoning (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Durr ant, 1993; Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods,
1982). So, when viewed with intellectual hindsight today, the historical sole pursuit of
the reasoning intellect by higher education since Plato's cave down through the
centuries, may have been an instructional error, one that springs anciently from missed
cues in the melodramatic statements and counter-statements of the teaching metaphors
of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., and the later Cartesian epistemology that defined a
cognitive self modelled upon Platonist and Aristotelian philosophy (Descartes, 15961650 in Markie, 1997).
Imported in the 17th century to America from the medieval universities of
Europe and England (Rudolph, 1962/1990), and successfully defended by The Yale
Report of 1828 (Day and Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990), the discipline of
the classical Greek, and ancient Latin curriculum survived to the end of the 19th century
in America (Rudolph, 1962), but its exclusive pursuit of the cognitive domain still retains
its instructional grip on American higher education (Mayer and Salovey, 1999,2000;
Terenzini, 1997; Astin, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Kerr, 1963/1995; Day and Kingsley, 1828 in
Conrad and Haworth, 1990; Newman, 1873 in Levine, 1978; Newman, 1873 in Kerr,
1963/1995; James, 1890; Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill and Krathwohl, 1956; Krathwohl,
Bloom and Masia, 1964; Rudolph, 1962/1990; Wolff, 1969; Petry, Mouton and Reigeluth,
1987; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Chickering and Reisser, 1993).
In The Yale Report of 1828. Jeremiah Day and his co-author, Yale
professor James Kingsley, reaffirmed the ancient cognitive tradition when they advised,
"Familiarity with the Greek and Roman writers is especially adapted to...disdpline the
mind, both in thought and diction, to the relish of what is elevated, chaste, and
simple..." (Day, 1828 in ASHE, p. 63). Day and Kingsley were reiterating the ancient
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classical division between an 'elevated'-that is to say, a 'higher'—domain of disciplined
rational thought versus a 'lower' domain needing rational control, what intellectual
history had always and traditionally interpreted as an ancient and necessary exclusion.

The Historical Exclusion of Emotion
Plato's discussions in the Republic offer an old way to look at a new
problem. The problem is whether to engage the affective domain as an educational
objective in the classroom, as has been suggested (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
Academically including the affective domain, thanks to a narrow reading of intellectual
history, is an idea going upstream, struggling against the sweep of tradition and
precedent.
A 1946 introduction to Plato's Republic explains that "The Republic is the
country of the human mind, and it is on its highways that you and I meet Plato coming
back" (Buchanan in Jowett, 1946, p. 9). In the Republic. Plato describes a subterranean
(i.e., lower) cave domain (Plato in Jowett, 1946, pp. 249-255) that is ignorant, nonrational and not good (Plato in Jowett, 1946). This lower domain is being compared to
the dazzling, bright light of the higher domain of rational thinking. This famous
metaphor carved an ancient philosophical schism in stone which has not yet been
bridged, not even today, an enduring exclusion of emotion horn intellect that has
persisted in Western thought (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Durrant, 1993; Aristotle, 384-322
B.C. in Richardson, 1992; Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982; Plato, 428-347 B.C. in
Jowett, 1946; Solomon, 1993) although "the emotions have always lurked in the
background" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3).
"Behold!" Plato writes, "human beings living in an underground den, which
has a mouth open towards light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their
childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see
before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind
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them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way;
and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette
players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets....And do you see...men passing
along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues andfigures of animals made of wood and
stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.
"You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.
"Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows
of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?
“True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never
allowed to move their heads?
"And of the objects which are being carried in like manner, they would see only
the shadows?
"Yes, he said.
"And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that
they were naming what was actually before them?
"Very true.
"To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the
images.
"That is certain.
"And now, look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are
released and disabused of their error. At first when any of them is liberated, and compelled
suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer
sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his
former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he
saw before was an illusion...
"...but that now, when...his eye is turned toward more real existence, he has a
clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is
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pointing to objects as they pass and requiring him to name them, —will he not be perplexed?
Will he not fancy that the shadows that heformerly saw are truer than the objects which are now
shown to him?
"...M y opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea ofgood appears last of all,
and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is inferred to be the universal author of all
things beautiful and right...in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in
the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in
public or private life must have his eyefixed. You will not misapprehend me if you interpret the
journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul (the contemporary 'self') into the intellectual
world" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 249-252).
After Plato's devastating cave metaphor and with the growing cultural
acceptance of rational thinking in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., the non-rational
domain never regained its former place (Daniel and Renfrew, 1988) of reverence,
importance and usefulness (Neumann, 1955/1963) that it had once held in the mythical
cave culture described in The Power of Myth by Joseph Campbell (Campbell, 1988),
extolled by the andent Greek historians (Herodotus and Thucydides in Hobbes/Grene,
1959), and by the Greek traveller, Pausanias, who lived in 120-180 A.D. and documented
the extant monuments and cave places of an andent way of thinking that had depended
on gods and goddesses and was gradually being replaced by science and reasoning.
After Plato (428-347 B.C.) for the next 2000 years, the history of Western philosophy
became "the history of the development of reason" (Solomon, 1993, p. 4).
One hundred years after Plato, the Greek philosopher, Aristotle,
contributed greatly to the bad reputation which Plato had heaped on the non-rational
domain. Although d tin g its other, nobler attributes, Aristotle described the nonrational domain as a realm of "vice and wickedness" whose bad influence could lead to
using even wisdom unwisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, p. 173). It m ust be
remembered that American higher education was classically designed upon this
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philosophical Greek foundation, which Aristotle helped define when he wrote: "...desire
does not imply the deliberative faculty. But sometimes it overpowers rational wish and
moves to action; at other times the latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, desire"
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Dennett, 1993, p. 70). Perhaps without intending to do so,
Plato and Aristotle anciently dug the trenches for an academic battlefield where
emotion was traditionally perceived to be a threat to reason, an opposing force to the
development of intellect, and "...the idea that emotion as such is...more primitive, less
intelligent...and more dangerous than reason, and thus needs to be controlled by
reason" (Solomon, 1993, p. 3).
Contemporary thinkers may unknowingly inherit this ancient dominance
of the cognitive domain and perhaps "a sense that affect (feelings, emotion) can
influence their decisions, at least under certain circumstances. However, it is usually
assumed that such influence is something irregular or unusual, that only strong and
infrequent feelings would have such effects; and that most often only negative feelings
such as anger, sadness, or fear would have an impact on thinking processes...(and that)
such influences are disruptive and tend to make their decisions 'irrational' and less
appropriate than otherwise" (Isen, 1993, p. 261).
One of Plato's main teaching points, embedded within the overstated
melodrama of the cave metaphor, might come forward again and shed new light on
the old historical schism that still yawns between the cognitive and affective domains.
Plato's point was that some emotions do threaten the rational thinker. Plato is pointing
out that a person has to be xvilling to leave behind the intriguing shadows cast by
firelight, the dark emotions caused by being self-defensive, the self-delusion and
ignorance caused by fearing the sharp climb up out of the comfortable darkness and
into the bright light of reasoning. This was the 'danger' of emotions: emotional
unwillingness to climb out of the cave. Note historically, that emotional willingness to
begin learning is step one in Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives, Handbook II:
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Affective D o m a in (see Appendix B for a synopsis of Bloom's taxonomies) (Krathwohl,
Bloom and Masia, 1964).
A closer study now of part of the classical curriculum that built early
American higher education reveals a strong positive role for emotions embedded in the
earliest philosophical definitions of 'thought7and 'self.' Why else would Plato advise a
rational thinker to periodically revisit the dangers of the dark cave, if not to stay in
touch with the emotional self?

The Role of Emotion in the Development of 'Thought' and 'Self'
Aristotle himself connects both a cognitive part and an emotional part to
the development of 'thought' when he defines 'intellect' as a phenomenon of multiple
parts animated by 'soul.' Some contemporary philosophers interpret the Aristotelian
'soul' as actually meaning 'm ind' (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Wilkes, 1992), but Aristotle's
thinking about 'soul' appears to be much larger than 'm ind' because in 'soul' Aristotle
includes all animated movement of the physical body ('soul' is w hat causes the body to
grow) and theorizes that 'soul' also animates an 'intellect' with multiple functions. (The
consciousness of an individual 'self' was yet to appear) (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Wilkes,
1992, p. 115).
According to Aristotle, one function of 'intellect' is active and rational;
another function of intellect is passive and non-rational but it can inspire the rational
intellect. The perishable part of intellect thinks; the deathless part inspires thinking
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982).
Intellect, then, is a complex phenomenon of multiple parts, for Aristotle,
and is not a single cognitive domain. Note historically, that centuries after Aristotle,
toward the end of the 20th century A.D., the concept of "multiple intelligences"
(Gardner in Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a) caused quite a stir in the academic
world. One outcome of this "new idea" about intellect was the research concept of
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emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1990), as one of many possible kinds of
intelligences that may be involved in cognition and achievement (Mayer, Salovey and
Camso, 2000a).
Aristotle remained true to Plato's teachings about the good and 'higher'
rational domain by defining the rational part of 'intellect' as having virtues "whose
function is finding the truth concerning how things are or how they came about"
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 20). However, in the Eudemian Ethics, both
rational and non-rational domains of 'intellect' are not entirely virtuous; both domains
have only an 'inclination' to be virtuous, or to seek vice. Aristotle theorizes that "it
follows that (a person's) 'character' is virtuous or bad by pursuing or avoiding
pleasures and pains" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 20) and notes the
complexity of various mediating variables that, for any individual, interact to determine
how the extreme feelings of pleasure and pain become balanced, or not. The extremes
of virtue and vice are defined by Aristotle as the parameters set by "feelings of pleasure
or pain" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982). Aristotle thus brings in the emotions
of the affective domain that are evoked by feelings of pleasure or pain as the very basis
for ethical reasoning. This is parallel to the emotional intelligence construct of
'emotional reasoning' (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) which suggests that feelings
can be used to assist rational thinking in making ethical decisions and solving problems.
To further complicate the matter of ethical reasoning, some rational
intellects are underdeveloped, ignorant or stupid (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods,
1982, p. 173). Even virtue can be used unwisely by an ignorant, or stupid, rational
thinker (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173).
The opposite may also occur. Ignorance or stupidity in the rational part of
intellect may be influenced by virtuous feelings from the non-rational part of intellect,
resulting in judging wisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982). Aristotle's rational
and non-rational functions of intellect are today's cognitive and affective domains

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38
(Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Mayer and Salovey, 1990).
Note historically, that the meaning and function o f ' intellect'—hundreds of years after
Aristotle—came to be equated with a cognitive self that thinks, because of the irrefutable
logic of a self-proclaimed devotee of Aristotle and Plato—the 17th-century French
mathematician and philosopher, Rene Descartes.
In 17th-century philosophy, Descartes' philosophical assertion, Cogito ergo
sum, effectively stripped the affective domain from its cognitive other half, two halves
of a whole 'intellect' as defined by Aristotle (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982), as
well as by emotion research (Damasio, 1994,1999) and emotional intelligence research
today (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). Even
though Aristotle described 'intellect' as being both rational and non-rational, Aristotle
also advised, "...be aware as little as possible of the non-rational" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C.
in Woods, 1982, p. 46).
In sometimes contradictory ways, then, the work of Plato and Aristotle
consistently presented both sides—point and counterpoint—to the rational versus nonrational debate. Although a generous defender of the sometimes important presence
of non-rational feelings during ethical reasoning, Aristotle also emphasized that nonrational feelings need to be controlled by reasoning: "...if virtue belongs to a human
being...it necessarily includes reasoning, as a starting point of action; reasoning controls
inclination and the affections...." (Aristotle. 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 15).
Yet it is not to control, but to connect the two domains that Aristotle talks
about ethics (from the Greek ethos which means character). The ethics connection is the
interaction of choosing: vice or virtue, emotional desires or a reasonable wish.
"Now 'character' (ethos), as the word itself indicates, is that which is
developed from habit...(and)...Virtue...is the sort of disposition...from which are done
the best functions of the soul, and its best affections...So let character be thus defined: a
quality of the part of the soul that is non-rational, b ut capable of following reason..."
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Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 17). As if anticipating future emotion
research, Aristotle teaches that virtue in both the domains becomes "...an instrument of
intelligence...." (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 43). In fact, by connecting
ethics to feelings of pleasure or pain, and by using Plato's idea that love of the good is
the basis for rational thinking (Solomon, 1993), Aristotle appears to have intersected the
two domains. Perhaps Aristotle devised a pilot concept of emotional intelligence.
If Aristotle could take the MSCEIT V.2 test used in this study today, he
would be tested on his understanding and defining of emotions, and management of
extremes of emotions.
As if studying for the test, Aristotle lists in the left and middle columns
emotional behaviors in their extremes, and, in the far right column, the golden mean or
balance:

irascibility

impassivity

gentle temper

foolhardiness

cowardice

bravery

shamelessness

thin-skinnedness

shame

intemperance

insensibility

temperance

envy

(unnamed)

fair-mindedness

prodigality

meanness

liberality

boastfulness

mock-modesty

truthfulness

flattery

churlishness

friendliness

servility

unaccommodating

dignity

softness

imperviousness

endurance

vanity

meanness of spirit

pride

unscrupulousness

unworldliness

practical wisdom

(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 18).
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"These affections, and others like them...are so described because of
excess, in some cases, or deficiency, in others. Thus the man who gets angry more than
he should, and more quickly, and at more things than he should, is irascible, while the
man who falls short in what he is angry at, and when, and how, is impassive; again, the
man who does not fear the things he should, and neither when nor as he should, is
foolhardy, the man who fears things he should not, and when he should not, and in a
manner he should not, is cowardly. Similarly, the man who desires what he should not,
and goes to excess in every possible way is intemperant, the man who falls short and
does not desire even the better and the natural, but is unsusceptible of feeling, like a
stone, is insensible....The man who thinks more highly of himself than he should is vain,
the man who thinks less highly is mean in spirit....A man is envious through being
distressed at good fortune in more cases than he should. (Even those who deserve to
do well upset the envious when they do.) ...but there is the man who goes too far in
not being distressed even when people do well undeservedly; he is easy-going, like
gluttons when food is concerned, while the other (envious) man is hard and grudging"
(Aristotle in Woods, pp. 18-19).
"Perhaps the most important single point to make about Aristotle's view
of emotion is the fact that his analyses make sense only in the context of a broader
ethical concern. Anger was of interest to him because it is a natural reaction to offense,
and a moral force which can be cultivated by reason and rhetoric...he discussed in some
detail those circumstances in which it is appropriate to get angry, those in which it is
not, and what amount of intensity of anger is justified....He also insisted that only fools
don't get angry, and that although overly angry people may be 'unbearable,' the
absence of anger (aimed at the right offenses) is a vice rather than a virtue. In (ethics)
as in all else, Aristotle defended moderation, the 'mean between the extremes.' So too,
Aristotle discussed fear at length in the Ethics with regard to courage, which is not
'fearlessness' or 'overcoming' fear so much as it is having just the right am ount of fear—
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not to be foolhardy or a coward either.... (analyses of) the emotions, in other words, are
central and essential to the good life, and the analysis of their nature is part and parcel
of ethical analysis" (Solomon, 1993, p. 5).
"I mean, a man is called sharp-tempered for being affected more quickly
than he should, bad-tempered and choleric for being so (angry) more than he should,
bitter for being prone to maintain his anger, violent and truculent for the retaliation
resulting horn the anger. Men are classified as gourmets or gluttons...according to
which form of nourishment they have an affectible capacity to enjoy against reason"
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 20).
Note historically, the necessary discipline to control the emotions by the
reasoning intellect, as described by Aristotle—this was the instructional target of the
classical Greek curriculum (Plato, 438-327 B.C. in Jowett, 1946). Note historially, that
Jeremiah Day's defense of the classical curriculum was to remind critics about the
classical objectives: discipline of the mind and control of the imagination (Day and
Kingsley, 1828 in Conrad and Haworth, 1990).
Into the Aristotelian historical context, Descartes' 17th-century hypothesis,
Cogito ergo sum, appeared with irrefutable logic. Descartes reasoned about what, if
anything, a person can know with certainty about incoming sense perceptions.
Descartes often references Aristotle's early philosophy on 'thought' and 'soul' and
Aristotle, in turn, references Plato (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982). Thus in the
first half of the 1600s, Descartes begins to question and reason his way via the Socratic
method, to answer an epistemological challenge by the Skeptics (Solomon, 1993), and in
so doing "...goes on to define the central problem of epistemology for the next three
hundred years" (Descartes, 1596-1690 in Markie, 1997, p. 34).
"In the first place, then, I considered myself as having a face, arms, and all
that system of bones and flesh as seen in a corpse which I designated by the name of
body....(Descartes, 1596-1690 in Wilkes, 1992, p. 114). Descartes perceived this body as
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having length, depth and breadth in space. "Next I examined attentively what I was. I
saw that while I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no
place for me to be in it, I could not for all that pretend that I do not exist. I saw on the
contrary that horn the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it
followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed, whereas if I had merely ceased
thinking, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true, I should have had
no reason to believe that I existed. From this I knew that I was a substance whose
whole essence or nature is simply to think..." (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Markie, 1997, p.
35-36).
Descartes set our contemporary parameters for the idea of 'consciousness'
of a cognitive self, and the epistemological model for teaching and learning strategies.
The idea of consciousness before Descartes may not have too different
from Plato's and Aristotle's day (Wilkes, 1992).
"The verb 'being conscious of', in its present (range of) sense(s), dates in
English from around 1620, and the noun 'consciousness' does not appear until 1678;
'self-consciousness' does not crop up until 1690. The term existed, of course, before
then; but it still retained its etymological meaning of 'shared knowledge' (cum + sciere).
French and German display the same pattern. It took the challenge of skepticism to
hoist consciousness—as we know it today—to the pedestal it still occupies" (Wilkes, 1992,
p. 115).
Descartes' Cogito separated Aristotle's large idea of 'soul' from 'intellect'
and helped turn 'being conscious of' into the contemporary idea of 'self.' Descartes
writes in a letter to one of his critics, "...men in earliest times did not distinguish in us
that principle in virtue of which we are nourished, grow, and perform all those
operations which are common to us with the brutes, apart from any thought...(this was
part of Aristotle's definition of 'soul')...But I, perceiving that the principle by which we
are nourished is wholly distinct from that by means of which we think, have decided
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that the name 'soul' when used for both is equivocal...and I have called (the principle by
which we think) by the name 'mind'...." (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Wilkes, 1992, p. 115).
Descartes' connection between thinking, mind, and the consciousness of
an individual thinker, evolved into the 'self' of contemporary culture. The ancient
duality (rational/non-rational) of 'intellect' as defined by Aristotle, and the upper vs.
lower, good vs. not-good, domains of thought, as defined by Plato, were narrowed into
a single 'condous self'—a cognitive, thinking self—by their 17th-century student, Rene
Descartes, in the Cogito (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Markie, 1997). The cognitive thinking
self is still the target of traditional higher education and psychology.
The business of contemporary psychology has been to make the cognitive
self aware of the desires and presence of the emotional self. The business of higher
education has been to educate the cognitive self, and, in recent years, to make that
cognitive self more aware of the desires and presence of the psychosodal domain
where the emotional self has been sent to reside on campus (Chickering and Reisser,
1993; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Terenzini, 1997). Education and psychology have
yet to recover from the adoration of cognition (Bacon in Kerr, 1963/1995) that some
have called Descartes' error (Damasio, 1994,1999).
Descartes' assertion that "I am thinking, therefore I must exist" (Descartes,
1596-1650 in Markie, 1997, p. 36) laid the epistemological groundwork for teaching to a
cognitive self. Even intuition for Descrates was bom from reasoning: "...intuition is the
indubitable conception of a dear and attentive mind which proceeds horn the light of
reason" (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Markie, 1997, p. 37). Descartes redefined the ancient
idea of consdousness as "shared knowledge" (Wilkes, 1992, p. 115)-shared w ith the
goddesses and gods—and replaced it with an independent self who knows that it thinks.
Descartes defined 'self' as "the thing that thinks" (Descartes, 1596-1650 in
Wilkes, 1992, p. 114). The Cartesian self is a cognitive self because it knows it is
thinking, and that whether its thoughts are true or false, it knows that as long as it is
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thinking, it has nQt ceased to exist. As long as the self knows it is thinking, then it
knows that it does indeed exist. (Otherwise, how could it know it was thinking?) But
Descartes did not entirely exclude the affective domain from the rational development
of 'thought' and 'self' in his existential conumdrum.
In contemporary psychology, consciousness still retains its Cartesian
cognitive dimensions. Today's 'self' is the T or ego of consciousness that appears to be
continuous in time (Cortright, 1997, p. 54). The T of consciousness is a personal
construct built by a set of values, beliefs and choices (compare to Aristotle's ethical
reasoning 'intellect' which rationally and emotionally chooses between virtue and vice).
Like Aristotle's emotional-rational intellect, today's T consciousness is a cognitive self
with a complex existence.
"Our fundamental identity is consciousness, but we identify with and cling
to certain contents of consciousness. That is, we normally believe, "I am this
experience...of sensing...feeling...thinking" (Cortright, 1997, p. 54). (Has anything
changed since Descartes?)
Among the new thinking about 'self' today is the idea that
"...consciousness is modified and conditioned by the structures of the self. It is
consciousness that frees us from our unconscious conditioning. Consciousness
becomes engaged in its ow n transformation" (Cortright, 1997, pp. 56,59). Each
conscious decision and choice among values and beliefs, then, for the late-adolescent
/young-adult in college becomes an opportunity for a conscious transformation of 'self'
by using situations that demand psychological involvement in decision making, as
described in As tin's 1984 model of affective development (Pascarella and Terenzini,
1991), situations requiring a choice or commitment. As Aristotle teaches, the values,
beliefs and choices of any one individual are decided through both emotional feelings
and rational thinking. Aristotle claimed that rational thinking can be guided by a
feeling of which choice would be more virtuous, that is, which choice would feel best
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(less painful, more pleasurable)—a feeling for virtue which Aristotle called "the
instrument of intelligence" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 43). What are the
educational implications of such an instrument? Why is its presence educationally
ignored?
Some undergraduates, like their predecessors in the history of higher
education, may have given the emotional self a bad name, by seeking emotional
experiences that challenge traditional or inherited beliefs and values. How, then, to
educationally understand this experimenting emotional 'self that may be actively
exercising itself in adverse ways during the undergraduate years? Can the
undergraduate 'self really be expected to be cognitive in the classroom, and only
emotional in 'interpersonal' social relationships?
An answer is suggested by Plato and Aristotle: 'self' is not one domain or
the other, but an interactive construct of at least two domains from which it receives
both cognitive and emotional input; each domain can be beneficial to the other. Even
Descartes made room within the cognitive self for an emotional self who feels and
imagines:
"What is a thing that thinks?" Descarets wrote in a letter to a friend. "It is
a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and which
also imagines and feels" (Descartes, 1596-1650 in Wilkes, 1992, p. 114).
Although the emotional part of the self, which William James equates with
ego Qames, 1884,1890) plays a strong role in the willing ascent of the cognitive self into
the intellectual world, the emotional self has been largely ignored and historically
excluded from the instructional target of higher education, which has always and
traditionally intellectually developed the cognitive domain.
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Higher Education and the Emotional Self
Experimental studies show that emotional self-concept is over-sensitized
in depressed learners (Slipp, 1975). They are hypersensitive to feedback about
performance. In one study, a depressed group of test participants was given a cardsorting task, along with a control group of subjects without depression. Performance
of the card-sorting was deliberately interrupted by the researchers so that all subjects in
both groups failed. The depressed group had actually performed no worse than the
normal group (that is, everyone failed), but depressed subjects reacted to their failure
with greater pessimism and far lowered expectations than the normal group (Slipp,
1975). This indicates how depression cues attention to self-defeating interpretation of
events. Emotion also determines the speed at which thinking is performed and the
richness of multiple information cues that are perceived and attended. In the card
sorting task, depression determined the cognitive mode (Damasio, 1994).
Conversely, a feeling of elation can cause rapid generation of multiple
mental images and cognitive associations in response to a wide variety of information
and meaning cues (Damasio, 1994). The wealth of imagery and associative cues causes
ease of inference and inclusive thinking, resulting in bold exploratory behaviors
(Travers, 1973). The opposite of this rapid and expansive cognitive mode is, for
example, the feeling of sadness and the cognitive mode that is paired with it. Sadness is
characterized by slowness of mental image formation, less association of meaning due
to perception of fewer mental cues, a more narrow band of inferences, and over
concentration on one or two images that will sustain the negative mood. The cognitive
state caused by sadness exhibits psychomotor inhibition such as reduced or lost
appetite, and a reduction of exploratory behaviors (Damasio, 1994).
The literature shows that sadness causes slow information processing
with perception of few cues; happiness causes rapid processing and a wealth of
information and meaning cues (Damasio, 1994; Francis, et al., 1998). Hence specific
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emotions are known to predictably generate a specific cognitive mode. For example,
happiness generates heightened attention and rich, rapid perception that assist peak
performance instead of mediocre or insignificant outcomes. Understanding that the
educational role of emotions is to direct cognitive attention to similarities and other
meaning cues in the environment "can potentially lead to a transformation" (Salovey
and Mayer, 1990, p. 186) in teaching (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) and thinking.
Depression and anxiety are the two emotions that have been studied
most by psychology (Francis, et al., 1998). Symptoms relating to learning include loss
of interest in activity, loss of pleasure in activity, chronic fatigue, a drop in energy,
inability to concentrate, indecisiveness (Oadey and Jenkins, 1996). Appraisal and
regulation of emotion to generate an optimal cognitive mode for achievement are
demonstrably important (Salovey and Mayer, 1990; Francis, et al., 1998; Schutte, et al.,
1998). In fact, research indicates "that happier college students obtain higher grades in
general" (Wessman and Ricks, 1966, p. 123 in Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 410)
although the originators of the emotional intelligence ability model (Mayer and
Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) caution that emotional intelligence is
not a cure-all but "...identifies a previously overlooked area of ability critical to certain
human functioning. These emotionally intelligent skills lay hidden in the boundary area
between mental ability and noncognitive dispositions..." (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000a, p. 408). Emotional intelligence is an ability to understand and manage emotions
to assist thought, across the two domains. How important is this to learning?
Self-concept is an important mediating variable for achievement in higher
educaton because it can determine the speed, confidence and creativity with which
people think. Self-concept involves an emotional measure of self-competence in the
objective world—self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997)—a measure indexed daily by what
William James called 'the emotional self' (James, 1884,1890).
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"Students with high self-efficacy tend to learn and achieve more than
students with low self-efficacy, even when actual ability levels are the same" (Bandura,
1986; Collins, 1982; Schunk, 1989; Spaulding, 1992; Zimmerman, Bandura and MartinezPons, 1992: all dtes referenced in Ormrod, 1995, p. 151).
What is the mechanism of self-efficacy in learning?
Self-efficacy beliefs straddle the line between affect and cognition. Selfefficacy is both an emotional feeling about ability and a cognitive assessment of ability
to perform a course of action. "Efficacy beliefs create attentional biases and influence
whether life events are construed...in ways that are benign or emotionally
perturbing

efficacy beliefs regulate emotional states by supporting effective courses

of action to transform the environment in ways that alter its (emotional) potential..."
(Bandura, 1997, p. 137). In relation to learning and achievement, then, emotionalcognitive self-efficacy beliefs can transform the learning experience by determining
attitude and motivation to achieve, and persistence, "whereas those of low self-efficacy
are quick to conclude that additional efforts would be futile" (Bandura, 1997, p. 137).
"If people believe they have no power to produce results, they will not
attem pt to make things happen" (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). Understanding and managing
emotions is central to the formation of self-concept/self-efficacy. Emotional intelligence
can therefore lead the way and make it possible for consciousness to become engaged
in its own transformation (Cartright, 1992, p. 57).
However, the complexity of self-concept/self-efficacy is a personal
construct whose childhood formation must be sought out. Self-concept is constructed
across the lifespan by the outcomes of life experiences and relationships with others
(Slipp, 1975; Santrock, 1997; Damasio, 1994). Thus, it is not just the responsibility of
students to cultivate positive self-concept (as an Aristotelian "instrument of
intelligence") but also a job for higher education to encourage self-concept/self-efficacy
in relation to learning, for undergraduates sitting in the academic classroom.
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Self-concept covers a lot of emotional territory. The emotional self is a
very important thinker, because deeply involved but hidden in the learning process
and, in the academic classroom, instructionally excluded or even repressed.
The repressed or excluded emotional self may be developmentally driven
to redirect cognitive attention away from achievement efforts, delaying or avoiding the
risk of failure, or simply retaining the comfortable status quo (Skaalvik, 1997) of not
trying. Personal emotions by late-adolescence may be conditioned to respond to
challenges in the personal environment in self-defensive, preorganized ways (Darwin,
1872/1955; James, 1890; Damasio, 1994; Erikson and Weathersby in Santrock, 1997;
Skaalvik, 1997). Is there, then, a reason to teach understanding and managing of
personal emotions, to the emotional self, in the academic development of rational
thinking? "Much of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by
another, " William James wrote,"of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems
likely enough that the higher brutes are capable. This sort of thinking leads
nevertheless to rational conclusions, both practical and theoretical. The links between
the terms are either 'contiguity' or 'similarity'....Having been thinking of one, we find
later that we are thinking of another, to which we have been lifted along, we hardly
know how" (James, 1890, p. 325).

The Educational Role of the Emotional Self

What Is an Emotion?
" Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well"
(James, 1890, p. 442).
William James was concerned with abstract reasoning, whose set of critical
thinking skills is one of today's most desired outcomes of higher education (Bloom, et
al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991; Terenzini,
1997). James asked a question that concerns higher education today:
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"Why cannot anyone reason as well as anyone else?"(James/ 1890, p. 241).
The answer to this question requires a definition of the hidden role of emotion in the
abstract process of reasoning (James, 1884,1890; Damasio, 1994,1999).
James benefitted from the research of his predecessors and con
temporaries in physiology, including Darwin, Freud and Pavlov (Ormrod, 1995).
When James wrote that "Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as
well" (James, 1890, p. 442), he was reiterating Darwin's and Pavlov's great findings
(Darwin, 1872/1955). The connection between human emotions and hum an instincts
that categorize new experience is William James' conceptual contribution to our
contemporary understanding of the necessary role of emotion in cognitive reasoning
and decision making Games, 1884,1890; Damasio, 1994,1999).
The problem with emotions is that an individual's past experiences
beginning in childhood cause ad hoc pairings of emotions with cognitive memory of the
past. Across the lifespan there is an ongoing formation of personalized emotional
associations Gaines, 1890; Damasio, 1994; Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993; Skaalvik, 1997;
Santrock, 1997; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993) with new experiences and events. In William
James' era at the end of the 19th century, Pavlov identified this phenomenon as a
preorganized learning mechanism in animals and humans (Pavlov, 1872/1927).
Without interventions, emotional past associations may remain
cognitively associated with past events occurring first in childhood within the family
(Damasio, 1994; Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993; Skaalvik, 1997; Santrock, 1997; Walsh and
Vaughan, 1993). The educational problem is that these past associations have created
the late-adolescent/young-adult developmental identity and self-concept which are
brought to the higher education table. The instructional challenge is that personalized
past associations emotionally direct cognitive attention Games, 1890; Damasio, 1994;
Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993; Skaalvik, 1997).
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An individual's set of past emotional associations are part of the "contents
of consciousness" (Cortright, 1997, p. 54), that form the "I" construct of self. The "I" of
cognitive consciousness can be mediated by natural maturation and life experiences
across the lifespan (Santrock, 1997) and can also be personally mediated by a set of
acquired abilities called emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b). William James contributed four definitions of how
emotion may be related to learning in the contemporary research concept of emotional
intelligence: 1. Emotion is a neuro-muscular reflex; 2. Emotion is an intellectual
feeling; 3. The ego is the emotional self; 4. Emotions are commonly shared by
everyone and can be nam ed and defined.

lames' Four Definitions of Emotion
1.

Emotion is a neuro-muscular reflex. James theorizes that the primal

emotions are physical sensations caused by excitation of nerve cells and muscles.
James is insistent that the primal emotions follow, but do not precede, physical exertion of
the body. This is James' primary definition of 'an emotion.' It cuts off emotion as an
omnipresent potential (which Damasio calls somatic markers) and forecloses on the
possibility that emotion is an ever-present conveyor of personalized survival
information that arises to focus cognitive attention for the well-being of the perceiver.
Instead, in this definition, James gives an idea of the body as a
preorganized container within which emotions may be occasioned to swirl.
James defines the standard emotions as physical sensations but the feeling
of 'an emotion' occurs only after a physical response has been made. In the context of
James' day, this concept makes perfect sense. Psychology was still in its infancy,
predominated by anecdotal and observational research by the great physiologists of
the time including Darwin, Pavlov and Freud.
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Looking at the physical body from their viewpoint, James was saying
nothing new when he theorized that the body's physical-response network produces a
preorganized and involuntary survival-reflex which arouses emotions and can include
cognition. The reflex-survival sensation, or feeling, is always involuntary, instinctive,
and animal-like. James then goes on a relentless search for "the mind stuff" of an
emotion (James, 1884, p. 193)—that is to ask, w hat remains after the physical sensations
of 'an emotion' have been felt?
Here James is using the core concept of Darwin's collection of anecdotal
observations.

James writes, "If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to

abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily
symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is
all that remains" (James, 1884, p. 193-194). Perhaps unintentionally in this definition,
James has exposed the instinctive pairing of emotion with cognition which is the deep
conceptual root of the modem concept of emotional intelligence—the dynamic when
emotion-cognition pair or form a relation in preorganized, observable ways within the
body state, in response to challenges to the well-being of the individual (Damasio, 1994,
1999). In his search to separate emotion from the body, and sounding like a page out of
Darwin's 1872 book on the physical expressions of emotion, James asks in 1884: "What
kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heartbeat
nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of
goose flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. Can
one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the
face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous
action....?" (James, 1884, p. 193).
But what if an emotion is not connected to a survival instinct? Here is
where James begins to separate himself from the pack. The pack of 19th-century
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physiologists who paved the way for modem psychology—Darwin, Pavlov, Freud-did
not anticipate in their published writings James' revolutionary idea that some emotions
are non-physical. Thanks to their work, James could readily strip away the observable
physical expressions and physiological sensations of an emotion, and w hat did he find?
At the bottom of 'an emotion' James found "intellectual perception"
Games, 1884, p. 194) which may indicate that emotions have another half. James at the
time, however, was determined that some emotions are non-physical.
2.

Emotion is an intellectual feeling. James' radical concept of "intellectual

feelings" Games, 1884, p. 201)—radical for his time-causes some initial confusion even
today because his definition includes the brain but not the rest of the body!
In this definition, James is careful to separate out w hat he calls "pure
cerebral emotion" Games, 1884, p. 201) from the rest of the body where the instinctive
emotions occur—James calls instinctive emotions "the standard emotions" such as
anger, joy or fear—involuntarily generated by the neuro-muscular pathways of the
body in response to environmental cues of danger or well-being.

Pure cerebral

emotion, when compared to instinctive standard emotion, is a pleasurable and
voluntary perception generated by refined sensibilities, both moral and aesthetic
Games, 1884, p. 201), and occurs only in the brain.
"Concords of sounds, of colours, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological
fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the
representation itself, and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from
the parts below the brain....We have then, or some of us seem to have, genuinely
cerebral forms of pleasure and displeasure, apparently not agreeing in their mode of
production with the so-called standard emotions we have been analysing

But a sober

scrutiny of the cases of pure cerebral emotion....Unless in them there actually be
coupled with die intellectual feeling a bodily reverberation of some kind, unless we
actually laugh at the neatness of the mechanical device, thrill at the justice of the act, or
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tingle at the perfection of the musical form, our mental condition is more allied to a
judgment of right than to anything else...it is a cognitive act.
"And the dryness of it, the paleness, the absence of all glow, as it (the
intellectual feeling) may exist in an expert critic's mind, not only shows us what an
altogether different thing it is from the standard emotions we considered first, but
makes us suspect that almost the entire difference lies in the fact that the bodily
sounding-board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute" Games, 1884, pp. 201201). This radical thinking is where James separates himself from the physiologists,
whose research James uses extensively, but who may have indeed been unable to
understand James' idea that intellectual feelings do not activate, nor are activated by,
the rest of the body's inseparable neuro-muscular network.
3.

Ego is the emotional self. James' great conceptual contribution is not

physiological but a psychological definition of an emotional self. In so doing, he makes
a great contribution to the field of educational psychology as it has evolved today.
James veers off in a visionary direction by bringing the body back into this definition of
emotion. James does this by relying on the physical body in this definition as a great
sounding board of consciousness.
James theorized that the physiological changes that accompany emotions,
which his predecessors took great pains to delineate, also create "mental moods"
Games, 1884) so that "....the entire organism may be called a sounding-board, which
every change in consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate...(so) that no
shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique,
when taken in its totality, as the mental mood itself" Games, 1890, p. 450).
The important connecting point in James' entire conceptual structure is
that each physical sounding board is personalized by past emotional associations which
may or may not be accurate reflections of a present event or challenge (intellectually
unraveling the personalized collection of past emotional associations was the point-of-
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departure for Freudian analysis). It seems to be William James who begins to forge the
current concept that emotion-cognition is an inseparable physical dynamic whose
creation is the personalized self. Understanding and managing the emotional part of
the cognitive-emotional self of today is the target of contemporary psychology,
particularly transpersonal psychology whose goal is to open up past emotional wounds
(Walsh and Vaughan, 1993) to cause healing and new growth.
James explains that: "The fans et origo of all reality...is...subjective, is
ourselves....The world of living realities...is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an
active and emotional term.... Reality, starting from our Ego, thus sheds itself from point
to point—first, upon all objects which have an immediate sting of interest for our
Ego...and next, upon the objects most continuously related with these. It only fails
when the connecting thread is lost" (James, 1890, pp. 296-297).
James' 'connecting thread' Games, 1890, p. 297) is the attention-directing
role of personalized past associations. These associations are emotional and as
instinctive as Pavlov's dogs, who would salivate even to misleading feeding cues that
were associated with similar past feeding events in the same environment
(Pavlov, 1927). Personalized past associations can direct and bias the learning activity
of the emotional self (Damasio, 1994,1999). James suggests that perception of
objective reality depends on the personalized biases of the emotional self. James even
introduces subjective-objective Cartesian duality into his definition of self, by saying
that reality includes "the self as knower and the self as that which is known" (Matthews,
1993, p. 37).
This duality means that the cognitive self is able to perceive itself both
subjectively and objectively—and this duality is what permits the ever-shifting
measurement of the effectiveness of 'self' in the world, and that daily measurement is
self-esteem Qames in Matthews, 1993). This duality greatly expands James' definition of
emotion. Part of the self's dichotomy is its subjective effort to gauge how effective its
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objective self is in the real world of external reality (external to the subjective self).
James theorizes that self-esteem is a subjective-objective barometer which "rises and
falls from one day to the other" (James in Matthews, 1993, p. 37). But lest one begins to
feel uncomfortable with the essential fuzziness of James' theories of an emotional self, it
is fortunate that neuroimages and case studies are available today (Damasio, 1994) that
support James' intuitive assertions. The emotions of self-esteem, however, should be
familiar to everyone because, as James and his predecessors theorize, emotions and
emotional expressions are commonly shared by everyone and can be named and
defined.
4-

Emotions are commonly shared by everyone and can be named

and defined. Faces showing emotions are a major part of the shared knowledge-base
being tested by emotional intelligence instruments such as the MSCEIT V.2 (Mayer,
Salovey, and Caruso, 2000b) today. Darwin did the same thing in his 1872 publicationpresenting photographs of people's faces to point out certain physiological expressions
of emotions that can be named and defined by everyone, and also scientifically
identifying the facial muscles that make those expressions possible (Darwin, 1872/1955).
The theory then as now is that certain standard or primary emotions are commonly
expressed and can be commonly named and defined. James like Darwin contributes
greatly to the modem knowledge base when he describes and defines some of the
physical expressions of the primary emotions.
In his classic two-volume publication in 1890, James writes: "The chief
feature of the physiognomy of grief is perhaps its paralyzing effect on the voluntary
movements. This effect is by no means as extreme as that which fright produces, being
seldom more than that degree of weakening which makes it cost an effort to perform
actions usually done with ease. It is, in other words, a feeling of weariness; and (as in all
weariness) movements are made slowly, heavily, without strength, unwillingly, and
with exertion, and are limited to the fewest possible. By this the grieving person gets
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his outward stamp: he walks slowly, unsteadily, dragging his feet and hanging his
arms. His voice is weak and without resonance, in consequence of the feeble activity of
the muscles of expiration and of the larynx. He prefers to sit still, sunk in himself and
silent. ...With this condition of weakness of the voluntary nerve- and musde-apparatus
of the whole body, there coexists, as aforesaid, just as in all states of similar motor
weakness, a subjective feeling of weariness and heaviness, of something which weighs
upon one; one feels 'dow ncast/ 'oppressed/ 'laden/ and one speaks of his 'weight of
sorrow / one must 'bear u p ' under it...Many are there who 'succumb' to sorrow to such
a degree that they literally cannot stand upright, but sink or lean against surrounding
objects...this weakness...of the entire voluntary motor apparatus (is in addition to)...the
involuntary or 'organic' musdes...found in the walls of the blood vessels....(which) act in
grief...(to be) more strongly contracted than usual, so that the tissues and organs of the
body become anemic. The immediate consequence of this bloodlessness is pallor and
shrunkenness, and the pale color and collapsed features... (which) give to the victim of
grief...a feeling of cold and shivering. A constant symptom of grief is sensitiveness to
cold, and difficulty in keeping warm" (James, 1890, pp. 443-445).
James's discourse on the physical and subjective symptoms of grief, and
the light it sheds on the related mood of sadness, and the related prolonged emotionstate of depression, is an important conceptual root that supports the current theory
that emotion determines the cognitive mode (Damasio, 1994). 'Cognitive mode' means
how new information is perceived in a learning situation (Pavlov might say here that all
life is a learning situation): how quickly, how richly, how many cues from the
environment are noticed, how problem-solving is approached within various primary
emotion states such as fear vs. happiness.
"What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of
quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of
weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite
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impossible for me to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition in
the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth,
no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a
placid face?" (James, 1890, p. 452).

Defining_Emotion:_ Tames' Predecessors
James' anecdotal observations of emotional expressions that form his
theories are based on the groundbreaking work of other researchers of his era. His
research contemporaries were the 19th-century giants of physiology—Darwin, Pavlov
and Freud—who in the last quarter of the 19th century laid the foundations for 20thcentury psychology.

James' theoretical orientation and work owe a great conceptual

debt to Charles Darwin's Emotions of Man and Animals (the first manuscript of which
was written in 1838) in which Darwin identifies and describes the physical "overflow of
nerve-force" (Darwin, 1872/1955, p. 9) resulting in specific facial expressions shared by
humankind in common, recognizable expressions of the various human emotions. As
Darwin's many references make clear, James' publications (1884,1890) are not an
original contribution to the study of emotion. James is more the crest of the wave of a
host of scientists before him, going back to the 1660s in Europe. Darwin quotes from
the pioneering work of his day on emotion, and dtes some but not all of the emotion
researchers before him, most of whom were anatomists or physiologists.
"Many works have been written on Expression, but a greater number on
Physiognomy....With this latter subject I am not here concerned. The older treatises,
which I have consulted, have been of little or no service to me

The following works,

on the contrary, deserve the fullest consideration" (Darwin, 1872, p.l).
In the body of his 1872 publication, Darwin frequently dtes Herbert
Spencer's Prindples of Psychology published in 1855; Bain's The Senses and the Intellect
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published in 1864; Sir Charles Bell, in the 1806 first-edition and 1844 third-edition of
Bell's Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression.
Darwin himself is building on previous conceptual physiological research
dating back to Le Brun's 1667 work, "Conference on the Expression of the Different
Characteristics of the Passions" ("Conferences sur l'espression des differents Caracteres
des Passions") which Darwin remarks is "the best known ancient work, and contains
some good remarks" (Darwin, 1872, p. 1). Darwin dtes the Dutch anatomist, Pierre
Camper's 1774-1782 series of lectures entitled, "Discours par Pierre Camper sur le
moyen de representer les diverses passions" and published in 1792 which "can hardly
be considered as having made any marked advance in the subject" (Darwin, 1872, p. 1).
Other names of physiologists and anatomists whose works are cited by
Darwin in his 1872 book indude Drs. Lavater, Duchenne, Moreau, Lemoine, Gratiolet,
Piderit, Maudsley, Browne, and Burgess whose 1839 paper is on "The Physiology or
Mechanism of Blushing." Darwin also draws on world literature for descriptions of
expressions of emotion, induding Homer, Shakespeare and Dickens who in Oliver
Twist writes about a furious mob surrounding a murderer as "jumping up one behind
another, snarling with their teeth, and making at him like wild beasts" (Darwin, 1872, p.
241). Darwin adds a line from Shakespeare's Henrv V. Act HI, Scene 1 to describe the
emotion of rage, and determination: "In peace there’s nothing so becomes a man, As
modest stillness and humility; But when the blast of war blows in our ears, Then imitate
the action of the tiger: Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, Then lend the eye a
terrible aspect; Now set the teeth, and stretch the nostrils wide, Hold hard the breath,
and bend up every spirit To his full height!" (Darwin, 1872, pp. 240-241). Darwin also
dtes a list of forty-one older authors listed in an appendix to a paper dated 1746, by
J. Parsons, entitled "Philosophical Transactions"—all of these writers, to whom Darwin
refers as "the older treatises...of little or no service to me" were writing about the
observable expressions of human emotions.
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Darwin-like, James relies on describing the physical expressions of emotions, using
anecdotal stories and commonly shared observations about animals and humans. In
his 1872 publication, Darwin supplements his anecdotes and observations with
photographs of human faces and drawings of dogs and other animals; William James
later in his two-volume 1890 publication, will also present an assortment of dog stories
to support his theory. It must be noted that the neurophysiologist and neurosurgeon,
Antonio Damasio, one hundred years after both Darwin and James, also supplements
his theories with photographs showing the emotional expressions of a human face.

Damasio's Definitions: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
The neurosurgeon, Antonio Damasio, is a self-confirmed admirer of the
work of William James (Damasio, 1994). Damasio's own work as a neurosurgeon using
neuroimaging technology, reflects James' conceptual framework in defining how a
personalized emotional bias, including self-concept and its daily measure of self-esteem,
are all part of a continuous background feeling generated by the body, a source of
feelings that directs cognitive attention toward or away from certain perceptions and
guides cognitive reasoning in reaching a conclusion.
"The point I want to stress is that your mind is not a blank at the start of
the reasoning process. Rather it is replete with a diverse repertoire of images,
generated to the time of the situation you are facing, entering and exiting your
consciousness in a show too rich for you to encompass fully. How do you sort out the
questions inherent in the images before your mind's eye? ...imagine that before you
apply any kind of cost/benefit analysis...before you reason toward the solution of the
problem, something quite important happens. When the bad outcome connected with
a given response option comes into mind, however fleetingly, you experience an
unpleasant gut feeling. Because the feeling is about the body, I gave the phenomenon
the technical term of somatic state ("soma" is Greek for body); and because it "marks"
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an image, I called it a marker

What does the somatic marker achieve? It forces

attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead...and allows you to
choose from among fewer options" (Damasio, 1994, p. 173).
If there is an inseparable dynamic of emotion-body-cognition, as
Damasio's work suggests, this would mean that emotions are not just involved in
personality and self-concept development, ego stage-development and successful or
failed social relationships, but in every level of paying cognitive attention,
understanding the meaning of cognitive perceptions, and completion of learning tasks.
From involuntary survival-reflex thinking to higher abstract reasoning—cognitive
attention and cognitive responses are 'driven' or 'selected' by personalized emotions
and emotional associations (Dmasio, 1994,1999).
Damasio identifies this as "an internal preference system" (Damasio,
1994, p.179) and describes its physical, neural base as "mostly innate regulatory
dispositions, posed to ensure survival of the organism" which is "inherently biased to
avoid pain, seek potent pleasure, and is probably pretuned for achieving these goals in
social situations" (Damasio, 1884, p. 179).
Damasio thus links the social conditioning of 'self' to his idea of somatic
markers, which are not just emotion states generated by the body-brain interaction at
any given time but "somatic pairings" (Damasio, 1994, p. 179). This means that
emotion-cognition-body form a memory bank that automatically associates and
compares incoming new perceptions with past emotional experiences, such as extreme
exhaustion caused by writing an academic paper. Thus the somatic marker will tag
"certain categories of entity or event with the enactment of a body state" (Damasio,
1994, p.180) such that a student may feel negative and tired when thinking about
writing the next paper, and embark on a series of delaying tactics (Skaalvik, 1997), or, in
extreme cases of prolonged task-avoidance, may become depressed and emotionally
unable to perform (Skaalvik, 1997; Slipp, 1975).
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Damasio's 'somatic marker hypothesis' links young adulthood thinking
to past emotional associations that have "pretuned" the thinker, especially during the
childhood development of a differentiated 'self' (Slipp, 1975) and the self-esteem that is
a measure of self-concept (James in Matthews, 1993). Emotions associated with
childhood and other past experiences are how a college student has been "pretuned" to
achieve (or avoid achieving) undergraduate outcomes such as academic high
achievement and satisfaction with the college experience.

Managing the Primary and Secondary Emotions
Damasio identifies the primary survival emotions—which James calls the
standard emotions—and which Damasio lists as Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, and
Disgust. These emotions in turn "correspond to profiles of body state response which
are largely preorganized in the James sense" (Damasio, 1994, p. 149). When Damasio
says "profiles of body state response" he, like James before him, is referring back to the
great 19th-century physiologists—Darwin, Pavlov, Freud—who with the help of
anatomists were able to identify specific neural and muscular responses that are
universally associated with specific emotions. Damasio agrees with James that the
primary emotions are aroused by preorganized survival instincts, just as James
described. "When the body conforms to the (physiological) profiles of one of those
emotions, we feel happy, sad, angry, fearful, disgusted" (Damasio, 1994, p. 149).
Following James' lead, Damasio further theorizes that, aside from the
primary survival emotions, there are secondary emotions which are "tuned by
experience" (Damasio, 1994, p. 149). The secondary emotions, also described as
universal by Damasio, are much more subtle than the five primary survival emotions
of Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, and Disgust.
The secondary emotions also occur only in adulthood. These emotions
are the refined spin-offs of the strong survival emotions that children can be observed
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to experience, without benefit of mediation by life experience or cognitive adjustment.
The secondary emotions are described more as feelings than actual emotions. For
example, euphoria and ecstasy are the refined adult feelings of extreme Happiness. The
secondary emotions of adulthood can occur when subtler cognition than children are
capable of performing, connects to subtle variations in the emotional body state(s).
This kind of emotional feeling is tied directly to adult cognition, and is not preorganized
and involuntary the way the primary survival emotions experienced in childhood are.
This definition is parallel to James' idea of the intellectual feeling but is far
from being what James had in mind when he wanted to separate out the 'cerebral
feeling' from the rest of the physical body. Damasio makes sure that the preorganized
reflex emotions aroused by the physical body are included in the adulthood experience
of the more subtle intellectual feelings, feelings which Damasio labels as universal.
James was trying to differentiate the survival reflex emotions from the
more subtle feelings that can occur when cognition mediates emotional feelings (as
directed by the re-tuning of past emotional associations and experiences across the
lifespan). This definition makes the careful personal construction of an emotional life in
young adulthood during the college years vitally important. According to Damasio's
theory, emotional re-tuning can occur at any time across the lifespan, not just
haphazardly, or by chance, but by a careful individual re-creation of ego, a conscious
transformation of the "I" construct (Cortright, 1997) of personality and self-concept.
The pretuning to which Damasio refers is known in psychology as 'object
relations' (Slipp, 1975; Matthews, 1993). Object relations are the first emotional
relationships that are formed in childhood. If past object relationships with parents and
siblings (parents and siblings are the 'objects' of the relationship) formed during
childhood, get emotionally associated with an adult's similar new relationships, the
intersection of past and present similarities may make or break an adult's effectiveness
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as a social self, as well as bias perception of self-concept and the daily measurement of
self-esteem (James in Matthews, 1993). Again, emotion is the hidden thinker.
Self-esteem is emotion-biased, a subjective judgment, about one's
objective self who is going through the external circumstances of life as a winner or
loser. Damasio explains how emotions direct social behaviors upon which self-concept
and self-esteem depend, behaviors which became so severely impaired in the strange
19th-century case of Phineas Gage:
"We were bom with the neural machinery required to generate somatic
states in response to certain classes of stimuli—the machinery of primary emotions.
Such machinery is inherently biased to process signals concerning personal and social
behavior, and it incorporates at the outset dispositions to pair a large number of social
situations with adaptive somatic markers....The critical neural system for the acquisition
of somatic-marker signaling is in the prefrontal cortices...(which) receive signals from all
the sensory regions in which the images constituting our thoughts are formed,
including the somatosensory cortices in which past and current body states are
represented continuously...(and) from the neurotransmitter nuclei in the brain stem
(for instance, those which distribute dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotinin) and in
the basal forebrain (those which distribute acetylcholine), as well as the amygdala, the
anterior cyngulate, and the hypothalamus. The innate preferences of the organism
related to its survival...are conveyed to the prefrontal cortices by such signals and are
thus part and parcel of the decision-making apparatus...(and) the prefrontal cortices)
themselves represent categorizations of the situations in which the organism has been
involved" (Damasio, 1994, pp. 180-181).
Damasio unlike Darwin, James and Pavlov can look at neuroimages of
these specific brain areas as they feed information and associated emotional preferences
to the prefrontal cortices—such as the ventromedial areas of the frontal lobe which were
obliterated in the freak accident that severely injured the left side of Phineas Gage's
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brain, and left him conscious and capable of all the cognitive functions such as speech
and memory, but unable to make a decision (Damasio, 1994).
According to Damasio's hypothesis, "most somatic markers we use for
rational decision-making probably were created in our brains during the process of
education and sotialization....Early in development, punishment and reward are
delivered not only by the entities themselves (external circumstances), but by parents
and other elders and peers, who usually embody the social conventions and ethics of
the culture to which the organism belongs....The critical, formative set of stimuli to
somatic pairings is, no doubt, acquired in childhood and adolescence" (Damasio, 1994,
p. 179).
Instead of backing away from emotions, because fearing that everyone is
a pretuned and socialized robot, Damasio suggests that the same society which has
socialized and repressed or marginalized emotions from thinking can also set thinking
free. Thinking can become free when a thinker learns to recognize if his or her
behavior is being directed by emotions from the past that are still "connecting specific
classes of stimuli with specific classes of somatic state" (Damasio, 1994, p. 180).
Understanding and managing personal emotions for intellectual and emotional growth
remains a neglected part of the individual's education. "But the accrual of somatically
marked stimuli ceases only when life ceases, and thus it is appropriate to describe that
accrual as a process of continuous learning" (Damasio, 1994, p.179)
Self-concept formed by childhood emotion-markers may be a necessary
condition for higher learning to occur, especially in achieving competence in traditional
instructional targets of higher education: decision making and abstract reasoning. The
necessary presence of emotion in decision making and abstract reasoning is shown in
the tragic case of Phineas Gage, a once-popular young man before his left frontal lobe
was physically damaged, in fact obliterated by a length of iron railing which entered his
brain through the left eye in a bizarre accident (Damasio, 1994).
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Descartes' Error and the Strange Case of Phineas Gage
The following words by William James are strangely predictive of the
Phineas Gage case, as if James is literally paving the way for Damasio's analysis of the
strange 19th-century case.
"If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply than ever how
much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame..." (James, 1890, p. 467). "The
only way to coercively disprove it, however, would be to take some emotion, and then
exhibit qualities of feeling in it which should be demonstrably additional to all those
which could possibly be derived from the organs affected at the time. But to detect
with certainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would obviously be a task
beyond human power....A positive proof of this theory would, on the other hand, be
given if we could find a subject absolutely anaesthetic inside and out, but not paralytic,
so that emotion-inspiring objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him,
but who, on being consulted, should say that no subjective emotional affection was felt.
Such a man would be like one who, because he eats, appears to bystanders to be
hungry, but who afterwards confesses that he had no appetite at all" Games, 1890, p.
454-455).
Enter Phineas Gage.
In 1848, Phineas Gage was a young foreman working for Rutland and
Burlington Railroad to lay new rail and expand rail service in Vermont. He was only
twenty-five years old but already a construction boss, described by his employers as
"the most capable and efficient man" in their employ (Damasio, 1994).
Part of young Gage's job was exploding rocks to clear the ground. One
afternoon at work, an accidental explosion blew an iron tamping rod sky high, leaving
Gage and his men looking down at an intact rock but hearing a strange whistling sound
overhead. It is the iron tamping rod which had been packing blasting power into a hole
in the rock, but now comes hurtling through the air from the explosion and suddenly
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strikes young Gage in the head. "The iron enters Gage's left cheek, pierces the base of
his skull, traverses the front of his brain, and exits at high speed through the top of the
head. The rod has landed more than a hundred feet away, covered with blood and
brains." Gage is thrown to the ground, and lays there silent but conscious! "Horrible
Accident" was the headline reporting the accident in the Boston newspapers a week
later on September 20, while in the 19th-century vernacular "Wonderful Accident" was
the headline in the Vermont Mercury on September 22,1848. A Boston medical article
entitled "Passage of an Iron Rod through the Head" reported that "his men (with
whom he was a great favourite) took him in their arms and carried him to the
road...and sat him into an ox cart, in which he rode, sitting erect, a full three quarters of
a mile, to the hotel...Gage got out of the cart himself with a little assistance from his
men" (Damasio, 1994, pp. 4-5).
Years later a young doctor named Edward Williams wrote the following
account of attending young Gage that day: "He was at that time sitting in a chair upon
the piazza...When I drove up, he said, 'Doctor, here is business enough for you.' I first
noticed the wound upon the head before I alighted from my carriage, the pulsations of
the brain being very distinct...the top of the head appeared like an inverted
funnel...bone being fractured about the opening for a distance of about two inches in
every direction...the opening through the skull and integuments was not far from one
and a half inch in diameter...and the whole appeared as if some wedge-shaped body
had passed from below upward. Mr. Gage, during the time I was examining this
wound, was relating the manner in which he was injured to the bystanders; he talked
so rationally and was so willing to answer questions that I directed my inquiries to him
in preference to the men who were standing about at this time. I can safely say that
neither at that time nor on any subsequent occasion, save once, did I consider him to be
other than perfectly rational. The one time...was about a fortnight after the accident,
and then he persisted in calling me John Kirwin..." (Damasio, 1994, p. 6.). In less than
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two months, Gage was pronounced cured, but Gage's behavior would begin to show
an "extraordinary turn"—"Gage's disposition, his likes and dislikes, his dreams and
aspirations are all to change. Gage's body may be alive and well, but there is a new
(kind of) spirit animating it" (Damasio, 1994, p. 7).
A doctor in Vermont named John Harlow took over the long-term care of
Gage and records that although Gage appeared fully recovered, was not paralyzed and
could feel, hear and see though his remaining left eye, had no difficulty with speech or
language, and walked firmly and used his hands with dexterity, his once-popular
personality changed drastically. "Gage became "fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in
the grossest profanity which was not previously his custom...impatient of restraint or
advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious
and vacillating, devising many plans of future operation which are no sooner arranged
than they are abandoned...." (Damasio, 1994, p. 8).
Gage was never able to hold a steady job for the rest of his life and made
extreme career moves such as moving to South America and becoming a side-show for
Bamum and Bailey Circus, in which he would show his head wound and brandish the
iron rod that had caused his tragic injury.
After he left the circus, Gage moved to San Frandsco where he "took to
drinking and brawling in questionable districts" (Damasio, 1994, p. 10) even though
his sister had married into a prominent family in San Frandsco. Gage experienced a
series of seizures that increased in frequency until he died on May 21,1861 at age 38.
Using the preserved skull of Phineas Gage 150 years after Gage's death,
Damasio holds up a telling neuroimage to the sad story of Phineas Gage with a
computer-generated look at Gage's damaged brain. The neuroimage connects his
irrational and non-sodal behaviors to the absence of the left frontal, anterior
ventromedial lobe that was obliterated by the iron rod. Gage was the victim of the
destruction of the brain-body regulator, the mediator between sodal expressions and
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primal ego desires generated in the lower centers of unrestrained animal instinct,
unacceptable social behaviors which defined the course of Gage's adult life after the
accident. In 1848 Gage's Vermont physician, Dr. Harlow, wrote that "...the equilibrium
or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculty and animal propensities" had
been destroyed (Damasio, 1994).
Gage's unrestrained and anti-social behaviors that did not appear until
after his injury, give evidence of the role of emotion in regulating and developing a
social ego, the 'emotional self' that William James describes. But more significantly, for
higher education, Gage's inability to make decisions or carry out plans defines the
hidden role of emotion in the expressions of 'thought' and 'self.'
"Whenever I call a decision advantageous, I refer to basic personal and
social outcomes such as survival of the individual and its kin, the securing of shelter, the
maintenance of...health, employment and financial solvency, and good standing in the
social group. Gage's...new mind (after the accident) no longer permitted (him) to
obtain any of these advantages" (Damasio, 1994, p. 170)
Before Gage was buried in 1861, the mortician opened Gage's coffin and
removed the skull. He also removed the iron tamping rod that had caused Gage's
injury and that had been placed beside Gage in the coffin. The iron rod was sent along
with Gage's skull to Dr. Harlow in Vermont. Until Damasio recently received the skull
and iron rod, they were at the Warren Medical Museum of the H arvard Medical School
in Boston.
What did Damasio want with the skull and rod? He wanted to find out
what brain areas had been damaged or obliterated, by the iron rod that would have
accompanied Phineas Gage to his grave. The intriguing fact about Gage's severe injury
was that his attention, memory, cognitive perception skills, language ability and motor
skills were all left intact. What then had been damaged?
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Neuroanatomy and neuroimaging technology that can reconstruct brain
area images in three dimensions, used computer manipulation of "the raw data
obtained from high-resolution magnetic resonance scans" of Gage's skull (Damasio,
1994, p. 31). The resulting neuroimages rendered pictures of what Gage's brain would
have looked like in 1861 on the autopsy table.
Damasio's analysis of the computer-generated images of Gage's
reconstructed brain found that the damage was intensive on the left hemisphere and
anterior sectors of the frontal lobe. The iron rod did not touch the brain regions
regulating motor function and language. The ventromedial prefrontal region of the left
hemisphere was severely damaged—and this region had recently been identified by
Damasio's research as "critical for normal decision making" (Damasio, 1994, p.32). It
was damage to the prefrontal cortices of Phineas Gage's brain that stopped him from
deciding on and carrying out reasonable plans for his future well-being, and behaving
according to social rules which he had previously respected. To reinforce these
conclusions about Gage's injury, Damasio was able to compare the similar post-injury
behavior of some of his contemporary patients who had prefrontal brain damage
similar to Gage's. Based on the comparative studies, Damasio concludes that "bilateral
damage to prefrontal cortices is consistently associated with impairments of reasoning
/ decision making and emotion/feeling" (Damasio, 1994, p. 61).
To explain this apparent necessary link between physical brain areas and
behaviors including decision making, Damasio writes, "...I propose that human reason
depends on several brain systems, working in concert across many levels of neuronal
organization, rather than as a single brain center. Both "high-level" and "low-level"
brain centers, from the prefrontal cortices to the hypothalamus and brain stem,
cooperate in the making of reason. The lower levels in the neural edifice of reason are
the same ones that regulate the processing of emotions and feelings, along with the
body functions necessary for an organism's survival. In turn, these lower levels
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maintain direct and mutual relationships with virtually every bodily organ, thus placing
the body directly within the chain of operations that generate the highest reaches of
reasoning... Emotion, feeling, and biological regulation all play a role in human reason.
The lower orders of our organism are in the loop of high reason" (Damasio, 1994, p.
xiii.)
Descartes' error was leaving the body out of his famous equation. His
error was an egocentric error. He equated 'self' with the cognitive "I" which performs
thinking. His error was that he excluded the emotions of the body, which are
generated by and inseparable from the body at all times, not just during an emotional
crisis. Descartes separated conscious cognition from the non-consdous "lower orders
of our organism" (Damasio, 1994, p. xiii).
Damasio illustrates the body-cognition-emotion conundrum with
neuroimaging of the preserved skull of the brain-damaged Phineas Gage. Damasio
again asks Descartes' question: "How is it that we are consdous of the world around
us, that we know what we know, and that we know that we know?" Unlike Descartes,
Damasio condudes that "....all is based on neural events within a brain, provided that
brain has been and now is interacting with its body" (Damasio, 1994, p. xvii).
In his day, William James mused: "Cognition and emotion are parted—
who can say that their antagonism may not just be one phase of the world-old struggle
known as that between the spirit and the flesh?" (James, 1884, p. 203).

Pavlov's Contribution
In the late-19th and early-20th century, Pavlov's contribution to the
emerging field of psychology was the chance discovery that preorganized and
involuntary responses form emotional assodations that may condition future behavior.
Today's psychology teaches that past emotional assodations across the lifespan impact
development of personality, self-esteem, self-concept, and "pretune" an individual for
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success or failure (Damasio, 1994,1999). Pavlov perceived that the possibilities of such
acquired associations are not robotic but fluid, infinite and individualized.
"So infinitely complex, so continuously in flux, are the conditions in the
world around, that that complex animal system which is itself in living flux, and that
system only, has a chance to establish dynamic equilibrium with the environment.
Thus we see that the fundamental and the most general function of the (cerebral)
hemispheres is that of reacting to signals presented by innumerable stimuli of
interchangeable signification" (Pavlov, 1927, p. 15).
James follows Pavlov in saying "that the nervous system of every living
thing is but a bundle of predispositions" which "react in particular ways upon the
contact of particular features of the environment" (James, 1884, p. 190). Pavlov's
research findings can be used to understand that emotions are preorganized responses
to the environment that, instinct-like, continue to direct future cognitive attention to
"selected" cognitive perceptions.

This hidden, emotional conditioning of cognitive

consciousness is a challenge to learning and teaching.
Pavlov's dog salivation experiments presented to the world for the first
time scientific evidence of the existence of an automatic learning-reflex, innate,
associative, non-rational and instantaneous. In fact, the preorganized learning-reflex
which Pavlov's dogs demonstrated, was shown by the dogs to be directed by the
instinct of hunger and the reflex behavior to find food to eat. James stated that
instincts arouse emotions, but Pavlov blurs the line between instinct and reflex.
According to Pavlov, reflexes are just "smaller instincts" "like the driving-belts of
machines..." (Pavlov, 1927, p. 8).
Pavlov adds that: "Between the simplest reflex and the instinct we can
find numerous stages of transition, and among these we are puzzled to find any line of
demarcation" and "It is pretty evident that under natural conditions the normal animal
must respond not only to stimuli which themselves bring immediate benefit or harm,
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but also to other physical or chemical agencies—waves of sound, light, and the like—
which in themselves only signal the approach of these stimuli" (Pavlov, 1927, pp. 9,14).
Pavlov's lab dogs consistently showed how a signal of approaching food
produces physical responses by the body, but not just simple responses. The dogs
responded not just to actual food approaching but to remembered past-assodations
when food was approaching, induding anyone in a white lab coat. James interpreted
Pavlov's great discovery of how assodative learning works to mean that Pavlov's
animals simply paired or coupled similarities occurring contiguously into w hat might be
called "feeding assodations." Hating is an obvious survival instinct, and James
theorized that instincts arouse emotion. Instinctive learning occurs when emotions are
evoked by an experience or event.
Pavlov's dogs showed how the survival instinct 'to eat' arouses instinctive
or reflex-emotions that direct attention in a biased way to perceive similarities (some
perceived similarities may be only imagined similarities)—assodated with previous
arrivals of food.
In his theory about human reasoning, James differentiates simple
assodation of events that occur together (as demonstrated by Pavlov's laboratory
animals) from higher human reasoning. James notes the brute animal's inability to do
any "thinking" more complex than simple coupling of similarities; James calls this
contiguous thinking.
For example, ringing a bell had been an event that the dogs previously
paired with the arrival of their food. Subsequently, simply ringing a bell would cause
the dogs to salivate even when no food or feeder was in sight. Pavlov's dogs did not
have the cognitive capadty to dissodate the past similarities of being fed with a ringing
bell. Pavlov's dogs could assodate but not dissodate similarities. The present could
not be dissodated from the past. In the past, there had been approaches of whitecoated people with dog food while a bell rang.
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The mind-body-environment, however, does not automatically stay in a
state of false equilibrium, as Pavlov's dogs next demonstrated. When a ringing bell
continued to signal "no food," a new contiguous association was formed, and
eventually the ringing bell without food elicited no salivation response.
According to James, not all humans are intellectually or emotionally
prepared to transcend the preorganized stimulus-response mechanism that begins to
emotionally condition thinking in childhood (Matthews, 1993; Slipp, 1977) and which
Pavlov's dogs demonstrated (Pavlov, 1927). The thinking and emotions of some adults
may remain self-centered, because still conditioned by childhood experiences, and may
continue across the lifespan to be a pawn of the past's associative, emotional
mechanism that is innate to all learning, but is generally ignored even by the learner.
Kohlberg, Erikson, and Loevinger among other developmental theorists
identified stages of self-development, ranking the self-centered early stages as the
lower stages, that is, the early stages of 'self' formation that occur in childhood but can
be mediated and transcended by future life experiences (Santrock, 1997; Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991). Lawrence Kohlberg believed that most adult thinking does not
develop past the self-centered childhood stage, which is stage two of Kohlberg's seven
stages of cognitive-emotional self-development (Kohlberg in Santrock, 1997). The
highest stages of self-development go beyond the simplistic, self-related, contiguous
thinking which James describes for some humans and the lower brutes (James, 1890;
Matthews, 1993; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993; Cortright, 1997).
James wonders why only some humans, but not others, are cognitively
able to dissociate among similarities and reach complex decisions using abstract
reasoning. James' great theoretical contribution to psychology is parallel to the
contributions of Pavlov's heroic laboratory dogs, who demonstrated that "association
by similarities" is a preorganized learning mechanism in humans and animals. James
theorized that past emotional associations function like an animal's survival instinct.
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In fact when James, like Darwin, presents an extensive number of anecdotal dog stories
Games, 1890) to illustrate how the associative learning-reflex is demonstrated by dogs
as well as their hum an owners, he refers to humans as "the talking animal" and "the
reasoning animal"—thereby blurring the distinction between animal instinct and
instinctive human learning that is preorganized and involuntary.
Pavlov assists James in this blurring when he defines a reflex as "a smaller
instinct" and describes "chains of reflexes" that can group together under one umbrella
instinct for purposes of well-being and survival. Pavlov's chance discovery of an innate
non-rational learning mechanism—James' 'association by similarities'—is useful in
defining why emotion is necessary in cognitive reasoning Games, 1890; Damasio, 1994).

lames' Contribution: Connecting Emotion to Reasoning
When James wonders in Principles of Psychology, "...why Darwin and
Newton had to be waited for so long" Games, 1890, p. 360) and "Why does it need a
Newton to notice the law of the squares, a Darwin to notice the law of the fittest?"
Games, 1890, p. 348), he is wondering about individual differences—a pivotal factor in
assessing the outcomes differences in higher education, and a question in emotional
intelligence research today. Like any good educator, James is wondering why some
people are high achievers where others fail to perform. James asks, "Why cannot
anybody reason as well as anybody else?" Games, 1890, p. 343).
In answer to his own question, James points out that "Geniuses...differ
from from ordinary minds by an unusual development of association by similarity"
Games, 1890, p. 348). Abstract reasoning is so complex and rarefied, according to
James, that not all humans can perform it. James saw that "The flash of similarity
between an apple and the moon...was too recondite to have occurred to any but
exceptional minds. Genius...is identical with the possession of similar association to an
extreme degree" Games, 1890, p. 360).
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James describes an undisciplined stream of consciousness, driven by
simple contiguous associations in which some adults, young children and some animals
appear to 'think/ The higher level abstract thinking that is both associative and
dissociative is a distinctly human cognitive ability, but cognition alone is not enough to
reach a solution in the reasoning process, even after analyzing each part of the whole
Qames, 1890). James describes "the roll out" Games, 1890, p. 347) of a conclusion or
solution to a problem "after the flight of reason" Games, 1890) has occurred. He
explains that "...association by similarity ...operates of itself in highly gifted minds
without any deliberation, spontaneously collecting analogous instances, uniting in a
moment what in nature the whole breadth of space and time keeps separate, and so
permitting a perception of identical points in the midst of different circumstances, which
minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity could never begin to attain" Games,
1890, p. 360). James drew a flower-like sketch of the reasoning process, with
intersecting petals A, B, C, D, and E and "m" intersecting all the petals in the center.
"If m, in the present representation A, calls up B, C, D, and E, which are
similar to A in possessing it, and calls them up in rapid succession, then m, being
associated almost simultaneously with such varying concomitants, will 'roll out' and
attract our separate notice" Games, 1890, p. 347).
Could the James "roll out" be "the lurking presence of emotion" that has
persisted in the history of the development of reason (Solomon, 1993, p. 3)?
Could the James 'roll out' be the Aristotelian inspiration of the affective
domain?
As contemporary case studies and neuroimaging show (Damasio, 1994),
without intact and healthy emotion areas of the brain in the lefet frontal lobe, cognitive
thinking cannot reach a conclusion or decide which solution best solves a problem
(Damasio, 1994). Educational applications that academically engage emotions to
determine an optimal cognitive mode for learning (Damasio, 1994) may also facilitate
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a "roll out" solution (James, 1890), as spelled out in Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives: Handbook II (see Appendix B) (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). This
1964 taxonomy suggests that William James' concept of the 'emotional self' (James,
1884) should be academically engaged, because: "Feelings, along with the emotions
they come from, are not a luxury. They serve as internal guides... (C)onceptualize the
essence of feelings as something you and I can see through a window that opens
directly onto a continuously updated image of the structure and state of our body....In
the landscape of your body, the objects are the viscera (heart, lungs, gut, muscles) while
the light and shadow and movement and sound represent a point in the range of
operation of those organs at a certain moment. By and large, a feeling is the
momentary 'view' of that body landscape. It has a specific content—the state of the
body and the specific neural systems that support it—the peripheral nervous system and
the brain regions that integrate signals related to body structure and regulation

the

qualifying body state, positive or negative, is accompanied and rounded up by a
corresponding thinking mode: fast moving and idea rich, when the body state is in the
positive and pleasant band of the (emotion) spectrum, but slow moving and repetitive
when the body state veers toward the painful band" (Damasio, 1994, pp. xix-xv).
The case foi a role for emotions in the development of 'thought' and 'self'
gives educational importance to the research concept of 'emotional intelligence.'

What is 'Emotional Intelligence'?
Emotional intelligence is an ability to understand and perceive emotions
and emotional expressions in self and others, an ability that can develop naturally from
life experience or can be taught and learned. Emotional intelligence when tested as a
performance ability intersects the two domains (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b)
because the test questions call for remembering and defining specific emotions and
situations, which is the first step in Bloom's Handbook I: Cognitive Domain:
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"...the remembering either by recognition or recall, of ideas, material, or
phenomena" (Bloom, et al., 1956, p. 62). Emotional intelligence when tested as a
performance ability intersecting the cognitive domain begins in the simple recognition,
recall and defining of emotional expressions, for example in photographs, and ends
with complex problem-solving in given hypothetical situations about dilemmas
involving emotions which require a decision or solution. Note historically, that it was
Aristotle who connected emotions to ethical reasoning; the contemporary emotional
intelligence research concept also involves emotions in reasoning-called 'emotional
reasoning' or 'reasoning with emotions'—about a problem or situation involving the
emotions of others (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
'Emotional reasoning' is part of a second definition of 'emotional
intelligence' in which emotions are tested with traditional measures of intelligence,
about the information that emotions convey, which meets the traditional standards of
an intelligence that is separate from but related to cognitive intelligence (Mayer, Caruso
and Salovey, 2000; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
The third deinition of 'emotional intelligence' is that it is "a part of
personality" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000). Personality development includes ego
and self-concept formation (Matthews, 1993; Slipp, 1977; Santrock, 1997, Pascarella and
Terenzini, 1991; Astin, 1977,1993; Chickering and Reisser, 1993), which are directly
related to academic achievement efforts in higher learning (Bandura, 1992). Other
popularized definitions of, and "cure-all" claims for, the concept of emotional
intelligence go beyond the scope of emotional intelligence as a set of abilities that
convey information and can be tested (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000). Even the
three limited definitions above, included in the original ability model of emotional
intelligence (Salovey and Mayer, 1990) that first introduced the research concept a
decade ago, cover a very large and diverse area of physiological and psychological
research that has been examined in relation to emotion since 1900.
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Historical Development of the Emotional Intelligence Concept
From 1900 to 1969, "psychology w as still a young concept" (Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). This was a period w hen the research concepts of
'intelligence' and 'emotion' were researched separately. This period defined the
historical domain separation of cognition from emotion. During this era, the
standardized intelligence or "IQ" test such as the Stanford-Binet (Santrock, 1997) was
first devised. In the separate area of emotion research, the early experiments were still
focused on confirming or disconfirming one of the concepts that James inherited from
his predecessors in physiology, namely, whether "feelings precede physiological
emotional responses, or vice versa" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20).
Darwin's work was also still having an impact on the research of this period, namely,
"whether emotions held similar meanings across species, as Darwin had proposed, or
whether they were culturally determined" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20)—
the evolutionist nature-versus-nurture debate.
From 1970 to 1989, "the precursors to emotional intelligence were put into
place" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). Research in this period became
"more sophisticated and inter-area" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000, p. 20). A new
field of study defined as "cognition and affect" integrated study of the previously two
separated areas of research. Research was looking for "lawful rules of emotion: what
emotions meant, and when they arose" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). The
research of Paul Erkman published in 1973 supported Darwin's idea that emotions are
not just a human phenomenon but evolve in similar ways across species. This
assertion helps prove the educational learning applications of Pavlov's findings. The
psychological influence of emotions on thinking began to be studied among depressed
individuals and in people with bipolar disorder (manic-depressive). Also, computer
programs that simulated human intelligence were devised that could demonstrate
understanding of the emotions of characters as told in stories (Mayer, Salovey and
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Caruso, 2000b, p. 20). Thus the scope of "emotions" was expanded from physiology
into psychology and cyberspace. A key development was the emergent idea that
"intelligence" is not a static entity but a composite of multiple and different kinds of
"intelligences" (Gardner, 1993 in Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a).
From 1990 to 1997, the concept of 'emotional intelligence' emerged. It
drew on diverse areas of research from the previous nine decades. A journal article
(Salovey and Mayer, 1990) formally theorized that brain research, intelligence
measurement, artificial intelligence, clinical psychology, and other areas of related
research, were "all addressing the same phenomenon: a heretofore overlooked
intelligence" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 21).
The first ability scale to measure emotional intelligence was devised in
1990 (Mayer, DiPaolo and Salovey, 1990). The first formal definition of emotional
intelligence was published in 1990 as: "the ability to monitor one's own and others'
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide
one's thinking and actions (Salovey and Mayer, 1990).
In 1997, a more complex four-branch model was designed (Mayer and
Salovey, 1997) to test emotional intelligence as an ability to: 1) perceive, 2) use, 3)
understand and 4) manage emotions. The ability in each of these four branches was
operationally defined as: 1) the ability to perceive emotions in oneself and others, as
well as in objects, art, stories, and the like; 2) the ability to generate, use, and feel
emotion as necessary to communicate feelings, or employ them for the emotional
facilitation of thought; 3) the ability to understand emotional information, how
emotions combine and progress through relationship transitions, and to reason about
emotional meanings; and 4) the ability to be open to feelings, to modulate them in
oneself and others so as to promote personal understanding and growth (Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000, p. 24).
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In the year 2000, the definition was refined by its originators who stated
that, "We believe that emotions can be intelligent and that emotions can be integrated
with intelligence to improve the quality of our rational decisions" (Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000, p. 23) and endorsed a definition of emotional intelligence in the year 2000
that reiterates their 1997 definition: "Emotional intelligence involves
the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion;
the ability to access a n d /o r generate feelings when they facilitate
thought;
the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and
the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and
intellectual growth" (Mayer and Salovey, 1997, p. 10).
By the year 2000, an emotional intelligence ability test (the MSCEIT, V.2) had been
designed based on these four abilities from the 1997 test, having a total of 15 task, area,
overall, and branch scores for each test participant.

What Emotional Intelligence Is Not
Emotional intelligence when tested as an ability operationalizes (makes
occur) the perception, use, understanding, and management of emotions, but the test
cannot be a cure-all for the emotional challenges of achievement. Emotional
intelligence as a set of abilities comprise only one mediating variable among hundreds
of other individualized variables that mediate achievement for any one person. The
social- and self-improvement applications of emotional intelligence "promised" by a
popularized self-help book became a sore point for the originators of the research
concept during 1994-1998 (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a).
"Consider that a person's grade point average is a reflection of her or his
behavior, over hundreds of days, over hundreds of quizzes, tests, and other
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assignments, as assessed (and influenced) by multiple independent observers" (Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).

Dozens of psychological variables also influence

grade point average and other measures of academic and social achievement in college,
and are identified in research literature (Bandura, 1992; Krathwohl, et al., 1964; Oatley
and Jenkins, 1996; Damasio, 1994,1999; Skaalvik, 1997; Guerreo and Miller, 1998; Ifert
and Roloff, 1997; Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 1997).
In the testing and appraisal of emotional knowledge, emotional
intelligence is not new. Test instruments that appraise and analyze the emotions that
impact learning have been available for decades, such as the Succeed-Fail Questionnaire
and the Adjective Rating Scale, designed to probe depression and childhood selfdifferentiation; and the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist and Thematic Apperception
Test which measure depression, hostility and feelings of well-being (Slipp, 1975, p. 139).
The literature indicates that depression has received the bulk of research, making
happiness in comparison a lesser known emotion (Francis, et al.,1998). In fact, a search
on PSYCHLIT tagging January 1990 to December, 1995 found 18,903 dtes for
"depression' and "only 515 dtes for "happiness"' (Frands, et al., 1998, p. 167).
The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On EQi) does measure
broader dimensions of emotion than depression induding independence,
assertiveness, self-actualization, empathy, sodal responsibility, problem solving,
flexibility, tolerance for stress, impulse control, happiness, and optimism (Schutte, et al.,
1998). The Style And Perception of Affect Scale is based on the concept "that being able
to attend rapidly, appropriately, and effortlessly to feelings (of self and others) is the
cornerstone of emotional intelligence" (Schutte, et al., 1998, p. 169); this test measures
body-based, evaluation-based, and logic-based perceptions of emotion.
The educational application of emotional intelligence would be to regulate
negative emotions based on past experience that may foster task-avoidance (Skaalvik,
1997) and to generate instead positive emotions which engender a rich, rapid and
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creative cognitive mode for learning (Damasio, 1994,1999; Mayer and Salovey, 1990).
This is the application of the original emotional intelligence ability model of 1990.
It was with regret, then, that between 1994 and 1998 (Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000b, p. 20), the originators of the research concept of emotional intelligence
saw it being proclaimed, sold in a best-selling book (Goleman in Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000), and even appearing on the cover of Time Magazine in 1998, as a self-help
remedy for social acceptance, a better personality, success in life—improvements
"accessible by virtually anyone" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 22).
The problem with that, as William James and Antonio Damasio have
explained, is that each individual is "pretuned" during childhood with personalized
emotional associations that function as unique and hidden variables determining
individual achievement or avoidance of achievement (Skaalvik, 1997; Matthews, 1993;
Slipp, 1977). These hidden psychological variables can produce serious emotion states
such as depression that may become "a double-bind on achievement" (Slipp, 1977) for
which knowledge of emotional intelligence is not a remedy. Emotional intelligence as a
research concept is at this time still growing up. Emotional intelligence is primarily still
a research measurement of individual understanding and awareness of emotions and
cannnot be applied as therapy or remedy for hidden emotional problems that may be
impeding greater social or economic success—a misleading promise by self-help books
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a).
During 1994-1998, the original researchers saw their concept of 1990 being
"stretched—popularly—to include a large number of personality traits (e.g., emotional
stability, optimism) or a set of unrelated competencies (e.g., leadership, collaboration)"
far beyond the scope of the academic research concept of emotional intelligence as a set
of abilities to understand and manage emotions that can be tested and measured
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 20-23).
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The self-help promises and "loose description of the (emotional
intelligence) concept created an explosion of activity"in the mid-1990s which equated
emotional intelligence with "getting" desired personality characteristics for success such
as empathy, motivation, persistence, warmth and generalized good social behavior
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000, pp. 22-23). The reality is that emotional intelligence
cannot guarantee self-improvement. Emotional intelligence tests can provide a mirror
to the emotional 'self' which may lead to increased awareness that emotions convey
information, to cue cognitive thinking and decision making (Damasio, 1994,1999).
Learning to understand how to manage emotions with 'emotional
intelligence' may indirectly lead individuals to desire a higher level of ego-stage
development (Weathersby, 1981; Loevinger in Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991) and the
maturity of a self-concept that goes beyond the conceits of self-esteem (Matthews, 1993;
Cortright, 1997; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993). The development of 'self' is a very
complex dependent variable, but can be mediated by knowledge of emotional
intelligence. During the undergraduate years, applications of emotional intelligence
could become an educationally important mediating variable within Astin's model of
higher education, because it is a learned ability to perceive, understand, use, and
manage personal emotions to facilitate self-concept formation, rational thinking and
achievement efforts.
The educational question is: Would the instructional inclusion of
emotional intelligence as a set of learned abilities become an effective mediating
variable in the undergraduate college experience, one that would assist individuals to
achieve, in some individual way, more "satisfying" psychosocial and academic
outcomes in the higher education experience (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom
and Masia, 1964; Chickering and Reisser, 1993; As tin, 1977,1993; Terenzini, 1997;
Pascarella and Terenzini, 1991)?
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It is Plato who must have the final w ord on this question:
"But the release of the prisoners from chains," Plato writes, "and their
translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, their ascent from the
underground den to the sun...this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to
the contemplation of that which is best in existence, w ith which we may compare the
raising of that faculty of reasoning which is the very light of the body...is not a theme to
be treated of only in passing, but will have to be discussed again and again" (Plato in
Jowett, 1946, p. 271).
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Chapter Three
Methodology

"What is missing is a systematic effort to collect evidence of
growth in affective objectives which is in any way parallel to
the very great and
systematic efforts to evaluate cognitive achievement"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 16).
The Research Problem
This study's research problem was the continuing exclusion of the
affective domain from the academic development of intellect in higher education today,
a problem that may be impacting the outcomes of the undergraduate college
experience. The purpose of this study was to look for a relation between the affective
domain of emotions and traditional cognitive domain indicators of academic
achievement.

Description of the Test Instrument
In this study, a standardized test instrument, the Mayer-Salovey-CarusoEmotional-Intelligence-Test, Version 2 (the MSCEIT, V.2) (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey
and Caruso, 2000b) was used to test and measure the affective domain 'intelligence' of
61 undergraduate college students who participated in this study at a top-ranked public
university in the southeastern United States.
The MSCEIT, V.2 was designed by Professor Peter Salovey, Chair of the
Department of Psychology at Yale University, and Professor Jack Mayer of the
Psychology Department, University of New Hampshire, in collaboration with David
Caruso, Ph.D, to involve emotions in simple cognitive thinking and in complex
problem-solving. The MSCEIT, V.2 was made available on-line for research use.
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See Appendix C for the MSCEIT. V.2 Test Manual description of MSCEIT, V.2
construct validity and reliability (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
The forerunner of the MSCEIT, V.2 was the Multifactor Emotional
Intelligence Scale (MEIS) developed by Professors Salovey and Mayer, in collaboration
with Dr. Caruso, which was made available for research use in 1997. The MEIS tested a
set of theoretically interrelated emotional intelligence abilities in tasks asking the testtaker to identify emotions in faces, music, designs, stories; in a synthesis of emotional
situations and emotional biases; in blends or combinations of different but related
emotions in a given hypothetical situation; and in managing emotions in self and
others. Prior to the MEIS, early research in emotion perception and use of emotions in
thought was published in 1990 and 1993 by Professors Mayer and Salovey (Mayer and
Salovey, 1993; Salovey and Mayer, 1990). This early research integrated existing
emotion-perception literature which had focused on perceiving emotions in
photographs of faces, in colors, and in abstract designs. The finding by Professors
Mayer and Salovey at that time (1990,1993) was that a single 'emotional' ability
appeared to be operating in what had been previously researched as separate emotionperception tasks. The research problem then became how to further define and
measure that ability.
The next research step forward was to identify the ability. The name
'emotional intelligence' was given to the ability to perceive, use, understand and
manage 'intelligence' conveyed by "the language of emotions" (Mayer and Salovey,
1990), and to test that ability with exercises designed to measure emotion-perception in
written stories (Mayer and Geher, 1996). Further analysis of the findings of that
research showed that scores on 'the stories task' correlated positively with the testtakers' SAT scores (Mayer and Salovey, 1990).
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From this earlier research, the current research concept of the MSCEIT,
V.2 emerged that the 'intelligence' of emotions correlates positively with general
intelligence and self-reported Grade Point Average (see Appendix C) (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) and with academic achievement as measured
and scored by the SAT (Mayer and Geher, 1996).
In this study, whose purpose was to look for a relation between the
affective domain of emotions and the cognitive domain of academic achievement, the
MSCEIT, V.2 was applicable because specifically designed to involve the 'intelligence' of
emotions (emotional intelligence) in exercises of cognitive thinking and abstract
problem-solving. This study's research questions ask if emotional intelligence scores
on the MSCEIT, V.2 are related to traditional cognitive measures of academic
achievement, and if age and gender are related to emotional intelligence test scores.
The MSCEIT, V.2 like the earlier MEIS instrument tests four components
of emotional intelligence: 1) the ability to perceive emotions; 2) the ability to access,
generate and use emotions to assist thought; 3) the ability to understand emotions and
emotional knowledge; and 4) the ability to self-regulate emotions in relation to self and
the emotions of others, so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth.

To do

this, the MSCEIT, V.2 presents eight tasks: the Faces Task, the Facilitation Task, the
Changes Task, the Emotion Management Task, the Pictures Task, the Sensations Task,
the Blends Task, and the Social Management Task. Chapter 4 provides more detail on
each task. The MSCEIT, V.2 tests 8 tasks in four branches of emotional intelligence
ability, and provides 3 overall index scores of emotional intelligence, for a total of 15
scores for each test participant.

Description of the Achievement Data
The achievement data for each of the 61 test participants were collected
and blind-coded for research use by this study:
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1)

SAT/ACT scores; 2) high-school class rank; 3) current-semester GPA

(at the time of MSCEIT, V.2 testing).

Ihg-Research-Ques.tiong
This study's research questions were:
1) Is there a relation between MSCEIT, V.2 measures of emotional
intelligence and traditional measures of academic achievement?
2) Do MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores differ by age and gender of the testtaker, and if so, is the difference statistically significant, or by chance?

The Research Hypothesis
The null hypothesis is that there is a zero correlation between measures of
academic achievement and measures of emotional intelligence.
The second null hypothesis is that MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores do not differ
by age and gender.
The null hypothesis for determining correlations between measures of
emotional intelligence and measures of academic achievement, and determining
correlations between measures of emotional intelligence and test-taker age was:
Ho: r = 0
and its alternate hypothesis was:
Ha: r # 0

The null hypothesis for determining mean score differences by age and gender was:
Ho: (i =
and its alternate hypothesis was:
H a : ^ * ***
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S e le c t io n o f th e .S a m p le

Undergraduates at a nationally top-ranked public university in the
southeastern United States were identified as the target population. From this
population, 61 undergraduates were selected in a convenience sampling for:
1) a group of high achievers, and 2) a comparison group of normal achievers.
Undergraduates in the high achiever group were members of Phi Beta
Kappa or designated Monroe Scholars. Undergraduates in the comparison group were
not members of Phi Beta Kappa nor designated Monroe Scholars.
To be designated a Monroe Scholar, for undergraduates on the campus
which participated in this study, an entering freshman is academically identifed as an
exceptionally high achiever, by a combination of high-school academic indicators
including GPA, class rank, dual enrollment in a college course while in high school
(Office of Admissions, 2002). To remain a Monroe Scholar as a college sophomore,
junior, and senior, the student's Grade Point Average (GPA) must remain academically
in the top 10% of her/her current undergraduate class. Entering Monroe Scholars live
together in the same dormitory and receive other incentives to continue being a high
achiever. Twenty Monroe Scholars were test participants in this study. Fourteen Phi
Beta Kappa members, who were current inductees of Phi Beta Kappa for that academic
year, participated in this study. Both the normal achiever group and the high achiever
group were administered the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test, V.2
(MSCEIT, V.2) on-line.

M S C E jT , V :2 D a ta C o lle c t io n

The MSCEIT V.2 was offered to all test participants on-line, accessed by
Microsoft WINDOWS Internet Explorer. Each test participant was asked to read and
sign an Informed Consent Agreement before being given the MHS-assigned user-codes
that accessed the MSCEIT V.2 on-line. All tests were administered and scored on-line,
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and the results emailed in an Excel spreadsheet to participating researchers, by MultiHealth Systems, Inc. (MHS, Inc.) of Toronto, Canada, in association with Professors
Mayer and Salovey and their collaborator, Dr. David Caruso. At the time of the testing
by this study, MHS, Inc. was compiling a normative database of MSCEIT, V.2 scores for
future research use (see Appendix C) (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).

Obtaining: Research Use of the MSCEIT, V.2 and Obtaining Achievement Data
The methodology for data-gathering began with (a) obtaining permission
for on-line research use of the MSCEIT, V.2 (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional
Intelligence Test, Version 2) which was done by telephoning and emailing Professors
Salovey and Mayer at their respective universities; (b) obtaining blind-coded measures
of undergraduate achievement data for those students who were tested by the on-line
MSCEIT, V.2, which was done through the Department of Institutional Research at the
college being used for the MSCEIT, V.2 testing; and (c) obtaining access to a purposive
sampling of undergraduate high achievers who were members of Phi Beta Kappa
an d /o r designated Monroe Scholars. Permission was obtained for testing
undergraduates in a required Introductory Geology class, mostly freshmen and
sophomores, who were not members of Phi Beta Kappa nor designated Monroe
Scholars.

Obtaining Use of Human Subjects Approval
Please see Appendix D for: 1) Proposal for Use of H um an Subjects for
testing with the MSCEIT, V.2, 2) Addendum Proposal, for a Protocol for conducting a
focus group, and 3) Informed Consent Agreements for the MSCEIT, V.2 testing and for
participation in the focus group, all submitted to the School of Education-Human
Subjects Review Committee (the SOE-HSRC) for approval.
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Approval from the SOE-HSRC was obtained in April and October 2001 to
conduct the MSCEIT, V.2 testing, and in January 2002 to conduct a focus group of
purposively selected MSCEIT, V.2 participants, selected for high scores and gender.

Data Analysis
This study's research design used the correlation method to quantitatively
analyze relationships between the MSCEIT, V.2 scores and test-takers' academic
achievement data, the MSCEIT, V.2 scores in relation to test-taker age. The t-tests were
also used, to analyze mean score differences by age and gender. Qualitative analysis of
a focus group further probed for themes in student explanations of relationships
indicated by the findings of the quantitative analysis. The following data analysis was
used.

Descriptive Statistics
Analysis of the data began with descriptive statistics of the MSCEIT, V.2
scores. Scatterplots and histograms of the MSCEIT, V.2 task, branch and overall index
scores were done (see Figures 1,2 and 3 and Appendix E) to determine mean scores
variance in relation to the achievement data.
One anticipated problem was the limited range of the achievement data,
since all MSCEIT, V.2 participants at this college were high achievers because they had
been admitted to an academically competitive, nationally top-ranked public university
with high admission standards. Descriptive statistics helped determine the range of the
academic achievement data, and scatterplots were especially helpful for determining the
cluster of MSCEIT, V.2 scores in relation to academic achievement indicators of the
sample. Histograms provided a quick look at the MSCEIT, V.2 scores and the
achievement data of the sample.
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The Pearson r
Using the MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores on each branch and the overall index
of emotional intelligence score, for the sample, the Pearson r determined correlations
between:
1. measures of GPA
2. measures of SAT/ ACT
3. measures of high-school class rank

t-tests by Age and Gender
t-tests were used to determine how MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores related to
student characteristics of age and gender, specifically:
1) do MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores differ by age of the test participant?
2) do MSCEIT, V.2 mean scores of males differ from MSCEIT, V.2 mean
scores of females?

Qualitative Analysis: The Focus Group
In Handbook of Intelligence published by Cambridge University, the
originators of the research concept of emotional intelligence suggested that future
researchers explore the question, "What is an effective emotional life?" because little
qualitative research has been done to research the human reality of the subject of
emotional intelligence (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).
Therefore, to complete this study, a focus group was conducted in order
to explore the reality behind the MSCEIT, V.2 scores, in an unstructured format. To
keep the discussion in focus on this research study, the open-ended discussion question
was asked, "What is an effective emotional life for academic achievement?"
In addition, the focus group participants, who were all tested by the
MSCEIT, V.2, were asked ad hoc sub-questions such as, "Name three emotions that best
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assist learning" and "What emotions do you do feel, and what do you do to manage
your emotions, before you begin studying?"
The focus group participants were purposively selected, based on
MSCEIT, V.2 scores and gender. The six highest-scoring undergraduates on the overall
MSCEITOX index of emotional intelligence ability were invited by email to participate in
a focus group. Of the six highest scorers, all were female; three of the six agreed to
participate in a focus group discussion.
Three participants in the focus group scored in the enhanced-ability range
of emotional intelligence ability, which is a score above 115—i.e., 15 points or more
above the MSCEIT, V.2 standardized mean score of 100. One Phi Beta Kappa was
randomly invited and participated in the focus group. Two males with good (100 to
115) MSCEIT, V.2 scores and some enhanced (over 115) MSCEIT, V.2 scores were
invited and participated in the focus group. A total of six undergraduates who had
been tested by the MSCEIT, V.2 participated in the focus group: 4 females and 2 males.
The purpose of a qualitative analysis of the focus group outcomes was to
collect and identify the MSCEIT, V.2 test participants' most frequently used words,
concepts, attitudes, themes and ideas in expressing express w hat they think and feel
about emotional intelligence and its relation to academic achievement in their
experience as college undergraduates.
Analysing the focus group outcomes was intended to help determine
w hat Professors Mayer and Salovey have called "the reality behind the concept of
emotional intelligence" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, p. 416).
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Chapter 4
Results
The Research Questions
The MSCEIT, V.2 test scores of 61 test participants and a focus group
discussion were analyzed to answer this study's research questions:
1) Is there a relation between measures of emotional intelligence and
measures of academic achievement?
2) Do the mean scores differ by age and gender and, if so, is the
difference statistically significant, or by chance?

Characteristics of the Sample
The data analyzed in this study were derived by testing a convenience
sampling of high achieving college undergraduates (N = 61) at a nationally top-ranked
public university in the southeastern United States with high admission standards.
Admission is competitive, with an average 8,(XX) applications each year for 1,332 places
in the entering freshman class (Institutional Research, 2002). For the academic year
2002, a total of 8,129 completed applications for admission were received, plus an
additional 650 incomplete applications, for a grand total of 8,770 applicants for
admission to the freshman class of 2000. Of these, 1,369 were admitted. In each year's
freshman class, approximately 200 are high school valedictorians. Academically for the
year 2000,79% of the entering freshman class were in the top-10% of their graduating
high-school class.
For 58 of the 61 undergraduates who participated in this study, their mean
combined SAT score (the SATOT) was 1380, comprised by a mean SAT Math score of
706, and a mean SAT Verbal score of 673.
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Of the 61 test participants, 3 took the ACT instead of the SAT, and 10 took
both the SAT and the ACT. The mean ACT English score for these 13 test participants
was 29.5, with a mean score of 29.3 on ACT Math, 29.0 on ACT Science, 29.8 on ACT
Composition. Of the 61 test participants in this study, 14 were members of Phi Beta
Kappa; 20 were Monroe Scholars; 27 were neither members of Phi Beta Kappa nor
designated Monroe Scholars.
The criteria for being designated a Monroe Scholar at this college is based
solely on high school academic-performance indicators, including high-school class
rank, grades, Advanced Placement classes, dual enrollment in a college course while in
high school, the complexity of the curriculum being studied in high school, and
participation in the international baccalaureate degree program. Ten percent
of each entering freshman class are designated Monroe Scholars. These high achieving
freshmen are encouraged to continue being high achievers by being offered residence
in a special dorm and the opportunity to win a grant for summer research following the
freshman year. Note that the Monroe Scholar designation is an especially high
achievement because a large percent (79% in the academic year 2000) of each incoming
class are in the academic top-10% of their high school graduating class (Office of
Admissions, 2002).
The average high-school senior-class size for 47 of the test participants in
this study was 229. The other 14 test participants in this study came from high schools
that did not academically rank its seniors. High-school class size ranged from a low of
85 students to a high of 545. Class rank percentile was very high for the majority of
the test participants, with the mean rank of 5.9 (where the 1 percentile was the highestranked student in this study, and the 30 percentile was the lowest-ranked).
More females (N = 44) than males (N = 17) took the test. The mean age
of test participants was 19.9 years of age, w ith two outliers at age 17 (N = 1) and age 26
(N = l).
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The mean current-semester GPA for the 61 test participants at the time the
test was taken, was 3.42. Twenty-four of the 61 test participants had a current-semester
grade point average (GPA) of 3.6 or above (2 of these test participants had a currentsemester GPA of 4.0). Thirty of the 61 test participants had a current-semester GPA of
3.5 to 3.0. Seven of the 61 test participants had a current-semester GPA of 2.9 or below.
A focus group of six of the test participants was composed of one Monroe
Scholar, one member of Phi Beta Kappa, and four students who were neither Phi Beta
Kappa members nor designated Monroe Scholars. Their ages ranged from 18 to 21.
Two focus group participants were male and four were female.

The MSCEIT. V.2 Test Instrument: Scale Item Hierarchy and Test Constructs
The scale item tasks on the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence
Test, Version 2 (the MSCEIT, V.2) are presented in a hierarchy of ascending complexity.
Each task is designed to test a theoretical set of interrelated emotional intelligence
abilities. The task constructs for testing emotional intelligence ascend from simple to
complex, in the sequential tasks that define each ability, as described below (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b):

Branch IX: Perceiving Emotions
Branch 2X: Using Emotions
Branch 3X: Understanding Emotions
Branch 4X: Managing Emotions

These four MSCEIT, V.2 test constructs are presented to the test-taker in eight tasks of
ascending complexity, as described below.
Following is the order in which the eight tasks are presented to the testtaker. The MSCEIT, V.2 begins with a simple task.
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Perceiving Emotions
Tested by Task A: The Faces Task
Task A measures the test-taker's ability to identify which emotion a
person is feeling, for example, in a photograph of a person's face (i.e., is that person
angry, frustrated, or happy?). (The on-line MSCEIT, V.2 opens with a photograph of a
scowling man.)

Using Emotions
Tested by Task B: The Facilitation Task
Task B is more complex than Task A. Task B was designed as
"transitional" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) to the more complex Task C. Task
B asks the test-taker to recall personal knowledge of how moods can interact with
thinking and assist in certain kinds of problem-solving. Task B is a recall-test of how a
mood might support or impair thinking and reasoning in given situations.

Understanding Emotions
Tested by Task C: The Changes Task
This task measures the test-taker's ability to understand how
emotions can change in relation to a situation or event. For example, frustration may
change to sadness, then to fear, then to anger. This task measures an ability to
understand the experience of multiple emotions as an emotion changes over time.

M a n a g in g E m o tio n s

Tested by Task P: The Emotion Management Task
This task measures the test-taker's ability to choose among
alternative courses of action, in order to achieve a certain result in relation to the
emotions of self and others. The test-taker is asked to rate the effectiveness of optional
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courses of action that lead to making a decision in a fictional test-situation where a
person has to self-regulate their own emotions in relation to others.

After completion of the above tasks (A through D), the following tasks
are presented to the test-taker in an order of ascending complexity, from simple to
most complex. Task E is a simple task.

Perceiving Emotions
Tested by Task E: The Pictures Task
This task asks the test-taker to identify which emotions are being
expressed in typical pictures of the environment. For example, the test-taker is asked:
What emotion is being expressed in a close-up photograph of a landscape of rocks?

Using.Emotions
Tested by Task F: The Sensations Task
This task asks the test-taker to compare different emotions to different
sensations such as light, color and temperature. In order to do this successfully (for a
high score), the test-taker will have to, theoretically, generate a certain mood in order
to use the mood to reason about that mood and "let the feeling direct thinking." For
example, the test-taker may be asked how the emotion of anger compares to the color
yellow. The test-taker is asked to compare that mood's characteristics to the sensations
evoked by the color. This task is simple but "transitional" (Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000b), leading into the more complex exercise in Task G.
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Understanding Emotions
Tested by Task G: The Blends Task
This task is a complex measure of the the test-taker's ability to
connect "emotional chains" or "families of related emotions" (Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000b) to situations which may cause those feelings, such as how situations of
personal loss can cause sadness that might transition to other related emotions. For
example, the funeral of a close friend's father may evoke personal feelings of sadness
for the friend's loss but also a feeling of relief that one's own father is alive; then a
feeling of guilt for feeling relief may follow.

Managing Emotions
Tested by Task H: Social Management Task
This task is the most complex of the eight tasks because it is testing the
ability to manage emotions in relationships. This task measures the test-taker's ability
to evaluate the effectivenss of optional courses of action, and to decide on one course of
action that, in the judgment of the test-taker, would achieve a desired social outcome
involving the emotions of other people.

With this progressive hierarchy of tasks in mind, note that for scoring the
MSCEIT, V.2 each task is shuffled into one of the four branches, as shown below:

Branch IX

Branch 2X

Branch 3X

Branch 4X

Task

A

B

C

D

Task

E

F

G

H

Each branch tests a construct of 'emotional intelligence' that is described
for each branch below.
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Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX tests the ability to accurately identify
feelings in self and others. Recall that the two tasks in Branch IX use pictures and ask
the test-taker which emotion is being expressed. The test construct of Branch IX is
Em otional Perception/ Previous research indicates that accurate perception of one's
ow n emotions is related to the ability to accurately perceive emotional expressions in
others (Zuckerman, Lipets, Koivumaki and Rosenthal, 1975 and Zuckerman, Hall,
DeFrank and Rosenthal, 1977 in MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b,
pp. 47-48).
Using Emotions in Branch 2X tests the ability to "take feelings into
account" and use personal feelings to think more accurately about a given situation or
event (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000, p. 48). The test construct of Branch 2X is
'Emotional Facilitation of Thought' (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b,
p. 48). The tasks in Branch 2X test recall of how emotional moods can influence
cognition. Previous research indicates that emotions can change how people think and
w hat they think about (Forgas, 1995 and Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman and Evans, 1992
and Salovey and Bimbaum, 1989 and Singer and Salovey, 1998 in (MHS, Inc./Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 48). For example, positive, self-assertive thoughts are
more likely to occur when a person is happy; self-destructive thoughts are more likely
to occur when a person is saddened or depressed. Emotions can prioritize cognitive
attention to pay more attention to what is emotionally important to the thinker
(Easterbrook, 1959 and Mandler, 1975 and Simon, 1982 in MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey
and Caruso, 2000b, p. 48).
Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X tests the ability to recognize how
emotions can change and combine over time, in relationships with other people, in
thinking about other people, and in thinking about one's self. Understanding
Emotions is the ability to decipher the "rich and complexly interrelated symbol set" of
emotions (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49). The test construct of
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Branch 3X is 'Emotional Reasoning' (MHS. Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b,
p. 48). Understanding how to decipher "the language of emotions" is one of the two
MSCEIT, V.2 constructs that "allow emotions to participate in thinking" (MHS, Inc.
/Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49). The second component in the test construct
of 'emotional reasoning' is tested in Branch 4X as the ability to Manage Emotions in self
and others.
Managing Emotions in Branch 4X is a test of the ability to "neither
minimize nor eliminate emotions completely" but, before acting out the emotion, to sit
down and fully feel the emotion rather than repress it. After experiencing the feelings
caused by the emotion, the experience can be used to make decisions about people and
situations in relation to oneself. The test construct of Branch 4X is the second
component of 'Emotional Reasoning' (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b,
p. 48). Branch 4X is the most complex level of the test hierarchy. Managing Emotions
uses the experience of the emotion to make decisions that self-regulate the behaviors of
self in relation to the emotions of others.
The MSCEITOX score on the MSCEIT, V.2 is an overall comparative index
of each test-taker's emotional intelligence ability, based on their test performance on all
eight tasks. "As with any global score, the MSCEIT Total score is a handy summary of
a person's performance on this test...The Total score compares an individual's
performance on the MSCEIT (V.2) to those in (the) normative sample" (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 47).
Scores on the four branches described above, and the total MSCEITOX
score, were analyzed by this study in relation to indicators of academic achievement,
and by age and gender of the test-takers. Table 1 shows the results: that the highest
scores by the sample are in the higher levels of the task hierarchy: in Task C and Task
G, Branch 3X and in Task D and Task H, Branch 4X.
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Table 1.

MSCEIT, V.2 Mean Scores, Standard Deviation,

and Range of Scores on MSCEITOX, Branches, and Tasks

Mean Score

Standard Deviation

Range of Scores
Highest

Lowest

Task A

101.1

13.90

119.4

54.9

Task B

982

15.22

121.3

55.6

TaskC

108.9

10.50

122.9

802

Task D

104.6

11.20

120.8

75.4

Task E

97.9

15.61

120.0

483

Task F

99.6

11.31

120.6

70.9

TaskG

110.5

9.99

121.4

79.8

Task H

103.9

11.15

120.8

54.6

Branch IX

995

15.34

121.4

41.7

Branch 2X

98.6

12.96

120.7

67.0

Branch 3X

111.1

958

124.3

823

Branch 4X

104.7

10.93

120-4

65.4

MSCEITOX

103.7

11.76

123.6

69.8
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Table 2. Correlation of MSCEIT, V 2 Task and Branch Mean Scores
with Test-Takers' GPA, Class Rank and SATOT

Pearson r Correlations

GEA

CLASS-RANK

SATOT

AGE

MSCEITOX
Pearson r

.244

.045

-.005

-.084

Sig. (2-tailed)

.058

.738

.973

.520

Pearson r

.314*

.017

.065

-.052

Sig. (2-tailed)

.014

.897

.630

.689

Pearson r

.432**

-.269*

.175

-.056

Sig. (2-tailed)

.001

.041

.190

.668

Pearson r

.109

.159

.027

-.032

Sig. (2-tailed)

.403

.233

.840

.809

Pearson r

-.012

.111

-.157

-.087

Sig. (2-tailed)

.927

.407

.238

.507

Branch 4X

Branch 3X

Branch 2X

Branch IX

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Figure 1. GPA and MSCEIT, V.2 Scores on Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X
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Figure 2. GPA and MSCEIT, V.2 Scores on Managing Emotions in Branch 4X
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Figure 3. High School Class Rank and MSCEIT, V.2 Scores on Understanding
Emotions in Branch 3X
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Analysis of the Data
Emotional Intelligence and Academic Achievement
As shown in Table 2, the MSCEIT, V.2 task, branch and overall index
mean scores were correlated with test-takers' GPAs, class rank and SATOT scores to
obtain a Pearson r.
The significant results of this study show that the 61 test participants'
GPAs at the time they took the on-line MSCEIT, V.2 correlate with their emotional
intelligence test scores on the higher level tasks of Understanding Emotions and
Managing Emotions. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the GPA-Branch 3X and Figure
2 shows the GPA-Branch 4X correlation.
GPAs correlated significantly with Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X
at a Pearson r of .432, significant at p< 0.01 (2-tailed).

GPAs correlated significantly

with Managing Emotions in Branch 4X at a Pearson r of .314, significant at p< 0.05
(2-tailed). In the lower level tasks of the MSCEIT, V.2 in Branch IX and Branch 2X,
there was no significant correlation found between GPA and Perceiving Emotions in
Branch IX, and no significant correlation found between GPA and Using Emotions in
Branch 2X.
The correlation found between GPA and the overall index of emotional
intelligence ability, the MSCEITOX score, was nearly significant at a Pearson r of .244,
significant at .058 (at p<.05) (2-tailed). Since this is an exploratory study using a small
sample, this result suggests a likely overall relation between the MSCEITOX ability
index score and GPA, which a larger sample size may have shown.
As Figure 3 shows, a significant negative correlation was found between
the high-school class rank of test participants and their MSCEIT, V.2 scores on
Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X. A Pearson r of -.269 was found between the
high school class-rank of test participants and their Branch 3X scores, significant at p<.05
(2-tailed). Class-rank is inversely related to Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X
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because the highest class-rank is represented by percentile, where the highest possible
class rank is also the lowest possible percentile rank. Hence a negative correlation
indicates that a high class rank (lowest percentile) is inversely related to high MSCEIT,
V.2 scores.
There was no significant correlation found between high school class-rank
and test scores on Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX, on Using Emotions in Branch 2X.,
nor on Managing Emotions in Branch 4X. There was no significant correlation found
between high school class-rank and test scores on the overall MSCEITOX index of
emotional intelligence ability.
There were no significant correlations found between SATOT scores and
the five measures of emotional intelligence from the MSCEIT, V.2 on Pereciving
Emotions in Branch IX, on Using Emotions in Branch 2X, on Understanding Emotions
in Branch 3X, nor on Managing Emotions in Branch 4X. There was no significant
correlation found between high school class-rank and test scores on the overall
MSCEITOX index of emotional intelligence ability.

Emotional Intelligence and Student Characteristics: Age and Gender
There was no significant relation found between age of test participants
and any of the four Branches or overall MSCEITOX index of emotional intelligence
ability, using both t-tests and the Pearson r.
A mean difference of -6.30 between male versus female scores on
Understanding Emotions was found in the t-test results: males scored a mean of 106.56
on Understanding Emotions with a standard deviation of 8.4; females scored a mean of
112.87 on Understanding Emotions with a standard deviation of 9.4; the statistical
significance of the difference was .017 at p<.05.
A mean difference of -6.41 between male versus female scores on
Managing Emotions was found in the t-test results:
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Table 3. MSCEIT, V.2 Mean Score Differences By Age and Gender
Male
N=17
Mean SD

Female
N=44
Mean SD

Age 17-19
N=31
Mean SD

E.I. M EAN SCORE
MSCEITOX

12.3

100.06

Mean Difference

Sig.
98.46

Branch 2X

Branch 3X

Sig,
97.99

Branch 4X

Sig.

99.85

15.2

100.09

Sig .
98.82

12.7

9751

13.1

2.11
Sig.
112.87 9.4

109.74

528

10.1

11252

8.9

-2.77
Sig.
106.50 10.6

105.00

11.4

-6.41
Sig.

143

.376

99.63 12.8

.017*
10.5

97.68
3.50

-6.30
Sig.

11.8

.691

101.19 16.2

.832

106.56 8.4

Mean Difference
Significance

Sig.

.762

13.9

103.04

1.21

-.83

Mean Difference
Significance

104.26 11.8

-1.38

Mean Difference
Significance

11.3

.160

;15.9

Mean Difference
Significance

E.I. MEAN SCORE

-4.98

Significance
Branch IX

105.05

Age 20-26
N=30
Mean SD

.042*

.261
104.42
5786

Sig.

.838

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
’* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Males scored a mean of 100.09 on Managing Emotions with a standard
deviation of 10.5; females scored a mean of 106.50 on Managing Emotions with a
standard deviation of 10.6; the statistical significance of the difference was .039 at p<.05.
There was no statistically significant mean score difference by gender
found in Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX, in Using Emotions in Branch 2X, nor on the
overall MSCEITOX index of emotional intellignce ability.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a focus group concluded this study. The
purpose of including a focus group discussion in this study was to gather the
participants' most frequently used words, concepts, attitudes, themes and ideas which
they might use to express w hat they think and feel about emotional intelligence and its
relation to academic achievement, in their own experience as college undergraduates.
The six focus group participants were asked sub-questions within an unstructured,
open-ended discussion format. The overall question being probed was suggested in a
journal article (Mayer and Salovey, 1997): What is an effective emotional life, for
academic ahdevement?
The focus group discussion was probing for w hat the designers of the
MSCEIT, V.2 call "the reality behind the concept of emotional intelligence" (Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 416).

Focus Group Results
Frequently Occurring Words. Ideas. Themes
In answer to the discussion question, "What three emotions do you feel
while you are writing a big paper or studying for a big exam?" the most frequently
occurring responses were:
excited, ready to leant, ready to go, eagerness, anticipation,
pleased, interested, enjoy, relieved, want to share ideas with
others, focus, balanced, confidence, pride
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Negative emotions experienced during learning were not mentioned by
the focus group participants. However, some responses did specify negative emotions
and unproductive emotion states experienced before beginning to study and before
beginning to write a paper, including:
anxious, disappointed by previous grade, dread, pain, boredom
but these emotions were said to occur because the subject to be studied was not of
interest (but was, for example, a required course outside the student's area of interest
or expertise).
The most frequently occurring words and concepts, describing feelings
experienced during the learning experience, were positive, as discussed by the six focus
group participants, and when analyzed, the following words began to form evolving
patterns:
1.

excitement
eagerness

1. excited, eager, ready (anticipation)

2.

excited
interested

2.

pleased, interested (paying attention)

3.

relief, pride
confidence

3.

relief (self-satisfaction)

These words and concepts, expressed above, by six academic high achievers in this
study's focus group, are described further by statements from the participants below.
The above words and concepts suggest an effective set of emotions for academic
achievement, namely, a student who feels:
eager to begin
excited, interested
confident
In their own words, the following comments by the six focus group
participants suggest why these feelings might be "an effective emotional life" (Mayer
and Salovey, 1990) for academic high achievement.
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Eagerness To Begin
Comments by the focus group suggest that an undergraduate who is
eager to begin is ready to begin. Getting emotionally ready to pay attention and learn
has been described as the first educational objective in the affective domain (Krathwohl,
Bloom and Masia, 1964). Being emotionally ready to begin learning directs 'controlled
attention' to occur in the cognitive domain (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) (see
Step 1 of Bloom's Taxonomy, Appendix B).
This study's focus group of academic high achievers, however, described
strategies to sidestep emotions, or to provoke the affective domain in negative ways to
begin learning.
Procrastination was a strategy used by some participants in this focus
group. An example of procrastination was described by a Phi Beta Kappa focus group
participant: "If my deadline is too far in advance, I am just not motivated, and I almost
need a little bit of frustration and pressure to get stuff done....it's easier, I think for me
to get stuff done in a high pressure, almost stressful stituation."
This participant said she can complete a four-hour learning task in less
than half that time when the deadline is fast approaching—but not too fast. She is
careful to leave herself just the right am ount of time to do a good job and complete the
task: "I don't really get super stressed-out, and I think the deadline thing is part of
that, it's that I create a certain level of stress for myself, and then I am prepared to deal
with that amount of stress. I mean, only if some other emergency comes up and now I
have less time than I alotted for myself, or something like than, then I would get
stressed-out but for the most part, I am like able to manage the am ount of stress that
works best for me, and that's usually all I ever can stand..."
The Monroe Scholar in the focus group described a strategy of
daydreaming, but said she never daydreams about her pending academic assignments.
Like the Phi Beta Kappa member of the focus group, the Monroe Scholar described a
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heightened state of attention when she finally stops daydreaming and begins the
learning task, induced by a fast-approaching deadline, so that optimal learning is done
in a compressed timeframe: "I find I do my best between 11 and 12 at night, maybe
because there's a sense of 'You can finish it up now'—maybe because I'm going to go to
bed soon anyway, but that's when I'll just focus and the hour will fly by! and I won't be
thinking of anything else, and I'll look up and it will be 12 o'clock and I'll say wow, I got
so much studying done! I can spend all day staring at one page in a book (and getting
nowhere) but at 11 o'clock, I'm just flipping the pages and I get it memorized like that!"
The Phi Beta Kappa participant added, "I've learned that you can't be a
procrastinator and a perfectionist all in one! And I've definitely encountered people
who put things off either for fear, you know, or in dread, or because simply they don't
have time or they're lazy, or because they think they work better under pressure, but
when it comes down to it, they have difficulty getting through any part of what they're
doing because they keep re-doing it, because they're a perfectionist and they're
worried, and they've left it to the last minute....and now it has to be really good, and so
they spend too much time on it and it gets overwhelming....(and so they don't finish).
(They) leave things to the last minute and then tear them up and start over at the
eleventh hour!" When asked, "And are they high achievers?" she replied, "Well...they
get decent grades but not nearly up to what their potential would be."
A 21-year-old male focus group participant said he delays beginning the
learning task by first getting everything clean and orderly in his study area (including
his personal hygiene). He cleans his room, then takes a shower and puts on clean
clothes before he feels ready to begin the academic assignment. Like the Phi Beta
Kappa and the Monroe Scholar participants in the focus group, he also self-reported an
optimal emotion state when learning finally begins: "I feel a heightened sense of what
I'm trying to say! I feel incresed attentiveness..."
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One 18-year-old female participant who had the highest MSCEITOX
overall index score of the sample, said, "I push my emotions aside" (and just dives in to
her learning task) because "Learning for me is emotion-less." She added that, for her,
performing the learning task can reverse a bad mood. She begins a learning task
without doing anything to mediate a bad or negative mood. When learning "is going
well" she self-reports that her bad mood changes "and I end up in a great mood later
on!"
Two of the female freshman-class participants in the focus group who
were very high scorers on the MSCEITOX overall index of emotional intelligence, and
the Monroe Scholar, all said they begin studying even if in a negative mood, and do
nothing to mediate a bad mood before beginning to study or write a paper. The
Monroe Scholar said that if she is in a depressed mood, she writes a depressing paper.
A male focus group participant said, "If I'm in an angry mood, I'd write a sarcastic
paper. " However, unlike the female focus group participants, the two male
participants say they try to mediate their emotions before beginning to study or write a
big paper. One male participant said, "I try to stay balanced, but when I have to start
studying or writing a paper, I can't focus. So I work out. I go jogging, or go to the
gym. My emotions transcend everything! They are reflected in everything I do. But
I like to have a dosing-in deadline. I'm best at an in-dass exerdse that has a set time
limit."
The senior-dass male partidpant said that he delays starting the learning
task. "I have a big exam this Thursday, but I haven't done a thing! I don't feel anxious
until time starts running out. Proscrastination! Point of no return! I (finally) get into
intellectual overdrive. Before I study, I dean my room because to think dearly I have
to be away from dutter....I really don't know how to make an emotional relation to my
studying. It seems to be an emotion-less adventure for me. But before I begin
studying, I feel antidpation—of the pain it's going to be! Dread!"
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When asked if he feels pain and dread about studying a subject he loves,
such as his major, he replied, "If it's a subject I'm interested in, I feel excited. I want to
put my best foot forward!"

Excited By The Subject
"Excited" was the most frequently used word by focus group participants
when asked, "What are three emotions you feel when learning a subject that you really
like?"
The highest-scoring MSCEIT, V.2 participant of the sample said, "It
depends on the assignment actually. But if it's in a subject that I enjoy....like I'm taking
another geology class, Environmental Geology...we had a problem set that wasn't due
like until the end of the week, but I was really excited about starting it, so I started it
early! It's just something I'm really interested in, and it's applicable to my career, so....I
was eager to get into it and learn stuff..."
The Phi Beta Kappa participant said that, even for her major which was
literature, when she knew it was time to stop procrastinating and get started, she would
try to generate some kind of excitement about learning the subject.
"I'd try to approach things with a certain amount of eagemess...a kind of
excitement or anticipation...I'd try to put myself in a frame of mind where I was happy
to start reading..."
A college teacher can also generate a feeling of excitement in students. A
teacher who displays intense interest in and love of the subject being taught, and who
tries to evoke positive emotions in students in relation to the subject, such as good
humor and laughter, before or during the learning experience in the classroom, can
help students become eager to go to class and ready to begin learning
—as three focus group participants explained about their Geology teacher (who later
that semester won a prestigious campus award as teacher of the year).
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His students said:
"I was actually like, looking forward to going to that class every day!
(laughing)...I was exdted...and, like, ready to learn."
"He was interested in what he was teaching. He bounced around a
lot...and any time he sensed he was losing us, he'd stand on his head or something! I
mean, you know, he'd snatch up the ruler...and one time he whipped out a rock and a
hammer and he goes, wham! It was pretty funny!"
The Geology class of 160 undergraduates was conducted in a large
stadium-style lecture hall that was more a shadowy amphitheatre than a classroom.
"He threw out frisbees and grapefruit on the first day of class! It got our
attention! It was variation from the dull routine. This professor always showed us the
excitement he felt about the subject of Geology. He was jazzed. He made it fun!"
Another focus group participant who was a student in the Geology class
said, "I didn't go to that class that much! I just have no interest in Geology. And I also
don't wake up in the momings...I fell asleep a couple of days in class actually ...and then
he'd call on you! He knew everybody's name in class, and he'd say, 'Hey, so-and-so
back there! Wake up!' I think he's a good person and a good teacher, it was just the
subject (that I didn't like)..."
The senior-class male participant in the focus group who had earlier said
that learning for him is emotion-less, subsequently said, "It's better to be emotionally
attached to the subject you're studying. For example, in my Latin American History
class, I've very interested and emotional about the subject because I feel pity for the
situation there and their poverty and want to go work there in the Peace Corps."
The highest-scoring test participant of the sample on the MSCEITOX said,
"I feel happiness when I'm learning things which are interesting to me, not just, 'Oh, I
have to take this class, ugh...' "
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When asked if that feeling of interest would be intellectually interesting or
emotionally interesting, the participant replied, "Well, probably like both. If it's
something I have a passion about, like say for instance, like the environment for me,
learning about it... I don't know, I'm just very passionate about it, really interested in it
and ready to go..."
The freshman male participant said, "It makes a big difference to get
excited about the subject. If I'm in a bad mood, the paper I write will reflect that mood.
A positive or negative attitude is reflected in the work you do. Your work will reflect
whateve emotion you feel."
All participants in the focus group agreed that negative emotions can "get
in the way" (as one participant put it) of academic performance. However, as each
focus group participant decribed their emotion management strategy, it was a
surprising disconnent that the study strategies of these high achievers were not all that
'emotionally intelligent' in that emotions were simply pushed aside and not mediated
by self-reflection or self-understanding, and even used in negative ways
(procrastination, daydreaming) to provoke anxious emotional readiness to begin the
learning task.

Several female focus group participants self-reported that they "use" a

higher learning task to escape negative emotional situations or events. One focus
group participant with enhanced emotional intelligence test scores said, "I put my
emotions at the back of my head while I study" because "Emotions belong in
relationships."
A female freshman participant in the focus group with enhanced-range
MSCEIT, V.2 scores (at least 15 points above the standardized mean score of 100) said,
"If I'm thinking about things that are going on in...my personal life, for example, then
I'm not really thinking about studying, until I have to sit down and do it, but then
sometimes I have a hard time focusing on it....let's say I am upset about something,
then studying's really hard."
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When asked, "So what do you do? Do you have any techniques to get
into a more positive mood?" the focus group participant with some of the highest
MSCEIT, V.2 scores of the sample, said, "I wish I knew some!"
When then asked, "Do you just go in with that negative feeling?"
she replied, "I guess...I guess I do."
When next asked, "And what about those negative feelings that you said
you started out with? Do they just...vanish?"
She replied, "They're just like in the back of my head...if I'm really focused
on my studies, I can't think about anything else but my studies."
In response to the question, "How do you get focused?" the Monroe
Scholar said, "That's the hardest part! I still don't know! Sometimes I can do it and
sometimes I can't. I tend to daydream if I'm not in a great mood. Or even if I am in a
good mood, I daydream a lot. And that gets...oh, in the way a lot."
When asked, "Why do you think you daydream a lot?" the Monroe
Scholar said, "It helps you figure out things about yourself."
Both of the male participants in the focus group described positive
strategies that approach the management of emotions via the physical body. The
freshman male participant said, "Before I study, I try to do something physical. If it's
been raining for several days, I may feel bad and down—the weather and the
environment are important to me. And so I do something physical to clear my mind."
As described above, the other male participant in the focuS group routinely goes
jogging, then cleans his room, takes a shower, puts on clean clothes, and finally sits
down and begins the learning task.
The four females in the focus group, however—including the two highest
scorers of the sample—described strategies not to balance emotions or get in focus, but
to sidestep, marginalize, or repress emotions before beginning the learning task.
Although one female focus group participant said, "I can start studying something in a
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bad mood and if it goes well, I can end up in a great mood later on," a second female
participant said, "If it goes badly then you're obviously going to get frustrated really
quickly, and get depressed and tired and you want to go to bed and quit..."
When this participant was then asked, "So have you ever written a good
paper when you're depressed and upset?" she replied,
"No! But a depressing paper? I've written one or two of those."
A third female participant said, "I just try to do my work even though I
am in a bad mood. Because I kind of see, like, my school work as kind of emotion-less.
And then my personal life as full of emotion. I see them as two separate things. Like
when I'm not working, then I'm like too involved with the emotions I have about, like,
what's going on in my life...But then I try to separate myself from that when I'm doing
my work."
This same participant was asked, "But, then, is there another set of
emotions involved in learning than the ones involved in your personal relationships?"
She replied, "Oh yes!"
This participant was then asked, "Do you think they are different?"
She replied, "Yeah. I mean I think there's an element of stress in both, like
aspects. But sometimes learning can be a little more positive than a relationship!"
The Monroe Scholar participant was then asked, "So, and then, you don't
do anything to manage yours?"
She replied, "I just try not to think about anything! Then I don't get
attached to anything! I just daydream!"
The Monroe Scholar was asked, "Oh, and so then, you daydream instead
of doing the work...?" and she replied, "Yes. And sometimes I talk to myself. Not a
good study strategy!"
In contrast to the females in the focus group who seemed familiar with
words and expressions of emotions, the senior-class male participant said, "I talk about
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emotions so little. My vocabulary is limited for emotions! But as for my (academic)
major, I feel a passion for the subject. I feel an intense desire to put my best foot
forward! I feel a heightened sense of what I'm trying to say! But as for emotions and
academics, I don't see an emotional relationship with academics."
The freshman-class male participant in the focus group who never
procrastinates said that when writing a paper, "I feel excitement, anxious; I want it to be
over with...If I get stuck for a good first sentence, I'll go on writing the paper and come
back later to see how I feel about it! It's a blank-paper kind of syndrome: as you write,
it's narrowing....emotions get focused and centered, it gets clearer and clearer."
This participant was then asked, "That's getting focused, but what is it like
to be un-focused?"
He replied, "When you're un-focused, there's so much going through
your head. Background noise (music, other people talking) can set limits on what's in
your mind."
The same participant was then asked, "What emotions are best for
learning?" He replied that, "You need to be free of stress, more than feeling any one
emotion. And relief—I feel relief when I get the first page, then first paragraph, and I
feel, 'Now it's going to flow.' "
"What else?" this participant was asked. "Name another emotion."
"Not happiness," he said. "Well, maybe some happiness would be good,
but not too much! What you need to feel is confidence!"

Confidence In Ability
All participants in this focus group of high achievers dted a feeling of
"confidence" as well as pride in ability when asked for a third feeling they experience
during optimal performance of a higher learning task. Confidence in ability was selfreported when optimal performance was perceived to be well underway. As one
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focus group participant put it, a feeling of confidence comes with the perception that,
"Now it's going to flow."
The Phi Beta Kappa participant explained, "I mean like, you're happy to
finish a section or a page or a chapter or whatever, and you feel a certain amount
of...success and then that bolsters you on....I mean like it's important I think for me in
the process of reading or writing something or whatever, that I feel like I've gotten past
certain...markers that say I'm half-done or I'm three-quarters of the way done.

So (I

feel) something about "relief" and "success" that I've finished part of it, so that I can
keep working on the rest.
"And (when I feel) a sense of completion of a part, I'm not constantly
going back and re-reading and re-writing it. So a good frame of mind I guess for me to
be in, is to feel...oh, I don't know the emotion word for it, but...completion...pride in
completing it, I guess. I'm a little bit competitive so there's a certain element of that,
when I feel, "Yes I'm doing well and probably better than some other people"
(laughing). It reinforces what I already think about myself and justifies any slight
arrogance I might have...(laughing).
"Actually, if I have gotten a grade lower than I usually do, the next time
around I am more reluctant, I am not as excited about doing the work. I mean I am
motivated in part by wanting to get a better grade, but...(if) I am disappointed in my
previous performance, I don't have as much energy to put toward the next thing

I

think that I rely on this long-term confidence that I generally have in m y abilities,
reminding myself of past achievements...can restore my confidence level which enables
me to do well...reminding myself that "I can do this, it will be fine...."
Other focus group participants also made similar connections between
emotions evoked by interest in the subject to be learned, and two traditionally
important undergraduate developmental objectives that are related to emotional
intelligence:
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1)

development of interpersonal skills such as being a team player and

having empathy for others, and 2) development of positive self-concept. The Monroe
Scholar said:
"I like French, and I'm taking two French classes this semester, and...oh, if
it's going well and I'm learning things and realizing, and it makes sense
and is going right, and something will daw n on you or something like that...then it's
really exciting! I want to tell everybody! I guess that's a sort of pride. You know,
'You did it!"'
Other focus group participants, but not all, said they experience a feeling
of relief during performance of the learning task. One participant, however, said, "I
don't really feel relief because I'm not doing my learning for someone else. You know,
like I would feel relieved if someone was like, forcing me to do it. So, not, I don't feel
relieved like that. I feel more....like, confidence."
The highest-scoring test participant summed up the developmental
relational index of emotions to self-concept: "I mean just basically I feel happy when I
am proud of what I have done." Comments by the senior-class male participant in this
study's focus group conclude:
"I would say that for learning, balance of emotions is a good thing,
but....also confidence. Believing that you can do it. Based on your past success..."

Summary of Im portant Focus Group Findings
All six of the focus group participants in this study showed marked
gender differences in the behaviors and attitudes they self-reported in relation to
emotion and learning.
All focus group participants described feelings of positive self-concept, in
relation to performance during, and after completing, the learning task. Descriptions of
self-concept by the high achievers in this focus group not surprisingly included
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confidence, pride, competition, self-satisfaction, but also included negative behaviors of
procrastination and daydreaming.
All participants felt that emotions are involved in higher learning in some
way, even if only as a hindrance to be avoided.
Four of the six participants initially expressed a traditional belief that
emotions interfere with and have no place in higher learning.
Three of the six participants—two females and one male—said that
emotions should be pushed aside during higher learning tasks because social
relationships are the domain of emotions; these three participants said they leave
their emotions in the social-relationship domain while they are studying. "Learning for
me is emotion-less." "I put my emotions at the back of my head while I study."
Yet, those participants who intially denied the presence of emotion in
higher learning, in further comments contradicted their previous statements. All six
participants described emotions they said they have personally experienced during
performance of the learning task. For example, the senior-class male participant who
said that "Learning for me is emotion-less" was later asked, "Do you ever feel any
emotion while writing a big paper? Say for example, when you put two and two
together, you know, when you come up with a good idea or a great insight?"
His reply: "Yes, then I feel joy or happiness."
Hence along with the practice of pushing emotions aside, denying their
presence in learning, an d /o r practicing task-avoidance techniques such as
procrastination and daydreaming, all six focus group participants described an effective
set of emotions for academic high achievement, based on positive emotions that they
themselves say they have experienced during the learning task. It is their personal
strategy, for dealing with emotions before learning begins, that varies.
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Conclusion
This study found two significant results.
1) that higher level 'emotional reasoning' skills of Understanding
Emotions and Managing Emotions are significantly related to academic achievement;
2) that significant gender differences in Understanding Emotions and
Managing Emotions were found in the data analysis and in the focus group discussion.
Further discussion in the final chapter will explore the implications of
these results for teaching and learning in college.
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C hapter Five
Discussion of Results
"f think that here I am kind of expected to
push my emotions aside
and just excell"
(College undergraduate, Focus Group, 2002)
"Wherever I go in my mind,
I meet Plato coming back"
(Greek epigram in Jowett, 1946, p. 5)
What This Study Was Looking For
This study was looking for a relation between the traditionally separated
domains of cognition and affect and undergraduate academic achievement.
Specifically, this study was looking for indication that both domains are
involved in the higher level thinking that is related to academic achievement.
This study began by looking for indication of affective domain
involvement in cognitive thinking. As discussed in Chapter 4, the MSCEIT, V.2 is a test
instrument designed to involve emotions in higher level cognitive reasoning, as well as
in other simpler, cognitive-like tasks. The simplest tasks ask the test-taker to name and
define emotions; the more complex tasks ask the test-taker to reason with emotions
(Salovey, July, 2002; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b). Reasoning with emotions is
defined by the MSCEIT, V.2 in a higher level test construct called 'emotional reasoning'
(Mayer, Salovey and Causo, 2000b).
'Emotional reasoning' is a carefully defined construct tested by four tasks
in two branches of the test. The task responses can operationalize an experience of
'emotional reasoning' if the test participant "allows emotions to participate in
thinking"(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 49). As described in Chapter 4, the
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'emotional reasoning' tasks on the MSCEIT, V.2 are designed to measure the testtaker's ability to use emotions to solve abstract reasoning problems. Solving the task
problem requires the test-taker to use his or her ability to understand and manage
emotions in hypothetical situations and events. It is important to understand the
abstract complexity of these 'emotional reasoning' exercises because it was on
'emotional reasoning' tasks that this study's special sample of high achievers had the
highest mean scores.
The high test scores on 'emotional reasoning' tasks by the sample in this
study were only part of what this study was looking for, namely, for indication that
emotions as an 'intelligence' can become involved in cognitive problem-solving. This
study was also looking for indication of whether or not the 'intelligence' of emotions
(emotional intelligence) is related to indicators of undergraduate academic achievement.
Indicators of academic achievement permeate the objectives of higher
education, and are familiar landmarks on the road to college admission: GPA, SAT
scores, high-school class rank. This study used these three traditional indicators of
academic achievement to look for a possible relation to an emotional 'intelligence'
whose language is expressed by emotional feelings that "convey information about
relationships" (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 1997, p. 399). "Information about
relationships" (other than cognitive information) may be a pivotal point of 'intelligence'
in complex critical thinking, as suggested in Chapter 2 (Damasio, 1994,1999; James,
1884,1890), and in the complex reasoning exercises that the MSCEIT, V.2 presents.
Cognitive reasoning skills indicators (such as grades, SAT scores, class
rank) are traditional measures of education outcomes that are systematically evaluated,
and were used in this study to look for correlations with emotional intelligence. The
educational concern prompting this study was that emotional intelligence may be
related to academic achievement, but measures and evaluation of emotional intelligence
are not included in traditional higher education.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, development of 'intellect' in the cognitive
domain is an historical tradition in higher education. Development of cognitive
intellect as an educational objective traces a long line back to Plato, the Aristotelian
model of 'intellect/ and the Cartesian 'self' that was defined as a cognitive knower.
Almost forty years ago, a group of educators at the University of Chicago formally
recognized this as a problem (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
The problem, posed by a committee of college professors and published
in 1964 as Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain.
basically asks: Is the academic exclusion of the affective domain an instructional
mistake? (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964).
"Basically the question posed...is whether a hum an being ever does
thinking without feeling" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 7).
Why have these questions languished for decades?
The academic exclusion of the affective domain is an embedded historical
tradition in higher education. '"Better to be the poor servant of a poor master' and to
endure anything, rather than think as they do..." Plato said about non-rational people
who will not learn how to reason (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 251).
One century after Plato, his follower Aristotle made lists of extremes of
emotions whose bad influence can cause even wisdom to be used unwisely (Aristotle,
384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173), and, in the Eudemian Ethics, advises his students to
"...be aware as little as possible of the non-rational" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods,
1982, p. 46). Aristotle's definitions are part of the historical problem. The historical
problem is that ancient definitions of emotion as a threat to cognitive development
(Solomon, 1993; Salovey and Mayer, 1990) are embedded in the curriculum of early
American higher education (Rudolph, 1962/1990). Throughout the 17th, 18th and
early- to mid-19th centuries in America, a college education required reading Plato and
Aristotle in the original Greek (Rudolph, 1962/1990).
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Recall from Chapter 2 that Aristotle theorized that there are multiple and
counteracting parts of 'intellect' which struggle for supremacy during abstract ethical
reasoning. For Aristotle 'intellect' is created by personal mediating variables including
both rational and emotional 'inclinations' (toward virtue or vice), inclinations that
struggle for supremacy but are mediated by personal socializing processes that seem
familiar to contemporary culture (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 398). In the
Eudemian Ethics. Aristotle links ethical decision making (choosing virtue or vice) to the
parameters set by "feelings of pleasure or pain" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982,
p. 173). Aristotle thus brings in the emotions of the affective domain (whose
expressions are personalized feelings of pleasure or pain) as the very basis for cognitive
reasoning about an ethical problem.
Aristotle theorized that "It follows that (a person's) 'character' is virtuous
or bad by pursuing or avoiding pleasures and pains" (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods,
1982, p. 20). Using personal feelings about a problem to guide cognitive reasoning in
solving it, is hence a very old idea, parallel to the emotional intelligence test construct of
'emotional reasoning' (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000).
Aristotle, however, not unlike Plato before him, seems deliberately trying
to muddy the intellectual waters, and bluntly states that reasoning has its limits because
some rational intellects are underdeveloped, ignorant, or stupid (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C.
in Woods, 1982, p. 173). Even a desire for virtue can be used unwisely by an ignorant
or stupid thinker (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982, p. 173). Aristotle seems to be
building an important place for emotions in cognitive thinking when he goes on to say
that virtue in the non-rational part of intellect can mediate ignorance or stupidity in the
rational part, resulting in judging wisely (Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Woods, 1982).
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Aristotle is describing a busy intersection of 'intellect' where emotions and
reasoning are involved in a kind of rough-and-tumble of 'inclinations' in both domains
that determines thinking and behavior: "desire does not imply the deliberative
faculty," Aristotle writes. "But sometimes it overpowers rational wish and moves to
action; at other times the latter, rational wish, overpowers the former, desire"
(Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. in Durrant, 1993, p. 70).
Aristotle's rational and non-rational 'functions' of 'intellect' are today's
cognitive and affective domains (Bloom, et al., 1956; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964;
Mayer and Salovey, 1990). Emotional intelligence is understanding and managing the
interactive 'inclinations' in the rough-and-tumble of the Aristotelian model of 'intellect.'
The idea that both domains are "beneficial" to thinking was suggested by
Plato. Plato advised the cognitive knower not to abandon the thinker in the
metaphorical cave (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, p. 255) but to revisit the cave,
because the two domains "can be beneficial one to the other" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in
Jowett, 1946, p. 255). This study has tried to follow all of Plato's and Aristotle's
contraindicating, point-counterpoint leads and cues in looking for a beneficial
interaction between the two domains in higher learning.
The construct of 'emotional intelligence' was one way to consider the
possibility that emotions become involved in higher level cognitive thinking in a
beneficial way, to 'arouse, sustain, and direct' achievement efforts (Mayer and Salovey,
1990, pp. 185-186). This study was looking for involvement of the historically separated
domains of cognition and affect, in relation to contemporary academic achievement.
This study was additionally looking for possible intervening variables that
may mediate emotional intelligence ability-performance. Therefore test-taker age and
gender were analyzed in relation to the MSCEIT, V.2 scores of each gender, and by age
grouping, to find if age and gender as mediating variables m ight intervene in some
way on performance in the affective domain.
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To conclude this study, and to fulfill a research suggestion by the
designers of the MSCEIT, V.2 (Mayer and Salovey, 1997), a focus group was also
conducted. The research suggestion was to probe the reality behind emotional
intelligence in relation to identifying which emotions are involved in an effective
emotional life (Mayer and Salovey, 2000a). This study's focus group was asked to
discuss emotions for an effective emotional life in relation to their own academic
achievement behaviors.
As Chapter 3 explained, three focus group participants were among the
highest-scoring female test-takers in this study; these participants scored in the
'enhanced' range of emotional intelligence (over 115, which is 15 points above the
standardized mean of 100). One of the three high-scoring participants was a Monroe
Scholar. Also in the focus group was a female Phi Beta Kappa test participant with
some 'high' (100 to 115) and some 'enhanced' emotional intelligence test scores. Two
male test participants with some 'high' and some 'enhanced' scores also participated in
focus group discussion, for a total of six participants.
The focus group participants were asked open-ended discussion questions
about their own affective domain involvement in academic achievement. This study
was thus looking for statistical as well as qualitative indication of an affective domain
relation to undergraduate academic achievement.
Why devote a dissertation study to this objective?
This study became concerned about the academic exclusion of the
affective domain based on previous research by the designers of the MSCEIT, V. 2
(Mayer and Salovey, 1990; Salovey and Mayer, 1997; Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000a, 2000b) as well as by related research about happiness (Francis, et al., 1995),
research suggesting that happier students have higher GPAs (Schutte, et al., 1997), and
research indicating that positive self-concept is a crucial factor in achievement efforts
(Skaalvik, 1997; Bandura, 1997). Higher education historians (Rudolph, 1962/1990;
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Chickering and Reisser, 1993) describe a long history of academically excluding the
affective domain (Rudolph, 1962/1990; Chickering and Resisser, 1993) which may be an
instructional mistake (Rudolph, 1962/1990; Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964) causing
or exacerbating the undergraduate distress that is self-reported (Counseling Services,
2002) and has been acted out (Rudolph, 1962; Chickering and Reisser, 1993) in the
history of the undergraduate experience.
But even if the affective stress symptoms routinely reported by college
undergraduates are not directly related to emotionally understanding and managing
the personal challenges of academic achievement, the significant results of this study,
and related research in the psychology of learning, suggest that understanding and
managing emotions comprise a crucial learning resource. The educational concern that
prompted this study is that higher level emotional development in relation to academic
achievement is traditionally left to chance in the undergraduate experience.

What This Study Found
The significant results of this study detected a tendency for those
undergraduates who understand and manage emotions to have higher GPAs. These
results were determined at a high level of statistical certainty, p<.01 and p<.05,
respectively.

As Chapter 4 explained, Understanding Emotions in Branch 3X

correlated significandy with test-takers' GPA at r .432, significant at p<.01 (2-tailed).
Managing Emotions in Branch 4X correlated significandy with test-takers' GPA at r .314,
significant at p<.05 (2-tailed). These significant p levels mean that there is a 99%
certainty, and a 95% certainty, respectively, that these two correlations of higher level
emotional intelligence to GPA did not occur by chance. But w hat does that 'higher
level' relation actually represent?
The MSCEIT, V.2 has combined the ability to Understand Emotions with
the ability to Manage Emotions into the test construct called 'emotional reasoning.'
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It was only on the 'emotional reasoning' tasks that the significant relation to academic
achievement was found. Hence it is important to understand what 'emotional
reasoning' represents.
A look inside the 'emotional reasoning' test scores reveals a pattern of
academic achievement linked to scores on Understanding and Managing Emotions:
test participants with higher GPAs had higher scores on Understanding and Managing
Emotions. Test participants with lower GPAs had lower scores on Understanding and
Managing Emotions. For these two components of the test construct of 'emotional
reasoning'—Understanding and Managing Emotions—test participants with higher GPAs
of 3.6 and above had a mean score of 113 on U nderstanding Emotions. Test
participants with lower GPAs of 2.9 and below, had a mean score of 100 on
Understanding Emotions. This is a statistically significant 13-point difference. Test
participants with 'm edium ' GPAs between 3.0 and 3.59, had a mean score of 111 on
Understanding Emotions, an 11-point scores difference from the higher GPAs' scores
on Understanding Emotions. The same pattern was true for higher GPAs and higher
scores on Managing Emotions, which is the other more complex part of the test
construct of 'emotional reasoning.'
Test participants with higher GPAs of 3.6 and above, had a mean score of
106 on Managing Emotions. Test participants w ith lower GPAs of 2.9 or below, had a
mean score of 97 on Managing Emotions. This is a statistically significant 9-point
difference. Test participants with GPAs in between the higher and lower, that is, GPAs
between 3.0 and 3.59, had a mean score of 104 on Managing Emotions. Note from the
Chapter 4 summary of mean scores for each branch and overall index score of the
MSCEIT, V.2, that all test participants scored higher on the harder, complex tasks of
Understanding Emotions and Managing Emotions, than on the simpler tasks of the
other two branches in the test. The central question is: Why?
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As noted in Chapter 4, the MSCEIT, V.2 was desgined to be presented in a
hierarchy of tasks of ascending complexity. At the top of the hierarchy of test
questions are problem-solving tasks that test Understanding and Managing Emotions.
At the top of the task hierarchy, then, is the test construct of 'emotional reasoning.'
'Emotional reasoning' is tested by both Branch 3X and Branch 4X. Test
questions in Branch 4X (Managing Emotions) were designed to be more complex than
test questions in Branch 3X (Understanding Emotions), but both branches were
designed to measure two components of the same abstract construct. That is to say,
because the task questions about Managing Emotions and Understanding Emotions are
testing the ability to solve complex abstract problems about an emotional situation or
emotional event, these are the hardest and most abstract questions on the test.
Responding to these questions requires that cognitive reasoning involve the emotions
and emotional knowledge of the test participant. Note again that it was only on
'emotional reasoning' tasks that a significant relation to the GPA and class rank of the
test participants was found.
As described in Chapter 4, this study detected a tendency for class-rank to
correlate significantly with higher test scores on Understanding Emotions, near the top
of the MSCEIT, V.2 task hierarchy, in Branch 3X. The significant correlation between
high school rank and GPA was found only in the abstract ability to understand
emotions.
The correlation of high-school class rank to emotional reasoning scores, as
explained in Chapter 4, is further corroboration of what this study was looking for:
the correlation of class rank with higher 'emotional reasoning' test scores is a further
indication that a relation does exist between ability in the affective domain (high scores
on Understanding and Managing Emotions) and academic achievement (shown by
high-school class rank).
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This study also found a correlation that was nearly significant ( r = .058)
between GPA and the overall index of emotional intelligence, the MSCEITOX score.
Although a larger sample size might have contributed to a true level of p<.05
significance, or lower, the 'dose proximity7of .058 to statistical significance indicates a
likely relation between academic achievement and the overal index of emotional
intelligence of the test partidpants in this study. This suggestion of a relation has thus
far, in this study, been suggested by multiple indicators.
Two additional indicators—age and gender—might suggest that personal
intervening characteristics may mediate between the 'intelligence' of the affective
domain and the 'intelligence' of the cognitive domain, in relation to undergraduate
achievement behaviors. Using both the t-test and the Pearson r correlation, there was
no significant relation found between the age of the test partidpants and their test
scores, although previous emotional intelligence research on the variable of age has
found such a relationship (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b). Previous research
theorizes that emotional intelligence is developmental across the lifespan, but the
results of this study did not support that theory. Two age-groupings were used in a ttest of mean score differences, but the analysis was limited by the small sample size and
restriction in range of participant ages.
Previous research on the mediating variable of gender indicates that
females tend to score somewhat higher than males on emotional intelligence tests
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a, 2000b) and a significant gender-difference was
found by this study in the higher test scores of females on Understanding Emotions and
Managing Emotions.

With this in mind, the following analysis of comments by the six

focus group partidpants suggests a surprising disconnect between the higher female
test scores on Understanding and Managing Emotions and actual achievement
behaviors as self-reported by gender.
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What The Results of this Study Suggest
Although the comments by this study's focus group cannot be
generalized back to represent the achievement behaviors of the entire sample, nor to
represent the entire U.S. population of high achieving undergraduates, this study's
focus group comments do point out that a) undergraduate females who self-report
more stress than males (Counseling Services, 2002; L.A. Times, 1999) may feel free to
express emotions in social relationships, but marginalize or repress emotions instead of
involving emotions in learning; and b) undergraduate males may feel culturallyexpected to manage and control emotions but not to express them. One of the
male focus group participants said that he hardly knew what words to use to answer
the focus group questions, because he so rarely talks about emotions.
Throughout this study's focus group discussion, as described in Chapter 4,
participants expressed beliefs and uncertainties about their academic achievement
behaviors that seemed to contradict their tested ability to understand and manage
emotions. Gender-differences about managing emotions were expressed. The four
female participants in this study's focus group self-reported study strategies to side
step, marginalize, or "push emotions aside." One top-scoring female test participant in
the focus group said, "I put my emotions at the back of my head" to study.
After making such assertions as, "Learning for me is emotion-less" and
the belief "that I am kind of expected to push my emotions aside here and just excell,"
the focus group listed positive emotions that they all said they have experienced before
and during performance of a higher learning task, provided that the learning task is in a
subject that they like, or even "feel a passion for." All focus group participants said
they have experienced a feeling of eagerness to begin learning, a feeling of excitement
about the subject to be learned, and a feeling of confidence in their ability to learn it.
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The contradictions expressed by the focus group about the role of their
emotions in higher learning strongly suggest that the affective domain is untaught,
unacknowledged, and unidentified during the undergraduate academic experience.
Even though feeling the presence of emotions in higher learning was selfreported by all participants in the undergraduate focus group, five of the six focus
group participants initially said they doubted that learning includes emotions.
However, as described in Chapter 4, even the doubters contradicted their previous
statements as the discussion continued and all participants subsequently described
emotional feelings that they say they experience during learning. There was a
disconnect, however, between high test scores on understanding and managing
emotions and self-reported achievement behaviors.
The high achieving undergraduates in this study's focus group reported
such negative achievement behaviors as daydreaming, procrastinating, pushing
emotions aside instead of emotionally-intelligent management of emotions to facilitate
learning. This apparent disconnect between knowledge and behavior indicates an
educational need to teach the meaning and uses of the affective domain for
undergraduate academic achievement, at least to this study's focus group. The
educational irony is that all 61 test participants—including the ones who self-reported
repressing or marginalizing their emotions in learning—scored higher on the harder,
complex test construct of Understanding Emotions and Managing Emotions, than on
the simpler parts of the test. What does this suggest?
The highest scores on the harder tasks that involved emotions in
reasoning are somewhat of a very curious result. Some of the sample's highest scorers
on 'emotional reasoning' tasks were in this study's focus group; they initially said that
emotions are not involved in learning. This odd result may simply indicate that this
special sample of academic high achievers was skilled at cognitive reasoning, and good
at following test instructions, instructions asking them to involve their ow n emotions to
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reason about and solve emotional problems. The focus group participants may have
simply been unfamiliar with thinking about emotions in relation to learning. The
MSCEIT, V.2 was designed to reveal the presence of emotions, which conventional
learning situations do not.
The significantly higher test scores on 'emotional reasoning' tasks could
mean that allowing emotions to facilitate thinking is easily done, is readily learned in
taking the test, or is an innate and natural function of 'intellect'-as Aristotle suggested
in his model of an interactive intellect with multiple parts.
Further, the curious and significant result of this study—where the highest
scores are on the harder tasks that ask participants to perform 'emotional reasoning'—
suggests that domain separation may be a misleading educational artifice that attempts
to exclude, but cannot prevent, the natural involvement of emotions in higher level
abstract reasoning. The review of the literature in this study and the significant results
of this study suggest that development of the affective domain should be included in
the undergraduate development of 'intellect.' Including both domains in the academic
development of 'intellect' is supported by the significant results of this study which
show that students who are good at 'emotional reasoning' have higher GPAs.
The relation of the affective domain to cognitive thinking can be better
understood by looking at the test scores of this study's sample of high achievers, on the
simple, cognitive-like tasks on Peredving Emotions in Branch IX. This study's sample
of high achievers attained a lower mean score on Perceiving Emotions in Branch IX
than on 'emotional reasoning' in Branches 3X and 4X. Note that the simple Branch IX
tasks did not require the test participants to use their skill at cognitive reasoning and
involve their emotions in reasoning. The low scores on Branch IX may simply indicate
that, as the test-taking began, this sample of academic high achievers was not all that
familiar with names and definitions of emotions.
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The question remains, however, as to why this sample of known high
achievers ('known' to be high achievers because admitted to a nationally top-ranked
and academically competitive college) did not perform as well at simple identification of
the names and definitions of specific emotions and emotional expressions, as they did
on tasks that asked them to reason with emotions to solve an abstract problem. Why?
Looking at the simple tasks on Using Emotions in Branch 2X reveals tasks
that also did not require abstract reasoning, a critical thinking skill at which this special
sample of academic high achievers had to be very skilled in order to be admitted to the
academically competitive freshman class (Office of Admissions, 2002). Branch 2X tasks
asked the test participant to simply recall the feeling of certain moods and then decide
how the moods interact with thinking. So, the question remains: Why did this study's
sample of high achievers score lower on the easier tasks?
As the MSCEIT, V.2 tasks proceeded, responding to the simple, cognitivelike identification and recall tasks may have "taught" simple emotional intelligence to
the test-takers. This sample of high achievers may have previously been conditioned
to suppress emotions when learning, or when taking a test, and hence may have
initially been reluctant or resistant to identify emotions or to think in what the MSCEIT,
V.2 test designers call the language of emotions (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b).
As the test proceeded, the progressive "learning" of emotional intelligence skills may
have been operationalized in this sample. As responding to the tasks proceeded, a
task-hierarchy of ascending complexity unfolded. Taking the test may have
operationalized innate higher level emotional skills that are naturally involved (even if
not educationally acknowledged) in the intellectual development of cognitive
reasoning.
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What this Study Learned about the Test Construct of 'Emotional Intelligence'
Higher Level Achievement Uses Both Domains
The results of this study indicate that emotional involvement in higher
level cognition can be evoked during the MSCEIT, V.2 task responses, and can be
measured as an emotional 'intelligence' ability. Further, based on focus group
discussion, it appears that even if the thinker does not acknowledge the involvement of
emotions in higher level thinking, or is unaware of the attention-directing and
facilitating role that emotions can play in higher level cognition, emotions can become
involved in higher learning anyway. The problem, however, with not being aware of
personal emotional involvement in complex thinking, or in trying to marginalize or
repress personal emotions during higher learning—as students may be conditioned to
do—is that potentially harmful anxiety, stress, and other undesired learning outcomes
may result.

Domain Separation is a Tenuous Thing
Desired educational outcomes in the cognitive domain appear to still be
separated from the affective domain, although some cognitive objectives sound
suspiciously like higher level 'emotional intelligence' as defined by the MSCEIT, V.2
instrument used in this study. Previous research has already correlated emotional
intelligence ability with general intelligence ability (see Appendix C) (Mayer, Salovey
and Caruso, 2000b). The two 'intelligences' may be more closely related than
suspected, as an existing taxonomy of educational objectives (Terenzini, 1997) may
unintentionally suggest in its description of cognitive objectives as "...a set of general
intellectual and cognitive competencies and skills. These skills constitute...complex
mental functions...the effective processing and utilization of information and include
such activities as critical thinking, problem-solving, the analysis and utilization of
information, creative thinking, and both formal (i.e., Piagetian) and postformal
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reasoning (the analysis of problems for which there is no verifiably-correct answer,
sometimes called "ill-structured" or "wicked" problems, such as crime, poverty,
abortion). This category also includes moral reasoning, which refers to the processes
by which judgments of right and wrong are made..." (Terenzini, 1997, Appendix C of
his report). Separating the two domains of emotions and cognition may be an error.
As described by the strange case of Phineas Gage in Chapter 2 of this study (Damasio,
1994), without emotions, cognitive problem-solving, utilization of information,
Piagetian formal and postformal reasoning, judgments of right and wrong in moral
reasoning—none of these 'cognitive domain' activities can be completed (Damasio,1994).
If there is a naturally occurring relation of emotions to higher level
cognition, then, what happens if emotions are ng£ "allowed to participate in thinking"
(Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000a)? This is the important educational question.
Emotional intelligence is knowing that it is important to generate certain emotions
before learning begins, because those emotions can facilitate complex thinking tasks.
Understanding how to generate and manage emotions is a personal emotional
intelligence task, that is not taught in school, but should ideally be done before learning
begins (as Bloom's Taxonomy, Step 1, Handbook II advises) (see Appendix B)
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). But which emotions to "involve"?

Suggestions for Future Research
Research Area 1: What is 'Achievement'?
In order to better understand the relation between emotional intelligence
and academic achievement which this study found, a future area for qualitative research
would logically want to explore a series of achievement questions, beginning with,
What is 'achievement'?
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What are the components of different kinds of undergraduate
'achievement' in various disciplines and areas of activity? Are there different kinds of
'achievers' ? Are some achievement behaviors more effective in some disciplines and
areas than others? Or, is there one set of achievement behaviors that are effective
across academic disciplines and other areas of achievement activity such as atheletics
and dramatic arts achievement?

One way to test these research questions is to

conduct a longitudinal study of the achievement behaviors of diverse populations of
undergraduate high achievers and low achievers, across disciplines and areas of
achievement.

What are the characteristics of 'high achievers'? The qualitative method
in a longitudinal study would be an ideal way to gather new information about the
personal characteristics of high achievers. This is an area of previous research in related
fields (including the psychology of leadership; teaching to gifted students; Bandura's
study of the achievement factor of self-efficacy beliefs versus actual ability; the
motivating role of personal interest). This proposed study would look for support of
those characteristics already identified in high achievers, including persistence, openness
to change, interest in exploring new ideas, but would also be looking for new indication
of whether or not high achievers display an ability to understand and manage their
emotions before and during the achievement effort. The educational question is
whether such characteristics can be taught to mediate the behaviors of low achievers.

What are the characteristics of Tow achievers'? Previous psychology of
learning research on the characteristics of low achievers has identified low self-esteem,
negative self-concept, self-inefficacy belief, lack of interest in the learning task, negative
behavior patterns that reinforce previous low achievement and low risk, and taskavoidance. This would be an educationally rewarding area of future emotional
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intelligence research, if the emotional causes and characteristics of self-defeating taskavoidance behaviors of low achievers (Skaalvik, 1997) could be further identifed.
Diverse Populations. Future research is needed to qualitatively identify,
and then track with longitudinal studies, the undergraduate achievement behaviors of
diverse populations, such as sons and daughters of recently arrived immigrant families
who learn English as a second language; high-achieving athletes; high-achieving
dyslectics; high-achieving dramatic-arts students; high-achieving undergraduates with
learning disabilities; high achievers with physical disabilities; high achievers who have
suuceeded against the odds. Do understanding and managing their emotions play
some role in their success?

Which Emotions Facilitate Learning? Part of further exploration of the
relation this study found between emotional intelligence and academic achievement
would ideally answer the research question, What is an effective emotional life? (as the
designers of the MSCEIT, V.2 instrument have suggested) (Mayer and Salovey, 1997).
The academic focus of such a study would seek to find qualitative and quantitative
indication of which emotions best facilitate learning at all levels, and especially in
performing complex higher level reasoning which is of particular interest to the
objectives of higher education.

Research Area 2: Can Individual 'Emotional Intelligence' be Mediated by Intervention?
If 'emotional intelligence' is a mediating variable related to higher
academic achievement, as the results of this study suggest, can it be taught and learned?
What would be the effects of knowledge and application of emotional intelligence, for
low achieving undergraduates? for diverse populations of undergraduates? across
academic disciplines? and different areas of achievement activity?
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Ideally the research groundwork for these questions would be laid by
work in Research Area 1, described above. Research Area 2 questions w ould comprise
an ideal follow-up study with the same population groups used in studying the
components of 'achievement/ Low achievers would be an ideal population for this
research question.
For example, experimental studies show that self-concept is over
sensitized in depressed learners (Slipp, 1975). They are hypersensitive to feedback
about performance. Recall the depressed card-players, as discussed in Chapter 2.
The depressed card-players experiment indicated how depression cues attention to
perpetuate self-defeating interpretation of events. Recall that depressed subjects
reacted to their failure to win (in an experiment situation where the card game was
stopped and all players were told they had failed), with pessimism and lowered
expectations than the normal group when asked to play another round (Slipp, 1975).
Emotion also determines the speed at which thinking is performed and the richness of
multiple information cues that are perceived and attended. In the card sorting task,
depression determined a cognitive mode of low risk, low achievement (Damasio, 1994).
Recall that, conversely, a feeling of elation can cause rapid generation of
multiple mental images and cognitive associations in response to a wide variety of
information and meaning cues (Damasio, 1994). The wealth of imagery and associative
cues causes ease of inference and inclusive thinking, resulting in bold exploratory
behaviors. The opposite of this rapid and expansive cognitive mode is the feeling of
sadness and the cognitive mode that is paired with it. Sadness is characterized by
slowness of mental image formation, less association of meaning due to perception of
fewer mental cues, a more narrow band of inferences, and over-concentration on one
or two images that will sustain the negative mood. The cognitive state of sadness
exhibits psychomotor inhibition such as reduced or lost appetite, and a reduction of
exploratory behaviors (Damasio, 1994).
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Hence such research would be educationally important, in order to
determine if individuals can learn how to understand the emotions they are feeling, and
learn how to manage their emotions to generate a personalized cognitive mode of
attention and positive engagement of the learning task. The challenge for higher
education is how to teach positive use of personal emotions in relation to higher
learning achievement, an educational application "that can potentially lead to a
transformation" (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, p. 186) of cultural expectations and
achievement behaviors concering the expression, understanding, and management of
emotions as a learning resource.
Instruments that appraise and analyze emotions have been available for
decades, such as the Succeed-Fail Questionnaire and the Adjective Rating Scale,
designed to probe depression and childhood self-differentiation; and the Multiple Affect
Adjective Checklist and Thematic Apperception Test which measure depression,
hostility and feelings of well-being (Slipp, 1975, p. 139).
The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory does measure broader
dimensions of emotion than depression including independence, assertiveness, selfactualization, empathy, social responsibility, problem solving, flexibility, tolerance for
stress, impulse control, happiness, and optimism (Schutte, et al., 1998). The Style And
Perception of Affect Scale is based on the concept "that being able to attend rapidly,
appropriately, and effortlessly to feelings is the cornerstone of emotional intelligence"
(Schutte, et al., 1998, p. 169), and measures body-based, evaluation-based,
and logic-based perceptions of emotion. Positive emotions such as happiness with its
rich, rapid and effortless cognitive mode is a worthy educational objective in the
affective domain and generating it could be an affective target of instructional design in
higher education.
Happiness has been identified in the literature as frequency and degree of
positive affect (Argyle and Crossland, 1987 in Francis, et al., 1998); as resulting from a
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supportive sodal network in a setting that offers positive interpretation of most daily
events (Francis, et al., 1998); identified as inner causation (Veenhoven, 1994 in Francis, et
al., 1998); and as having a significant correlation with self-esteem (Lu and Argyle,1991).
The Oxford Happiness Inventory Scale asks: "Who is a happy person?" (Francis, et al.,
1998, p. 168).
Responding to the scale items on the MSCEIT, V.2 (MHS, Inc./Mayer,
Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) gives undergraduates the opportunity to identify how they
subjectively express, experience, and perceive emotions in self and others, and an
opportunity to perform emotional reasoning exercises in Tasks D and G
(Understanding Emotions) and in Tasks E and H (Managing Emotions). Taking an
emotional intelligence test is one way to become aware of the developmental presence
of emotional intelligence and its relationship to higher level achievement which this
study has reported. Responding to the MSCEIT, V.2 instrument operationalizes a
personal experience of emotional reasoning (Salovey and Mayer, 1990).
Other instruments that operationalize emotional understanding and
emotional management include 1) the Affect Expression Rating Scale, a self-report of
emotional expressiveness; 2) the Affective Communication Test, a self-report Likertscale; 3) the Affect Sensitivity Test which uses videotaped interactions between two
individuals for respondents to identify the emotions being expressed; 4) the
Communication of Affect Receiving Ability Test (CARAT) which uses a videotape of
people watching slides of beautiful or unpleasant or unusual scenes for respondents to
identify, from facial expressions shown on the videotape, what slide each target is
watching; and 5) the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS) which presents face and
body expressions for cognitive-emotional identification, and a similar scale presents
faces, colors and designs for identification of emotional constructs in stimulus-receiving
(Salovey and Mayer, 1990).
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The State and Trait Meta-Mood Scales (SMMS and TMMS) searches for
multiple experiences of moods by asking respondents to identify which moods are
typical, which are not; which moods are understandable, which are not; what mood is
caused by dancing or studying or other specific situations, in order to help the
respondent understand what situations cause or are associated with a specific emotional
mood. The SMMS and TMMS are designed to help respondents identify situations or
behaviors that have correlated with a desired mood, such as happiness being caused in
the past by music and dancing (Salovey and Mayer, 1990). This knowledge can help
individuals identify situations and behaviors to generate future moods.

The Oxford

Happiness Inventory is an instrument for identifying the cognitive mode of happiness,
by asking for a response to such scale items as:
I am sure that the future is overflowing with hope and promise.
I feel that I am in total control of all aspects of my life.
Nowadays, I wake up feeling more rested that I used to.
I can make all decisions very easily.
I feel I have boundless energy.
My time is always perfectly organized so that I can fit in all the things I
w ant to do.
I am always committed and involved.

Future research to identify emotionally intelligent individuals and the
emotional skills they employ has been suggested in the literature (Salovey and Mayer,
1990; Schutte, et al., 1998) but to date no longitudinal research study has addressed the
acquisition and application of the primary emotion state of happiness (Francis, et al.,
1998) or related feelings of happiness (such as eagerness to begin, excitement about
learning, confidence-contentment) in an educational context as an optimal cognitive
mode for achievement.
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Research Area 3: How to Design a New Taxonomy for Emotionally Intelligent
Undergraduates in a Complex World?
The complexities of the contemporary world may require a new kind of
thinker who has learned to be adept at complex problem-solving across the two
domains. Ideally, existing taxonomies of educational objectives could be used to design
a new taxonomy of educational objectives that would academically include the affective
domain. For example, domain-inclusive educational objectives can be designed by
looking at Astin's Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) questionnaires
which "over the years have incorporated fifty-seven different affective-psychological
(scale) items... (such as) student satisfaction with the college environment...." (Astin,
1977/1983, pp. 31-32).
The variables investigated by CIRP were organized into four categories.
Astin has documented in all four categories affective learning objectives, and it is there
that emotional intelligence as a mediating variable might be applied:
the CIRP questionnaire areas are 1) interpersonal self-esteem which includes social selfconfidence; 2) intellectual self-esteem which includes intellectual self-confidence; 3) selfcriticism which includes sensitivity to criticism and defensiveness; 4) understanding of self
and others, which includes cheerfulness and desire to achieve (Astin, 1977/1983, p. 33).

Combining Astin's model with the first three instructional steps for
engaging the affective domain in Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives.
Handbook II: Affective Domain (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964), w ould provide a
wealth of clues for designers of instructional strategies who want to fulfill a new
taxonomy of academic objectives that engage the affective domain.
An ideal learning environment in which to experiment with strategies to
engage the affective domain, is on-line distance and distributed higher education. An
effective pedagogy for engaging the affective domain on-line, would include visual
manipulation of the on-line learning environment, to visually generate emotions that
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facilitate learning, such as eagerness to begin, excitement about the subject to be
learned and confidence in ability to learn it. Visual innovations to engage the affective
domain would be presented on-line, and could be tailored to engage the attention of
the individual learner before learning begins, per Step 1 of Bloom's Taxonomy,
Handbook II (see Appendix B) (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964). The effectiveness
of an innovative on-line experiment to visually evoke involvement of the affective
domain could be determined by pretesting two groups of on-line learners on the
subject to be learned; presenting the visual innovation to an experimental group, while
not presenting the innovation to a control group; then posttesting to measure academic
achievement of each group.

Conclusion
Why has this study researched the emotional intelligence of the affective
domain and suggested engaging the affective domain as a pedagogical strategy in
higher education? The reason is that there may be a relation between higher level
emotional intelligence and higher academic achievement. As the literature in this study
and the results of this study suggest, emotional intelligence may not be needed in
simple cognitive tasks, but may become naturally involved in higher level cognition,
because it is needed to assist complex higher level reasoning in abstract problem
solving.
Although the statistics in this study indicate that emotions are related to
higher learning performance, students in this study's focus group reported disengaging
their emotions before beginning higher learning tasks. More research is needed to
resolve this paradox and to understand more fully how emotions and cognition may
relate during higher learning in the undergraduate experience.
This study has glimpsed the possibility of some kind of relationship
between emotional intelligence and academic achievement, and suggests further study
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of ways in which emotional intelligence might be further researched to become more
fully engaged in higher learning.
In conclusion, it seems that, wherever this study goes, it meets Plato
coming back. Plato expresses a good reason for studying the relation of emotional
intelligence to the cognitive domain:
"(the) whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of
...temperance and wisdom..." Plato writes in the Republic.
(and) "to this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the
energies of his life" (Plato, 428-347 B.C. in Jowett, 1946, pp. 343-346).
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Appendix A

Client Demographics:
Students Who Completed O ngoing Therapy
for the Academic Year 1999-2000
and
for the Academic Year 2000-2001

(Counseling Services, 2002)
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Client Demographics, Academic Year 1999-2000
For Students Who Com pleted Treatm ent D uring This Period
GENDER
n

valid
Missing

ETHNIC
5SJ7
0

1 ' ’ ' "597

0

RANK
597
0

GENDER

vaiia
Female
Male
Total

AGE
372
225

Marital
Status

Valid
Percent

Percent
2.3
70.9
26.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
2.3
73.2
100.0

70.9
26.8
100.0

ETHNIC
Percent
6.5
5.4
5.2
2.5
2.8
77.6
100.0

Frequency
39
32
31
15
17
463
597

vaiia
Asian American
Black / African American
Hispanic / Latino(a)
Other
White / Caucasian
Total

Valid
Percent
6.5
5.4
5.2
2.5
2.8
77.6
100.0

(Cumulative
Percent
6.5
11.9
17.1
19.6
22.4
100.0

RANK

vauo
Freshman
Graduate
Junidr
Other
Senior
Sophomore
Total

Percent
4.4
7.5
19.8
22.8
.7
28.8
16.1
100.0

Frequency
26
45
118
136
4
172
96
597

Valid
Percent
4.4
7.5
19.8
22.8
.7
28.8
16.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
4.4
11.9
31.7
54.4
55.1
83.9
100.0

International

valid

.Ou
1.00
Total

Frequency
581
16
597

597

0

O f those Reporting Gender:
Female = 72.5%
Male = 27%

Frequency Table

Frequency
14
423
160
597

Intemation
al
59/
0

Percent

97.3

2.7
100.0

Valid
Percent

97.3
2.7
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
97.3
100.0
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AGE
Frequency
Valid

Missing
Total

l/.UU
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00
23.00
24.00
25.00
26.00
27.00
28.00
29.00
30.00
31.00
32.00
33.00
34.00
37.00
42.00
51.00
53.00
Total
System

Percent

i

1

33
61
83
77
32
12
9
12
10
13
7
3
5
4
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
372
225
597

5.5
10.2
13.9
12.9
5.4
2.0
1.5
2.0
1.7
2.2
1.2
.5
.8
.7
.5
.2
.3
.2
.2
.2
.2
62.3
37.7
100.0

Valid
Percent
.3
8.9
16.4
22.3
20.7
8.6
3.2
2.4
3.2
2.7
3.5
1.9
.8
1.3
1.1
.8
.3
.5
.3
.3
.3
.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
.3
9.1
25.5
47.8
68.5

Valid
Percent
§.4
1.0
4.0
.8
.3
84.4
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
9.4
10.4
14.4
15.2
15.6
100.0

112
80.4
82.8
86.0
88.7
92.2
94.1
94.9
96.2
97.3
98.1
98.4
98.9
99.2
99.5
99.7
100.0

Marital Status

vaiia
Divorced
Married
Partnered
Separated
Single
Total

Frequency
56
6
24
5
2
504
597

Percent
9.4
1.0
4.0
.8
.3
84.4
100.0

Note that percentages are based on the w hole sample.
Thus missing data is calculated into percentages.
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Depression

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
336
261
597

Percent
56.3
43.7
100.0

Valid
Percent
56.3
43.7
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
56.3
100.0

Anxiety

vaiia

-1 uo
.00
Total

Frequency
341
256
597

Percent
67.1
42.9
100.0

Valid
Cumulativ
Percent
e Percent
57.1 ~
~ s n '
42.9
100.0
100.0

Obsessions/XCompulsions

valid

-l.ud
.00
Total

Frequency
>5
522
597

Percent
12.5
87.4
100.0

Valid
Percent
12.5
87.4
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
12.6
100.0

Valid
Percent
43.4
56.6
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
43.4
100.0

Valid
Percent
29.3
70.7
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
29.3
100.0

Low Self-Esteem

valid

-l.ud
.00
Total

Frequency
259
338
597

Percent
43.4"
56.6
100.0

Academic Difficulties

Valid

-1 .ud
.00
Total

Frequency
"T75"
422
597

Percent
29.3
70.7
100.0

Peer Interpersonal Problems

Valid

-1.uo
.00
Total

Frequency

2o6
391
597

Percent
34.5
65.5
100.0

Valid
Percent

34.'5
65.5
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
34.S
100.0
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Anorexia

Valid

-1 uu
.00
Total

Frequency
11
586
597

Percent
' ' 1.8
98.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
1.8
98.2
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
2.2
97.8
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
2.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
3.2
96.8
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
3.2
100.0

Valid
Percent

Cumulativ
e Percent

Bulimia
Frequency
vaiia

-1 .l)u
.00
Total

' 13
584
597

Percent
2.2
97.8
100.0

Compulsive Eating

valid

-l.dO
.00
Total

Frequency
13
578
597

Percent
3.2
96.8
100.0

Body Image Distortion
Frequency
valid

-l.dO
.00
Total

42
555
597

Percent
7.(5
93.0
100.0

“

“ 7.0

7"0

93.0
100.0

100.0

Valid
Percent
2.7
97.3
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
2.7
100.0

Valid
Percent
3.2
96.8
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent

Sub-Clinical Eating Disorder

Valid

-i.uli
.00
Total

Frequency
16
581
597

Percent
2.7
97.3
100.0

Suicidal

Valid

-1 .uO
.00
Total

Frequency
19
578
597

Percent

3.2
96.3
100.0

3.2
100.0
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Disorganized-Oissociative

vaiia

-i.uu
.00
Total

Frequency
3
594
597

Percent
.5
99.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
.5
99.5
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
.b
100.0

Valid
Percent
8.0
92.0
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
8.0
100.0

Valid
Percent
9.2
90.8
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
9.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
2.7
97.3
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
2.7
100.0

Bereavement

Valid

-1 uu
.00
Total

Frequency
48
549
597

Percent
8.0
92.0
100.0

Assertion

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
55
542
597

Percent
9.2
90.8
100.0

Anger Control Problems

"Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
IS
581
597

Percent
2.7
97.3
100.0

Difficulty Expressing Affect

Valid

-l Ou
.00
Total

Frequency
89
508
597

Percent
14.9
85.1
100.0

Valid
Percent
14.9
85.1
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
14.9
100.0

Valid
Percent
12.7
87.3
100.0

Cumulativ
e Percent
12.7
100.0

Sleep Problems

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
76
521
597

Percent
12.7
87.3
100.0
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Client Demographics, Academic Year 2000-2001
For Students Who Completed Treatm ent D uring This Period
N

Intemation
al
651

Marital
ETHNIC
Status
653
653
_____ 1S2- _______2_ _______2_ _________ £L. _________ £L
AGE
471

Valid
Missina

GENDER
653

Frequency Table
GENDER

Valid
Female
Male
Total

Valid
Cumulative
Frequency
Percent
Percent
Percent
7
1.1
1.1
1.1
460
70.4
70.4
71.5
186
28.5
28.5
100.0
653 _____ lffl.Q. _____ m .0 ..

ETHNIC

Valid
Asian American
Black / African A
Hispanic / Latino
Other
White / Caucasian
Total

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
Percent
4.1
4.1
4.1
5.5
5.5
9.6
4.3
4.3
13.9
16.1
2.1
2.1
3.1
3.1
19.1
80.9
80.9
100.0
100.0 _____M 5 L .

Frequency
27
36
28
14
20
528

.

___552.
RANK

Valid
Freshman
Graduate
Junior
Other
Senior
Sophomor
Total

Frequency
19
56
116
142
6
221
93

_____ 555-

Percent
2.9
8.6
17.8
21.7
c
33.8
14.2
____ m a -

Valid
Percent
2.9
8.6
17.8
21.7
.9
33.8
14.2
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
2.9
11.5
29.2
51.0
51.9
85.8
100.0

Valid
Percent
97.7
2.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
97.7
100.0

International

Valid

Missing
Total

.00
1.00
Total
System

Frequency
636
15
651
2
653.

Percent
97.4
2.3
99.7
.3
100.0
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RANK
653
____ JL

AGE

Valid

Missing
Total

17.00
18.00
19.00
20.00
21.00
22.00
23.00
24.00
25.00
26.00
27.00
28.00
29.00
30.00
31.00
32.00
34.00
37.00
42.00
46.00
51.00
53.00
Total
System

Frequency
1
42
67
103
110
47
18
9
15
12
14
5
5
5
6
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
471
182

Percent
.2
6.4
10.3
15.8
16.8
7.2
2.8
1.4
2.3
1.8
2.1
.8
.8
.8
.9
.6
.3
.3
.2
.2
.2
.2
72.1
27.9

Valid
Percent
.2
8.9
14.2
21.9
23.4
10.0
3.8
1.9
3.2
2.5
3.0
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.3
.8
.4
.4
.2
.2
.2
.2
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
.2
9.1
23.4
45.2
68.6
78.6
82.4
84.3
87.5
90.0
93.0
94.1
95.1
96.2
97.5
98.3
98.7
99.2
99.4
99.6
99.8
100.0

Valid
Percent
7.7
.8
4.6
.9
.3
85.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
7.7
8.4
13.0
13.9
14.2
100.0

_____ S52. ____ M L
Marital Status

Valid
Divorced
Married
Partnere
Separate
Single
Total

Percent
Frequency
7.7
50
.8
5
4.6
30
.9
6
.3
2
85.8
560
653 _____IQfl.Q-

Note that percentages are based on the whole sample.
Thus missing data is calculated into percentages.
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Depression

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
Percent
301
46.1
352
53.9
653 _____12Q.0-

Valid
Percent
46.1
53.9
.100.0

Cumulative
Percent
46.1
100.0

Valid
Percent
41.0
59.0

Cumulative
Percent
41.0
100.0

Anxiety

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
268
385
653

Percent
41.0
59.0

____ M L ____ 1212-

Obsessions/Compulsions

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
74
579

Percent
11.3
88.7

Valid
Percent
11.3
88.7

251- . -1212-

Cumulative
Percent
11.3
100.0

1QQ.Q.

Low Self-Esteem

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
226
427
653

Percent
34.6
65.4
1212-

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
34.6
34.6
65.4
100.0
12 1 0 .

Academic Difficulties

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
152
501
653

Percent
23.3
76.7
1212-

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
23.3
23.3
76.7
100.0
- .1 2 1 0 .

Peer Interpersonal Problems

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
155
498

251-

Percent
23.7
76.3

Valid
Percent
23.7
76.3

Cumulative
Percent
23.7
100.0

1212- ____ 1212-
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Anorexia

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
14
639

Percent
2.1
97.9
1QQ.0

_____ 552-

Valid
Percent
2.1
97.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
2.1
100.0

Bulimia

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Valid
Cumulative
Frequency
Percent
Percent
Percent
7
1.1
1.1
1.1
98.9
646
98.9
100.0
. 653 .
.100.0 _____ 1222-

Compulsive Eating

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
Percent
3.4
3.4
3.4
96.6
96.6
100.0
100.0 _____ 102.0..

Frequency
22
631
653

Body Image Distortion

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
42
611
653

Percent
6.4
93.6

-

Valid
Percent
6.4
93.6

Cumulative
Percent
6.4
100.0

J22.2-. ____ iQ2.o_

Sub-Clinical Eating Disorder

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
20
633
653

Percent
3.1
96.9
100.0

Cumulative
Valid
Percent
Percent
3.1
3.1
100.0
96.9
-102.0.

Suicidal

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
24
629

- -552-

Valid
Percent
3.7
96.3
-120.0 ______ 1QQ.Q

Percent
3.7
96.3

Cumulative
Percent
3.7
100.0
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Disorganized-Dissociative

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Valid
Frequency
Percent
Percent
6
.9
.9
647
99.1
99.1
_
653 _____ IflQJL____ M L

Cumulative
Percent
.9
100.0

Bereavement

Valid

-1.00
00
Total

Frequency
38
615

Valid
Percent
5.8
94.2

Percent
5.8
94.2

Cumulative
Percent
5.8
100.0

_____ SSI- ____ 12QJ2-____ M L
Assertion

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
32
621
653

Valid
Percent
4.9
95.1

Percent
4.9
95.1

____ M L

Cumulative
Percent
4.9
100.0

-KHLflL

Anger Control Problems

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
21
632

Percent
3.2
96.8

_____ 252- ____ M L

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
3.2
3.2
100.0
96.8
_____ m i ,

Difficulty Expressing Affect

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Frequency
39
614

_____

Percent
6.0
94.0
552- _____ m i .

Valid
Percent
6.0
94.0

Cumulative
Percent
6.0
100.0

____ M L

Sleep Problems

Valid

-1.00
.00
Total

Cumulative
Valid
Frequency
Percent
Percent
Percent
77
11.8
11.8
11.8
576
88.2
100.0
88.2
653 ______12.QJL. _____m o -
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Appendix B

Synopsis of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives.
Handbook II. Affective Domain

(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964)
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Appendix B
Synopsis: Bloom's Taxonomy. Handbook II: Affective Domain
"The additiotial element in the step beyond the Willingness to Respond level
...is that the behavior is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction,
an emotional response,
generally of pleasure, zest, or enjoyment"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 180).

Steps 1 and 2 in Bloom's Taxonomy, Handbook II. Affective Domain
are relevant to further exploration of this dissertation's finding of a relation between
understanding and managing emotions and academic achievement. In "A Condensed
Version of the Affective Domain of the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, pp. 176-193) six steps are described to address and
engage the affective domain, first as a prelude to learning, and then during the learning
task. Following are som e highlights of this taxonomy's first two steps of learning in the
affective domain: Receiving and Responding. These lead to a gradual intersection of
both domains, but the first act of learning occurs in the affective domain as simple
awareness and willingness, and ascends to emotional satisfaction (pleasure, zest,
enjoyment) in making a learning response. Recall the comments made by this study's
focus group; some comments confirm the concepts of this taxonomy. The first steps
that precede learning begin with sim ple awareness of the presence of a learning
stimulus. The obvious, first educational objective is that the learner 'receive' or pay
attention to the learning stimulus.

Step 1.0 Receiving. "At this level we are concerned that the learner
be sensitized to the existence o f certain phenomena and stimuli; that is, he (or she)
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be loilling to receive or attend to them. This is clearly the first and crucial step
if the learner is to be properly oriented to learn what the teacher intends that he (or she)
will....The category of Receiving has been divided into three sub-categories to indicate three
different levels o f attending to phenomena....the sub-categories do represent a continuum.
From an extremely passive position or role on the part of the learner, where the sole
responsibility for the evocation o f the behavior rests with the teacher— that is, the responsibility
rests zvith (the teacher) for 'capturing' the student's attention— the continuum extends to a
point at which the learner directs his (or her) attention...toward the preferred stimuli"
(Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 176). The first step, Receiving the Learning

Stimulus, is sub-divided into a hierarchy of ascending awareness: Sim ple A w aren ess o f
the Learning S tim u lu s, W illin gn ess to R eceive the Learning S tim u lu s, C on trolled
A tte n tio n to the Learning S tim u lu s.

Step 1.1 Awareness.

"Awareness is almost a cognitive behavior. But unlike

Knowledge, the lozvest level of the cognitive domain, zve are not so much concerned zvith a
memory of, or an ability to recall.. .as zve are that. ..the learner will merely be conscious of
something— that he (or she) take into account a situation, phenomenon, object, or stage of
affairs...unlike Knozvledge (in the cognitive domain) (this stage) does not necessarily imply
attention " (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, pp. 176-177). For example, the learner

would be guided to a sim ple awareness by colors, forms, arrangements o f objects or
symbols representing people, things or situations to be studied.

Step 1.2 Willingness to Receive. "In this category zve have come a step up
the ladder but are still dealing with what appears to be cognitive behavior. A t a minimum level,
zve are here describing the behavior of being zvilling to tolerate a given stimulus, not to avoid it.
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A t this level o f the continuum, the teacher is not concerned that the student seek it out, nor
even, perhaps, that in an environment croivded zvith many other stimuli the learner zvill
necessarily attend to the stim ulus.... A t best, he (or she) is zvilling to take notice of the
phenomenon..." (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 177).

Step 1.3 Controlled or Selected Attention. "At a somezvhat higher level zve
are concerned zvith a nezv phenomenon, the differentiation of a given stimulus into figure and
ground at a conscious or perhaps semiconscious level— the differentiation of aspects of a
stimulus zvhich is perceived as clearly marked off from adjacent impressions. The perception is
still zvithout tension or assessment, and the student may not knozv the technical terms or
symbols zvith zvhich to describe it correctly or precisely to others. There is an element of the
learner's controlling the attention here, so that the favored stimulus is selected and attended to
despite competing and distracting stimuli" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 178).

The second step in Bloom's Taxonomy, Handbook II is Responding. Like
Step One, which has three components of ascending awareness, Responding is
subdivided into three parts: Acquiescence in Responding, Willingness to Respond, and

Satisfaction in Responding.
2.0

Responding.

"At this level, zve are concerned zvith responses zvhich go

beyond merely attending (paying attention to) the phenomenon. The student...is actively
attending. As a first stage in a "learning by doing" process the student is committing himself
(or herself) in some small measure to the phenomenon involved...This is the category that many
teachers zvill fin d best describes their 'interest' objectives... that a (student) become sufficiently
involved in or committed to a subject, phenomenon, or activity that he (or she) zvill seek it out
and gain satisfaction from zvorking zvith it or engaging in it" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia,

1964, p. 178).
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2.1 Acquiescence in Responding.

"We might use the word 'obedience' or

‘compliance’ to describe this behavior....Compliance is perhaps a better term ...since there is
more of the element of reaction to a suggestion and less of the implication of resistance or yielding
unwillingly...The student makes the response, but...has not fid ly accepted the necessity for
doing so" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 179).

2.2 Willingness to Respond.

"The key to this level is .. .capacity for

voluntary activity. There is the implication that the learner is voluntarily committed to
exhibiting the behavior... not ju st because of a fear of punishment, but ‘‘on his (or her) own" or
voluntarily... the element of resistance or of yielding unwillingly... is here replaced with consent
or proceeding from one's own choice" (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 179).

2.3 Satisfaction in Responding. "The additional element in the step beyond
the Willingness to Respond level (the consent, the assent to responding, or the voluntary
response) is that the behavior is accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction, an emotional response,
generally of pleasure, zest, or enjoyment. The location of this category in the hierarchy has
given us a great deal of difficulty, fust where in the process of internalization the attachment of
an emotional response, kick, or thrill to a behavior occurs has been hard to determine....The
category is arbitrarily placed at this point in the hierarchy where it seems to occur most
frequently and where it is cited as or appears to be an important component of the objects at this
level of the continuum. The category's inclusion at this point serves the pragmatic purpose of
reminding us of the presence of the emotional component and its value in the building of affective
behaviors” (Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia, 1964, p. 180).
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BLOOM'S INSTRUCTIONAL STEP 1
Step 1.1 Present the Learning Stimulus*

Step 1.2 E ngage Willingness to Receive It*

Step 1.3 Promote Willingness to Respond to It*

*Resulting in: 'CONTROLLED'ATTENTION
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Appendix C

The Reliability and Validity of the MSCEIT, V.2
Synopsis of Chapter 7 from
The MSCEIT, V.2 Technical Manual
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 77-88)
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Appendix C
The Reliability and Validity of the MSCEIT, V.2,
A Synopsis of Chapter 7,
The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 77-88)

The MSCEIT, V.2 instrument used in this study was designed by
John D. Mayer, Ph.D. of the University of New Hampshire, Peter Salovey, Ph.D.
of Yale University, and David R. Caruso, Ph.D., and was scored and administered
by Multi-Health Systems, Inc. of Toronto, Canada at www.mhs.com. The
MSCEIT, V.2 instrument "has been designed to produce a highly reliable full
scale score, and highly reliable branch scores" (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000b, p. 77). For the scale group of branch scores on the MSCEIT, V.2,
the coefficient alpha of reliability for each branch is as follows: for Branch IX,
Perceiving Emotions, alpha = .87, based on 1,211 test participants; for Branch 2X,
Facilitation of Emotions, alpha = .76, based on 1,500 test participants; for Branch
3X, Understanding Emotions, alpha = .73, based on 1,561 test participants; for
Branch 4X, Managing Emotions, alpha = .82, based on 1,334 test participants
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 78). The Technical Manual
recommends the reliability of the MSCEIT, V.2 branch scores for interpretation
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 78).
The MSCEIT, V.2 was "intended to measure one unified area of
ability: emotional intelligence, that can be subdivided into subsidiary areas of
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skill. This will be the case only if the various subscales.. .intercorrelate
positively ...(and) That is the case..." (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000b, p. 79). Although some data were not available for some tasks, the
available data showing intercorrelations among the individual Tasks—the Faces,
Pictures, Synesthesia, Facilitation, Changes, Blends, Emotional Relationships and
Emotions Management Tasks—are all positive (MHS, Inc./M ayer, Salovey and
Caruso, 2000b, p. 79).
Issues of validity are concerned with "face validity" which means
"whether a test appears to measure w hat it is supposed to measure. As noted in
the introduction (to The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual), people mean more than
one thing by 'Emotional Intelligence.' Some people think of it as denoting
warmth, motivation, and persistence; others view it as a mental ability....When
people review, or take, the MSCEIT, the face validity of the test is immediately
apparent. The ability to perceive emotions, via the Faces Task, for instance, has a
great deal of face validity. Asking the test taker about a mood's impact on
thinking, such as in the Facilitation Task, or which strategies are more effective in
emotional situations, such as in the Emotions Management Task, are readily
identifiable by test takers as measures of emotional intelligence (MHS,
Inc./M ayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). The only part of the test that
some test takers have reported as "odd" or "different" than other tests they
have taken are the Tasks that measure "the ability to employ emotions to think
creatively an d /o r to solve problems" but, "Typically, it is also our experience
that these people also score in the below average range (on these Tasks)" (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80).
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"Content, or Sampling, Validity has to do with whether a test's
items are rationally drawn from the domains that the test is supposed to cover.
The 1997 ability theory of emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1997) was
designed to capture the most important skills composing emotional intelligence.
The MSCEIT, in turn, was designed to measure emotional intelligence according
to that theory...and draws sufficient items from each of the four branches of the
model to measure them comprehensively. At the same time, some pragmatic
compromises were made. For example, Branch 1 items sample from the
'perception'...rather than from the 'expression' portion...because it is technically
expensive to assess the expression of emotion. Fortunately, emotionally
expressive behavior may be highly correlated with the ability to perceive
emotion" (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). Hence the
content validity of the MSCEIT,m V.2 scale can be "summarized as a good
representation of the (1997) model, incorporating pragmatic compromises"
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80).
The predictive validity of the MSCEIT, V.2 has yet to be fully
determined because "Actual completed studies with the MSCEIT are few in
number as-of-yet)" (MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80).
However, the first version of the MSCEIT, the MEIS, has been used in a number
of research studies in relation to ability, personality and behavior measures
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). Hence "it is reasonable to
expect that the MSCEIT will predict criteria similar to that of the MEIS" (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 80). Relevant to this dissertation's
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study are the relationships already determined between emotional intelligence
and general intellectual ability, using the MEIS which preceded the MSCEIT, V.2.
Using 503 test participants who took the MEIS and the Army Alpha Vocabulary
Test, a correlation of test scores found that r = .36, significant at the p<.01 level;
two other studies using 239 participants and 208 participants to take the Army
Alpha Vocabulary Test and the MEIS, found correlations of r = .38 and r = .37,
respectively, significant at the pc.Ol level. For self-reported Grade Point
Average, a correlation with the MEIS scores was .53, significant at the p<.01 level
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 81).
A strong correlation between "satisfaction with life" and emotional
intelligence has also been determined at r = .61, significant at the pc.Ol level,
using 35 test participants, a Satisfaction with Life Scale and MEIS test scores
(MHS, Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, p. 84).
The construct validity of the MSCEIT, V.2 "refers to whether a test
truly measures the concept it claims to measure. The MSCEIT was designed to
measure an intelligence as described by the four-branch ability model...(e.g.,
Mayer and Salovey, 1997). That is, it is supposed to measure a person's ability to
carry out valid abstract reasoning in the area of emotions, as indicated by the
capacity to perceive, facilitate, understand, and manage emotions.
"The construct validity of a test is generally established over many
years of research with the instrument. Each study with a test contributes, in
effect, to the test's construct validation. If the test behaves in a theoretically
expectable manner, then the test's construct validity is enhanced. If the test
contradicts what scientists would expect to happen on the basis of prior theory
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and research concerning the concept, then the test's construct validity is
undermined.
"Research with the MSCEIT is still at an early stage. Nonetheless,
the findings discussed above (Chapter 7 of The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual)
concerning the MSCEIT's content, criterion, and structural validity, may all be
used as evidence for the test's construct validity.
"The MSCEIT also has a beautiful subfactor pattern. Results from
one of the two factor analyses...(show)...a clear four-factor pattern.
Remarkably, every task loaded most highly on its predicted factor. The
other—maximum likelihood—factor analysis was about the same" (MHS,
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b, pp. 89-90). A pattern matrix using a
Principal Axis Factoring, forcing four factors, was one of the factor analyses cited,
and can be found with other statistical data indicating the validity and reliability
of the MSCEIT, V.2, in Chapter 7 of The MSCEIT. V.2 Technical Manual (MHS.
Inc./Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2000b) whose distribution and use are
administered by MHS, Inc. of Canada at www.mhs.com.
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Appendix D

Proposal for Research Use of Human Subjects
and Informed Consent Agreement

(School of Education-Human Subjects Review Committee,
SOE-HSRC, 2000/2001)
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Dates

April 3, 2001

To:

School of Education Human Subjects Review Committee,
College of William and Mary

From:

Betsy Edison, Ph.D. Candidate, Higher Education
College of William and Mary

Subject:

Review of Research Involving Human Subjects using
a Diagnostic Psychology Test, the MSCEIT V. for
Completion of EPPL 765 Advanced Research Course.

1.
Please find attached my EPPL 765 Research Proposal
employing the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test
Version 2 (MSCEIT V.2) as the research instrument. Included is the
Informed Consent Agreement for your review, in compliance with the
Code of Federal Regulations for research involving human subjects.
As described in detail in the attached proposal, my human subjects
will be undergraduates at the College of William and Mary. I
understand that each participant in my research project is
required to read and sign the Informed Consent Agreement before
being permitted to take the MSCEIT V.2.
2.
The MSCEIT V.2 is administered by Multi-Health
Systems of Canada for the ongoing research of Professors Jack
Mayer of the University of New Hampshire and Peter Salovey, Chair
of the Psychology Department at Yale University. Use of the MSCEIT
V.2 on Internet is given to academic researchers with permission
from Professors Mayer and Salovey, until June 1, 2001. The MSCEIT
V.2 would be taken in April-May 2001 by selected William and Mary
undergraduates (who have been selected but not contacted pending
SOC-HSRC approval) .
3.
The purpose of this research is to contribute to
the existing new body of research literature, in both higher
education and psychology of learning, by finding the correlation
between emotional intelligence and high academic achievement in a
selected sample of undergraduates at the College of William and
Mary.
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PROPOSAL ADDENDUM
Date:January 10, 2002
To:
Human Subjects Review Committee-School of Education
College of William and Mary
From:

Betsy Edison, Ph.D. Candidate, School of Education,
College of William and Mary

Subject:

Additional Research Involving Human Subjects who were
Tested April-October 2001 with the MSCEIT V.2
Proposed Addition of an MSCEIT, V.2 Focus Group
for Completion of EPPL 765
1.

The proposed addition of a qualitative Focus Group

would complement the quantitative research data already collected
by testing undergraduate students at the College of William and
Mary during April-October 2001, using the Mayer Salovey Caruso
Emotional Intelligence Test, Version 2 (MSCEIT, V.2) as the
research instrument, for which testing the SOE-HSRC approval was
given in April 2001.

2.

Only students already tested and scored on the

MSCEIT, V.2 would be invited to participate in a Focus Group.
These students signed the SOE-HSRC approved Informed Consent
Agreement for taking the MSCEIT, V.2.
Consent Agreement - Focus Group"

The additional "Informed

(please see attached) would also

be signed by all Focus Group participants, and is hereby submitted
for SOE-HSRC approval in compliance with the Code of Federal
Regulations for research involving human subjects.

Human subjects

are all undergraduates at the College of William and Mary.
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3.

The MSCEIT V.2 is administered by Multi-Health

Systems of Canada for the ongoing research of Professors Jack
Mayer of the University of New Hampshire and Peter Salovey, Chair
of the Psychology Department at Yale University. Use of the MSCEIT
V.2 on Internet was given to academic researchers with permission
from Professors Mayer and Salovey.

4.

Precis of the Quantitative Part of this Study

Approved in April 2001 bv SOE-HSRC: The purpose of this research
is to contribute to an existing but relatively new body of
research literature still emerging in educational psychology, by
finding the quantitative correlation between emotional
intelligence and achievement, using MSCEIT, V.2 test scores and
achievement data for a sample of undergraduates at the College of
William and Mary.

The Research Hypothesis
This research is testing to see if there is a relationship between
achievement and Emotional Intelligence (E.I.). The null hypothesis
is that the scores of high achievers do not differ from the scores
of normals. The other null hypothesis is that there is a zero
correlation between achievement and E.I.

5.

The Need for a Qualitative Addendum: According to

the designers of the MSCEIT, V.2 (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso,
2000), "...There are reasons to be excited both about emotional
intelligence and the variables that predict success....(but)...To
some extent, the fate of emotional intelligence measures is
connected to...better criteria of life activities (including
success)..." (Mayer, Salovery and Caruso, 2000, p. 416).
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Informed Consent Agreement

page 1 of 2

EPPL 765
Advanced Research Project
Graduate School of Education at the College of William and Mary
Research Contact: Betsy Edison

edison2OO10e a r t h l i n k .n e t

Informed Consent Agreement
1.
By answering the scale item questions on the MayerSalovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence-Test Version 2 (MSCEIT V.2),
a standardized diagnostic psychology test accessed on Internet
Explorer, you will be participating in a higher education research
project at the College of William and Mary.
2.
The purpose of this research project is to find the
correlation between emotional intelligence and high achievement in
undergraduate higher education. The research question asks if
undergraduate high achievers are also emotionally intelligent.
The research question is two-fold: Are undergraduate 'normal'
achievers as emotionally intelligent as undergraduate high
achievers at the College of William and Mary?
3.

Expected duration of your participation is 30 minutes.

4.
There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts
that may occur as a result of participating in this research.
5.
There are no compensation or treatments available if
injury occurs due to the non-risk status of your participation.
6.
You may contact Graduate School of Education researcher,
Betsy Edison, Ph.D. candidate in Higher Education with a Cognate
in Psychology of Learning, College of William and Mary, at
edison2001@earthlink.net by email, or by calling (757) 565-5465,
for answers to any pertinent questions about the research or your
rights as a research subject.
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Informed Consent Agreement

Page 2 of 2

7.
Your participation in this research project is
voluntary: refusal to participate will not result in penalty. You
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty.
8.
Confidentiality of test participation will be ensured
because your computerized test will contribute to a group average
or mean, to be used to determine the standard deviation from the
mean, a group (not individualized) number to be quantitatively
analyzed within a larger database of statistics, which will
maintain participant confidentiality.
9.
Appropriate alternative procedures or courses of
treatment related to emotional intelligence development and
research, that might be advantageous to participants in this
research project, may be requested from Multi-Health Systems, Inc.
which administers the MSCEIT V.2, at www.mhs.com.
10. Benefits to the participant and/or to others that may
reasonably be expected from this research include Mayer and
Salovey's concept that 'emotional intelligence' is a measurable
ability that can be acquired in order to use feelings to motivate,
plan, and achieve in one's life.

Participant Name (Print)

(Date)

Participant Signature

(Date)
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Informed Consent Agreement - Focus Group

page 1 of 2

Graduate School of Education at the College of William and Mary
Research Contact: Betsy Edison

ediaon20019earthlink.net

I n fo r m e d C o n s e n t A g r e e m e n t
1.
By discussing questions presented to you in the MSCEIT,
V.2 Focus Group (the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-IntelligenceTest, Version 2 Focus Group), you will be participating in a
higher education research project at the College of William and
Mary.
2.
The purpose of this Focus Group is to gather qualitative
data for the better understanding of the quantitative correlation
sought by this study, between emotional intelligence and
achievement in undergraduate higher education.
3.

Expected duration of your participation is 45 minutes.

4.
There are no reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts
that may occur as a result of participating in this research.
5.
There are no compensations or treatments available due
to the non-risk status of your participation.
6.
You may contact Graduate School of Education researcher,
Betsy Edison, Ph.D. candidate in Higher Education with a Cognate
in Psychology of Learning, College of William and Mary, at
edison2001gearthlink.net by email, or by calling (757) 565-5465,
for answers to any pertinent questions about the research or your
rights as a research subject.
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Informed Consent Agreement- Focus Group

7.
Your participation in this research project is
voluntary: refusal to participate will not result in penalty. You
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty.
8.
Confidentiality of test participation will be ensured
because your comments will be qualitatively synthesized (not
individualized) into predominant themes, expressions, and most
frequently arising ideas in an analysis of this data that will not
cite names of participants but only predominant themes, which will
maintain participant confidentiality.
9.
Appropriate alternative procedures or courses of
treatment and information related to emotional intelligence
development and research, that might be advantageous to
participants in this research project, may be requested from
Multi-Health Systems, Inc., which administers the MSCEIT V.2, at
www.mhs.com.
10. Benefits to the participant and/or to others that may
reasonably be expected from this research include Mayer and
Salovey's concept that 'emotional intelligence' is a measurable
ability that can be acquired in order to use feelings to motivate,
plan, and achieve in one's life.

Participant Name (Print)

(Date)

Participant Signature

(Date)
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Appendix E

Histograms, Significant Correlations
and Summary Data
of this Study
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B ranch IX Perception of Emotions
T ask A: T he Faces T ask
This task measures the partidpants's ability to identify, in a picture of a
person's face, what emotion that person is feeling (e.g., angry or happy).

Frequency

Std. Dev = 13.90
Mean = 101.1
N = 61.00
O ■O ■O ■O

O

O •O ■O •O Rq

°.q 'Tq °.c

Task A Scores
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Branch 2X Using Emotions
T ask B: T h e F a cilitatio n T ask
This task measures the partidpants's ability to recall personal knowledge
of how moods can interact and assist in certain kinds of problem-solving. This is a
recall-test of how a mood can support or impair thinking and reasoning in given
situations.

Frequency

Std. Dev = 15.22
Mean = 98.2
N = 61.00

■o ■o o •o -o -o ■o •o •o Q0

°.0 y.0 °.0

Task B Scores
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B ranch 3X

Understanding Emotions

TaskC: The Changes Task
This task measures the partidpants's ability to understand how
"emotional chains" or "families of related emotions" form and transition from one to
another, for example, how frustration can change to sadness or anger. This measures
knowledge o f experiencing possibly conflicting emotioins in certain situations.
Frequency

Std. Dev = 10.50
Mean = 108.9
N = 61.00

Task C Scores
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Branch 4X

Managing Emotions

Task D: The Emotion Management Task
This task measures the partidpants's ability to choose alternative actions
in achieving a cetain result. The test-taker is asked to rate the effectiveness of optional
dedsions and actions in situations where a person has to regulate their ow n emotions.

Frequency

Std. Dev = 11.20
Mean = 104.6
N = 61.00

■o -s -o -s- -o s -o

-o -s

Task D Scores
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Branch IX Perception of Emotions
T ask E: T h e P ictu res T ask
This task measures the participants's ability to determine which emotions
are being expressed in typical pictures of the environment, such as in a landscape
picture or in a picture of rocks.

Frequency

Std. Dev = 15.61
Mean = 97.9
N = 61.00

•O ‘O ■O ■O ■O -O ■O •O •O O

° . q S- q 0 . q S- q ° . q

Task E Scores
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Branch 2X

Using Emotions

Task F: The Sensations Task
This task measures the participants's ability to compare different emotions
to different sensations, such as to light, color, and temperature sensations. In order to
do this successfully (for a high score), the test-taker must theoretically generate a
certain mood in order to then reason with that m ood and "let the feeling direct
thinking" in comparing a mood's qualities to a sensation, such as an angry mood and
the color yellow.

Frequency
101

----------------------------------------------

Std. Dev = 11.31
Mean = 99.6
N = 61.00

Task F Scores
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Branch 3X

Understanding Emotions

Task G: The Blends Task
This task measures the participants's ability to connect situations with
certain emotions (e.g., knowing that a situation involving a loss can make someone
sad).

Frequency

Std. Dev = 9.99
Mean = 110.5

Task G Scores
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Branch 4X

Managing Emotions

Task H: Social Management Task (Emotions in Relationships)
This task measures the partidpants's ability to evaluate how effective
different actions would be in achieving an outcome involving the emotions of other
people.

Frequency

Std. Dev = 11.15
Mean = 103.9
N = 61.00

■o ■o ■o -o -o •o ■o ■o ■o °.Q ±0 Q0

°.0

Task H Scores
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Branch Scores
Frequency

Std. Dev = 15.34
Mean = 99.5
N = 61.00

BRANCH 1X

Frequency

Std. Dev = 12.96
Mean = 98.6
65.0
75.0
85.0
95.0
105.0 115.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0 110.0 120.0

BRANCH2X
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Branch Scores
Frequency

Std. Dev = 9.58
Mean = 111.1
N = 61.00

\O rO ' 'vT -O ' ovT -6■
f°o °<p0s 0> /o v <r
C> vT ^o-S-O S-O-J- 'O -S--0-S-0
BRANCH3X
Frequency
161412 -

IQ
S'

2

Std. Dev = 10.93
Mean = 104.7

0

N = 61.00
65.0
75.0
85.0
95.0
105.0 115.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0 110.0 120.0

BRANCH4X
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MSCEITOX: Summary score of Branches IX, 2X, 3X, 4X

Frequency

Std. Dev = 11.76
Mean = 103.7
N = 61.00
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0 110.0 120.0
75.0
85.0
95.0
105.0 115.0 125.0

MSCETTOX
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T-Test
Group Statistics

BRANCH3X

GENDER
Male
Female

N

Mean
106.56447
112.87241

17
44

Std. Deviation
8.42961324
9.49905974

Std. Error
Mean
2.0444815
1.4320371

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Eaualitv of Variances
F
BRANCH3X

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Sig.
.003

.953

Independent Samples Test
t-test for Ecuafity of Means
df

t
BRANCH 3X

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Sig. (2-tailed)

-2.395

59

.020

-6.3079385

-2.527

32.629

.017

-6.3079385

Independent Samples Test

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Std Error
Upper
Lower
Difference
BRANCH3X

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Mean
Difference

2.63333750

-11.57723

-1.038642

2.49612400

-11.38854

-1.227339
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T-Test
Group Statistics

BRANCH4X

GENDER
Male
Female

N

Mean
17 100.09541
44 jpg-apa?*.

Std. Deviation
10.55602145
10.65373618

Std. Error
Mean
2.5602113
1.6061112

Independent Samples Test
Levene’s Test for
Eaualitv of Variances
F
BRANCH4X

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Siq.
.158

.693

Independent Samples Test
t-test for Ecualitv of Means
df

t
BRANCH4X

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

-2.113

59

.039

-6.4139291

-2.122

29.379

.042

-6.4139291

Independent Samples Test

t-test for Equalitv of Means
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Std. Error
Upper
Lower
Difference
BRANCH4X

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances

3.03485624

-12.48666

-.34119583

3.02229627

-12.59176

-.23609742
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Correlations
Correlations
GPA
BRANCH4X
Pearson Correlation
1
.314*
Sig. (2-tailed)
.014
N
61
61
BRANCH4X
Pearson Correlation
.314*
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
.014
N
61
61
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

GPA

C orrelations
Correlations
GPA
BRANCH3X
Pearson Correlation
1
.432*'
Sig. (2-tailed)
.001
N
61
61
BRANCH3X
Pearson Correlation
1
.432**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.001
N
61
61
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

GPA

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Correlations
Correlations
HSRANK
BRANCH3X
Pearson Correlation
1
-.269*
Sig. (2-tailed)
.041
N
58
58
BRANCH3X
Pearson Correlation
-.269*
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
.
.041
N
58
61
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
HSRANK
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INSIDE THE PEARSON CORRELATION:
U nd erstand ing Emotions
GPA 3.6 to 4.0
GPA 3.0 to 3.59
GPA Below 3.0

Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 113
Mean MSCEIT, V.2 sco re = 1 1 1
Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 100

Note th e 13-point scores difference in U n derstan din g Emotions,
for higher GPAs v ersu s lower GPAs.

Managing Emotions
GPA 3.6 to 4.0
GPA 3.0 to 3.59
GPA Below 3.0

Mean MSCEIT, V.2 sco re = 106
Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 104
Mean MSCEIT, V.2 score = 97

Note th e 9-point sco res-d ifference in Managing Emotions
for higher GPAs v ersu s lower GPAs.

